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Chairs: Jan Svejnar; Jagadeesh Sivadasan
This dissertation comprises three essays on two themes in international trade – volatility
and innovation. I explore how volatility influences exporters’ choices of foreign destinations,
how innovation is spurred by export participation and foreign investment, and how countries
adopt a policy innovation – a treaty that facilitates the creation of enforceable international
trade contracts.
In the first chapter, I develop a simple model of trade with heterogeneous firms facing
stochastic demand. As those firms incur adjustment costs in response to market fluctuations,
the model predicts that fewer firms will enter destinations with high demand volatility - those
destinations are less profitable. I test the prediction using data on the universe of Chinese
exports at the firm level. The data show that fewer exporters serve destinations with high
demand volatility.
The second chapter of the dissertation compares the effects of foreign direct investment
and exporting on product innovation. Governments in many developing economies try to
stimulate innovation and private-sector growth with policies that promote exports or attract
foreign investment. Using a rich firm level database of Chinese manufacturing and industrial
enterprises, I show that exporting is a stronger predictor of product innovation than foreign
investment. Firms that receive foreign investment tend to engage in more product innovation,
but not at the same level as the firms that learn by exporting.
The third dissertation chapter discusses the adoption of innovations. The policy innova-
tion I consider is a trade treaty that allows private parties to create enforceable international
x
trade contracts, even in the absence of a common legal jurisdiction. Private international ar-
bitration between importers and exporters are enforced by the national courts of signatories
to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (NYC). This treaty makes private international arbitration a viable legal alternative
to trading on reputation or self-enforcement. Surprisingly, many countries waited decades to
join the NYC despite the obvious benefits. I show in this chapter that peer effects contribute
to countries’ adoption of the treaty. Countries with regional trade agreement partners that
are NYC members have a higher hazard of participating in the treaty.
xi
CHAPTER I
Demand Volatility and Export Entry
Chapter Abstract
This chapter asks whether and how demand volatility affects exporters’ choices of for-
eign destinations. All export destinations exhibit volatility, with demand from some being
more volatile than others. To answer the question, I develop a simple model of trade with
heterogeneous firms facing stochastic demand. Firms in the model incur adjustment costs
in response to fluctuations in demand. This model predicts that fewer exporters will serve
destinations with higher demand volatility, as adjustment costs decrease profits. I test this
prediction using data on the universe of Chinese exports from 2000 to 2006 at the firm level.
As expected, fewer exporters in the data enter destinations with high demand volatility.
Additional firm level regressions show a negative and statistically significant relationship
between demand volatility and aggregate trade levels.
1.1 Introduction
Demand volatility is an undeniable feature of international trade. While aggregate trade
figures may hide this fact, as global trade growth remained consistently near 6% since the
nineties, trade at more disaggregated levels show a different pattern. In the average year,
11% of trade destinations represented by product-country combinations experience a shock
that reduces demand to zero. Generally, for imports of specific products to most countries,
year-on-year growth shocks cover the full spectrum of negative and positive values.
The drivers of demand volatility include income shocks, government policy and sectoral
specialization by firms in the macro-economy. Foreign destinations exhibit different levels of
1
demand volatility because these factors vary by product and country, and demand fluctua-
tions reflect these factors, which are beyond individual firms’ control. I characterize export
destinations by the volatility of historical demand, joining a long tradition of scholarship on
demand shocks that are exogenous to firm level prices (Blum et al., 2013; Rob and Vettas,
2003; Staiger and Wolak, 1992; Viner, 1922). In proposing that demand shocks may be
exogenous to firms and their technical efficiency, the paper follows Foster et al. (2008).
Do exporters avoid destinations with high demand volatility? Phrased differently, do
exporters choose country and product combinations with low demand volatility over similar
destinations high demand volatility? The question is relevant to understanding how volatility
determines the margins of international trade, and to the exporter choices that lead to
aggregate trade values.
To address the question formally, this paper develops a model of trade with adjustment
costs.1 Expected profits fall with adjustment costs, e.g. the costs of hiring in times of peak
demand or deactivating equipment during lulls. With lower expected profits, fewer firms
will find entry into a given destination profitable. Firms in the model are heterogeneous in
terms of productivity, so that the more productive are able to enter destinations across a
wider range of demand volatility. The model’s predictions for trade’s extensive margin are
unambiguous: destinations with high demand volatility will have fewer exporters and lower
levels of trade.
I take the model’s predictions to a unique combination of firm-level and global trade
data: I observe the destination choices of exporters from the universe of Chinese export
transactions between 2000 and 2006, and measure demand volatility using aggregate im-
ports between 1995 and 2005 for each of these destinations. I define destinations as the
import stream for unique product-country combinations, like the US imports of truck tires,
or Kenyan imports of bicycles. The UN COMTRADE database provides this trade informa-
tion for narrowly defined HS6 product categories at the country level. Using global demand
to estimate demand volatility addresses possible concerns that firm-level shocks drive the
measured volatility, rather than patterns of markets’ demand.2
The data show a negative and statistically significant relationship between demand
1 A robust body of work in microeconomics and macroeconomics describes the nature of labor and capital
adjustment costs, and how they influence aggregate economic outcomes, e.g. (Bloom et al., 2007; Cooper
and Haltiwanger, 2006; Pindyck, 1982; Lucas, 1967). Of these, Lucas (1967) raises the specific concern that
adjustments change producer’s per-unit costs - an idea that features notably in my model.
2Using Chinese firm-level data is informative for an empirical exercise that describes exporter behavior.
China is the world’s largest exporter. Furthermore, the high level of correlation between China’s aggregate
exports and the rest of the world suggests that its exporters behave like firms of other nationalities.
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volatility and export entry. First, the likelihood of zero entry is higher for destinations with
high demand volatility. It is about 20% more likely that at least one Chinese firm exports
to a destination with zero demand volatility relative to an otherwise identical destination
at the opposite extreme of demand volatility near 1. The average likelihood of export entry
decreases by 2.8% with one deviation from the mean value of demand volatility. With the
liberalization that accompanied China’s WTO accession in 2001, the number of exporters
nearly tripled between 2000 and 2006, therefore entry is an important measure of exporters’
responses to markets in the period of trade expansion covered by my data.
Second, conditional on having at least one Chinese exporter, the number of exporters
serving a destination is 5 to 10% lower for destinations with demand volatility one standard
deviation above the mean, depending on the measure of volatility adopted. The negative
estimated effect of demand volatility on entry holds up to alternative definitions of demand
volatility, export entry and a variety of specifications that address concerns about the causal
nature of this relationship. The effect of demand volatility on trade is not limited to the
extensive margin – the value of exports to destinations are 2% lower with a one standard
deviation increase in demand volatility in my more conservative estimates.
The findings imply that the prospect of adjustment costs deters firms from incurring the
up-front costs of exporting to destinations with high demand volatility. I define adjustment
costs in this paper to broadly include capital adjustment costs, as well as the costs of firing
and hiring employees. From an exporter’s perspective, the findings support the argument in
Cuñat and Melitz (2012) that countries may derive a comparative advantage in exporting
products with highly volatile demand if they have flexible labor regimes – and therefore
lower labor adjustment costs. One can make broad statements about exporter behavior and
demand volatility based on these findings for two reasons: Chinese exports are correlated
with global exports (Amiti and Freund, 2010), and China is currently the world’s largest
exporter.
For an importing country, demand volatility represents a potential barrier to economic
growth. Most producers in developing economies use imported inputs, usually imported
capital goods (Connolly, 2003). In the data, I find that prices are slightly higher for Chinese
exports of capital goods to destinations with high demand volatility. Controlling for quality
differences should make these price differences starker. The literature generally finds lower
prices in the developing economy destinations where high levels of demand volatility are more
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common, e.g. Manova and Zhang (2012) and Harrigan et al. (2011).3 Demand volatility also
leads to fewer imported varieties after controlling for other determinants of trade. Firms
in destinations with high demand volatility therefore lose the potential benefits of new and
more imported varieties described in Goldberg et al. (2010).
Based on the foregoing, market-specific patterns of demand volatility can contribute
to our understanding of aggregate trade, its extensive margins and the presence of zeros.
They complement the explanation for zeros in trade and the large body of work on the
determinants of trade. Helpman et al. (2008) shows that zero bilateral trade is more likely
with long distances or high marginal costs. This paper extends the idea, suggesting that
high adjustment costs due to demand volatility can also increase the occurrence of zero
trade. Others describe the determinants of trade in terms of firm-level productivity and
geographically-driven trade costs, e.g., Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) and Melitz (2003).
This paper suggests a role for a market feature like demand volatility. In addition to providing
evidence that volatility influences exporter choice, the paper contributes to the literature in
three ways.
First, by focusing on the decisions of firms to serve specific combinations of products and
countries, I provide an approach for explaining firm level trade choices that country-level
measures like GDP, exchange rates and geographic distance may not adequately capture.
My units of observation are destinations represented by product-country combinations, like
the US imports of bicycles: The GDP of the US may not be relevant to a Chinese exporter
of bicycles if GDP is a poor predictor of the demand for bicycles in particular. To such an
exporter, historical information on imports of bicycles into each potential foreign market is
more valuable.4 Therefore, this paper describes demand from destinations as a random walk
with a constant growth trend, following Carroll et al. (2011) and Hall (2004). Exporters
forecast profits from the volatility and trend observed in each destination’s demand history,
and enter markets on that basis. Market-specific volatility for a given product reflects income,
policy or other transactional frictions not explained by equilibrium prices.
3This finding in section I.A.8 agrees with the evidence in Eaton and Kortum (2001) that capital goods
have higher relative prices in developing economies (where I find the most volatility). Other papers that find
lower prices for exports to developing economies do not focus on specific sub-categories like capital goods,
which make up less than 11% of global exports.
4 Most exporters serve few foreign destinations. The median number of products and countries per
exporter in the data are 5 and 4 respectively. Country-level measures like GDP mask shocks that may be
important to firms that focus on a few product categories. For example, US imports of pure fructose (HS
170250) are more volatile than Rwandan imports of truck tires (HS 401120). The two countries’ aggregate
measures of GDP and demand volatility are at opposite ends of the spectrum.
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Second, the paper extends the literature on investment under uncertainty to the context
of trade. The initial costs of setting up overseas trading networks are analogous to invest-
ments made in the expectation of future returns. Future demand is not known, but rational
agents characterize its expected value using historical information. This yields new testable
insights on export entry. If adjustment costs are expected to be higher for destinations with
high demand volatility, then fewer exporters should serve those destinations. Recent related
papers show that policy uncertainty reduces exports, when trade costs are driven by policy
(Handley and Limão, 2012, 2013). In that context, exporters are more likely to invest in
foreign destinations with stable tariff regimes. Earlier work by Dixit (1989) shows that with
uncertain prices, firms require prices above a certain threshold to expand their operations.
The same relationship between uncertainty and investment holds for exchange rate uncer-
tainty (Das et al., 2007; Frankel and Rose, 2002; Glick and Rose, 2002). The novelty in this
paper is its focus on demand, as the volatility of trade costs, prices and exchange rates only
explain small shares of the variation in trade.
Finally, I provide a simple and intuitive measure of volatility: i.e. the sum of squared
deviations from a trend for a series. I use a linear trend, though the measure is flexible enough
to admit other trend specifications. Others define volatility as the standard deviation of year-
on-year growth rates, but measuring growth rates is problematic when observations include
zero.5 The index of volatility introduced by this paper avoids such issues of measurement.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 presents a stylized model
in the tradition of Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008) to motivate the empirics. Section
1.3 follows, with the data, formal definitions for key variables, empirical specifications and
results. Section 1.4 discusses the implications and concludes.
1.2 Model
1.2.1 Adjustment Costs with Stochastic Demand
In this model, exporters decide on foreign destinations using information on historical
demand shocks. Exporters can form unbiased expectations of demand for each year in a
forward-looking planning horizon, given the trajectory of past demand. Previous related
papers model demand uncertainty in a framework that requires exporters to learn about
5One can correct the conventional measure of growth volatility by using a mid-point growth measure,
which bounds growth between -2 and 2, but it does not help that those extreme values of growth may be
outliers that skew the measure of volatility.
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demand e.g. Akhmetova and Mitaritonna (2012) and Nguyen (2011). In that context, the
conditional distribution of possible demand outcomes is taken as unknown. In this paper, the
conditional distribution of demand outcomes depends only on historical demand realizations.
In other words, firms form expectations of volatility and future demand for each des-
tination from its historical demand. For example, a destination that imports exactly $1m
for all years between 1995 and 2005 will lead all exporters to expect little no growth, and
negligible demand volatility. (Past volatility is taken as the predictor of future volatility).
This aggregate import volatility described in the paper applies to all exporters, as historical
demand is common knowledge to all firms.6
I illustrate the section’s main idea using refineries. Updating the capacity of a refinery
in production is costly. For a refinery that exports, each production run incurs upfront
customization costs, as gasoline and diesel blends differ by country. Therefore, before a
refiner enters a foreign destination, it must consider the usual per-unit marginal costs, the
upfront customization costs and the costs of capacity adjustments expected in its planning
horizon for that destination. The hypothetical demand trajectories in Figure 2.1 illustrate
the relevance of capacity adjustments. Judging from the plots of historical demand, the two
destinations in the graph have the same expected size, but the scales of deviations from
the expected trajectory of demand differ. As the producer must consider the relative costs
of scaling production to match demand in each period, the destination on the right panel
becomes more preferable if the historical pattern of volatility persists.
Exporters only serve destinations with non-negative expected profits – after accounting
for adjustment costs. With adjustment costs, some marginally profitable destinations with
high demand volatility become unprofitable.7 For the refinery example that motivates this
section, a rational exporter may find the destination on the right panel of the figure profitable,
but avoid the destination on the left. Large production scale adjustments reduce realized
profits, as documented in the literature on adjustment costs (Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006;
Lucas, 1967).
6One could conceptually create firm-specific measures of demand volatility that use weighted composites
of the demand history for each firm’s target destinations. Larger shocks at the firm-level may make such a
firm-specific measure higher than the currently proposed destination-specific measure – the differences may
be more notable for new entrants or small firms. However, the relationship between these two conceptions
of demand volatility depends on the ’diversification effect’ - where demand shocks offset one another for
multi-destination exporters, which account for the largest share of exports.
7 The model proposed here reverts to a conventional model of trade if one collapses the planning horizon
to one period, and presumes perfect information about future demand. Adjustment costs disappear with
these additional assumptions. In that sense, this paper extends the conventional model of trade to include
multi-period sales and information.
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The graph is purely illustrative - its two hypothetical destinations have equal average size, but different levels
of demand volatility. The horizontal line represents projected demand and vertical lines represent deviations
from the demand trajectory.
Destinations with high demand volatility and expected adjustment costs will attract fewer
exporters – as long as expected demand volatility reflects the observed demand history.
Demand volatility measures the variability in demand over time, and as expected, high
demand volatility corresponds to high adjustment costs for firms serving a destination. The
next steps relate demand volatility to profits.




{pijk ∗ qijkt − ĉijk(1 + adjustment costsijkt)qijkt} − Sjk (1.1)
pijk = unit price
qijkt = quantity sold




= standard unit costs
p and q represent the prices and quantities for firm i in the planning horizon that covers
periods t ∈ [1, H]. ĉijk, the standard unit production cost captures τjk, the combined per-unit
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costs of inputs like labor and materials, which are specific to product j, and trade factors like
shipping and tariffs for destination k. It also accounts for the firm’s productivity φij. Firms
with higher productivity φ will therefore have lower unit costs and higher profits per unit
sold. (For parsimony, the model ignores temporal discounting and simply sums profits from
period 1 to H; a reasonable approximation if the planning horizon is short and the discount
rate is small).
Adjustment costs may be overtime wage costs, equipment capacity modification or hiring
and firing costs. I adopt the convex quadratic form proposed in Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006):8





The γj term is a product-specific scaling parameter. It enables comparisons in the cross-
section of destinations. For example, the cost implications of a 20% growth shock to demand
are different for an auto manufacturer, compared to a maker of tee-shirts. Each sector faces
different relative costs of updating production capacity. γj captures these differences in scale
adjustment cost differences. q∗ijkt is the planned production scale or capacity for firm i in
period t.9
In the adjustment costs function, q − q∗ represent deviations from the production scale,
or the height of the vertical lines in Figure 2.1. Unit production costs should depend on
the proximity of actual production to the expected production scale. Several recent papers
show that production scale adjustments alter marginal costs (Blum et al., 2013; Soderbery,
2013; Ahn and McQuoid, 2012). (The foregoing implicitly assumes that the cost of chang-
ing production scale from q∗jkt−1 to q
∗
jkt is zero, because such changes follow the planned
8Costs are symmetric around q∗ in equation (1.2); this makes the model tractable, although cost symmetry
may only be a crude approximation to the data.
9The additive form specified in equation (1.1) for adjustment costs ensures that unit costs will not be
zero for the hypothetical destination with zero demand volatility. This structure also allows one to measure
adjustment costs’ effects separately from other components of unit costs, which improves on related papers
that also consider changing marginal costs with market-specific shocks (Vannoorenberghe, 2012; Ahn and
McQuoid, 2012; Liu, 2012).
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trajectory).10
Aggregate demand is stochastic, but the growth process for demand is known, given
the demand history. Therefore, exporters can characterize aggregate demand Q in each
destination and estimate expected profits from equations (1.1) and (1.2):
Qjkt = Q
∗
jkt(1 + νjkt) (1.3)
Q∗jkt, period t’s expected aggregate demand is estimated from the trajectory:
Q∗jkt = Q
∗
jk0(1 + tĝjk) (1.4)
The Qjk0 baseline and the expected growth trend ĝjk in (1.4) come from historical data.
11
Demand volatility σ2jk represents the second moment of the distribution of the growth
innovations νjkt in equation (1.3), given that νjkt ∼ N(0, σ2jk). Assuming a normal distribu-
tion for ν helps to obtain a tractable form for expected profits shortly.12 (I adopt the linear




which approximates linear growth for small values of ĝjk).
From historical data one gets ĝjk, which characterizes Q
∗
jkt, as well as σ
2
jk, which fully
describes the expected shocks to demand, even if specific realizations of Qjkt are not known.
In the model, exporters estimate σ2 for each product-country destination once, and do not
update their estimates of demand volatility. This simplifying assumption helps to justify
tests in the cross-section of destinations in Section 1.3. I show that this assumption is
reasonable, based on tests in Section 1.3.2.3.
The next subsection derives exporters’ expected demand q∗ijk from the expected aggregate
demand Q∗jk. Firms’ profits and the decision to export to jk depend on qijk and q
∗
ijk.
10Alternatively, one could change the definition in (1.2):














The inclusion of planned investment costs, scaled by γp suggests biased estimates if γp is not equal to zero.
Taking γp as zero seems reasonable for two reasons: (1) the costs of adjusting scale upwards must be less
than profits from increased scale if one is to observe more firms in larger markets in equilibrium; (2) early
studies that do not consider expected demand find no statistically significant estimates for labor or capital
adjustment costs (Hall, 2004).
11Firms can forecast qijkt, given the history of Qjkt. Even with perfect information about future demand,
e.g., a firm like Boeing making airplanes to order, the demand stream with greater deviations from a stable
growth trajectory will incur higher adjustment costs, regular planned investments of labor and capital in
each period are less costly to implement than large swings. Having information on future demand may
reduce, but not eliminate those adjustment costs.
12Growth innovations in the data resemble a normal distribution near the mean. The (1 + ν) term
correspond to growth shocks in the Euler equations proposed by Carroll et al. (2011) and Hall (2004).
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1.2.2 Export Entry
The primary variable of interest is the number of exporters that find a destination prof-
itable, and therefore export to that destination. In the empirics, this translates to gross
export entry in the long run for trade destinations. This section explores the relationship
between this variable and demand volatility.
Exporter i producing its unique variety of product j for market k can expect to sell qijkt





pijk is the firm’s expected price, P is the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate price index and ε is the
elasticity of substitution between varieties of j. Qjkt is the aggregate demand for product
j in country k. The steps that follow assume no exporter is large enough to affect the P
index. As previously mentioned, Qjkt is stochastic.
For each destination, q∗ijk = E(qijk), the optimal production scale for an exporter is the
expected demand.13
From equations (1.2), (1.3) and (1.5):












The expected profits over the planning horizon from equation (1.1), (with risk-neutral ex-
porters and known sunk costs S):
E(Πijk) = E{[pijk −
τjk
φij
(1 + adjustment costsijkt)]qijkt} − Sjk
13The Envelope Theorem justifies this cost minimization, given the assumption that adjustment costs are
symmetric in equation (1.2). See more on this in Appendix Section I.B.1
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Substituting equation (1.6) and discarding t subscripts yields:



























































The E(ν2jk) term is σ
2
jk, as defined in the notes to equation (1.3). The E(ν
3
jk) term is zero,
being the third moment of a normal distribution.14 This gives the expected profit:







ijk − Sjk (1.7)
As in equation (1.1), standard unit costs are
τjk
φij
: the product of variable costs τ (mate-
rial, capital, labor inputs, shipping and tariffs), and the firm level productivity index 1
φ
.
Adjustment costs reduce expected profits.15
Firm-level prices determine expected profits, so the next steps focus on deriving prices
pijk. (Note that I abstract away from period-to-period price changes – each exporter’s
price is assumed invariant in the planning horizon for export entry). I also assume rational








= 0 =⇒ dE(Πijk)
dq∗ijk
= 0 (1.8)




















14One can get (1.7) from the profit function for adjustment costs that are any real-valued function of
the growth innovation ν. For a normal distribution with mean zero, σ2 the second moment of ν can fully
describe the terms of such a function i.e. higher order moments of ν.
15While the form in equation (1.7) is tractable enough to yield closed form solutions for firm level prices,
the model’s predictions will hold even if adjustment costs have a component that is fixed, or that does not
scale linearly with expected production q∗ijk. The challenge of deriving equilibrium prices with such extended













Prices in (1.9) take the same form as in conventional models of trade with heterogeneous
firms with one difference; unit costs include (1 + γjσ
2
jk) to reflect adjustment costs. This is
the expected price for firm i in destination jk. Firms with high productivity φjk will have
lower prices, assuming no quality differences.









































Only firms above a certain productivity threshold will be profitable in destination jk.
Applying the zero-profit entry condition to equation (1.10) identifies those firms. One gets














Of the Nj firms producing j, only a fraction Njk will export to destination jk. That
fraction could be as low as zero if none meets the φ∗jk threshold. Deriving the fraction Njk is
straightforward if one can describe the productivity of all producers of j with the distribution
G(.). I model Nj as an exogenous variable:
17
Njk = Nj(1−G(φ∗jk)) (1.12)
17 In assuming an exogenous mass of exporters, I follow others – notably, Chaney (2008) and Eaton et al.
(2004). Here Nj is the number of firms making product j, e.g., the number of firms that make bicycles,
regardless of export status or productivity. Njk represents firms whose productivity exceeds the threshold
for jk, given the assumed productivity distribution. Some producers of j will not export at all, if the lowest
threshold φ∗ of all possible markets is higher than firm productivity φij .
12
I take G(.) as the Pareto distribution.18.
Njk = Nj[1− (1− (φ∗jk)−θj)] = Nj(φ∗jk)−θj (1.13)
θj is the Pareto shape parameter for product j.
Equation (1.13) shows an unambiguous relationship between σ2 and Njk, (which suggests
a focus on the extensive margin of trade). φ∗jk is a function of τjk(1 + γjσ
2
jk), therefore Njk is
a function of σ2jk. In contrast, Section I.B.2 in the appendix models the relationship between
demand volatility and trade volumes, which is not as pointed as the relationship in (1.13).19
Substituting the threshold defined in equation (1.11) into (1.13):
Njk = Nj








Focusing on Njk and σ
2.

























Plotting ln(Njk) against σ
2 should give a line with a negative slope. The elements of the
RHS term in equation (1.14) are all non-negative by definition: the Pareto shape parameter,





18 This choice follows Chaney (2008) and is consistent with the firm size distributions described in Hsieh
and Ossa (2011) and Axtell (2001) Any of the general class of power law distributions should yield similar
predictions, given reasonable assumptions about how the distribution is truncated.





for x ≥ xm. The two parameters that
characterize the distribution are xm, the minimum productivity for a firm that produces j and θ, the shape
parameter. For simplicity, I define the range of productivities on a scale [1,∞), this sets xm equal to one, so
G(x) = Pr(X < x) = 1− (x)−θ.
19The dominance of the extensive margin is consistent with other papers that model the responses of
heterogeneous firms to trade costs, e.g. Crozet and Koenig (2010) and Helpman et al. (2008). The adjustment
costs associated with demand volatility increase exporters’ per unit costs, just as trade costs do.
13
Prediction: Higher levels of destination demand volatility σ2jk reduce the numbers of ex-
porters in equilibrium.
To restate the hypothesis, the adjustment costs associated with demand volatility reduce
profitability, such that the mass of firms that find a destination profitable decreases with
increases in demand volatility. If demand volatility is zero, the model reverts to the conven-
tional model of trade. One way to take this prediction to the data is a linear regression of
Njk on σ
2; the sign of the coefficient on demand volatility should be negative.
Lemma: Holding other factors equal, the average productivity of firms in destinations with
high demand volatility is higher.
From equation (1.11), it is clear that the productivity threshold φ∗jk for entering a des-
tination increases with demand volatility, therefore one expects the minimum level of other
proxies for productivity like exporters’ share of a product’s exports to increase with demand
















Corollary: The rate of decline in exporter numbers with demand volatility is not constant,
but varies nonlinearly with gamma γ.
The cost implications of demand volatility are non-linear, so are its impacts on an ex-
porters’ profit. Entry choice by extension is nonlinear with respect to demand volatility. The
non-linearity will depend on γj. For very small γ, such that low labor-firing costs for example
make adjustments relatively costless, the slope of log(Njk) with respect to σ
2
jk will always be
approximately linear and proportional to θj, the productivity distribution’s shape parame-
ter. For large γj, the slope is increasingly non-linear, and decreases in absolute terms with
σ2. (If the γ term was a function of σ2 because adjustment costs are not linear proportions
of ν2 as proposed in equation (1.2), the slope could increase or decrease with σ2).
Testing the relationship betweenNjk and the square of the demand volatility term directly
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addresses this corollary in Section 1.3.2.4.
1.3 Empirics
This section examines the relationship between exporter numbers and demand volatility.
First, I describe key variables and data sources. Regression estimates follow the definitions:
a baseline specification and variations that further test the model’s predictions. I address
the most important alternative explanations at the end of the section.
1.3.1 Data and Definitions
The key variables come from two trade datasets: firm level export data from China to
describe exporter choices, and UN COMTRADE data on global imports by product and
country to describe the history of each destination in terms of size and demand volatility.
The firm level export data captures exporter numbers in each destination, derived from
the universe of Chinese export transactions between years 2000 and 2006. The UN COM-
TRADE data include global imports of each narrowly defined HS6 product category for all
countries between 1995 and 2010. Annual imports up to 2005 were collapsed to product-
country-year observations – imports of bicycles (HS871200) into Kenya in the year 2000 from
all countries would be one observation, for example. (Restricting historical data to 2005 and
earlier is motivated by the fact that firm level export data stop at 2006). I estimate demand
volatilities using this global import demand history for each destination.20.
The combined datasets represent the destination choices of more than 243,000 Chinese
exporters, mostly in the period of export expansion that followed entry into the WTO,
covering more than 390,000 of the roughly one million possible product-country combinations
that define destinations. (These are imports into one of more than 200 countries in any of
the 5000 narrowly defined HS6 product categories). Appendix Section I.A.1 describes these
data sources further and outlines how I merge the two. Information on GDP, distance and
other predictors of trade come from the CEPII gravity dataset (Head et al., 2010).
The next sub-sections describe the key variables in the empirical specification: the de-
pendent variable, which is a multi-year count of unique exporters and the key independent
variables, derived from the historical demand data described in the preceding paragraphs.
20The COMTRADE database of global trade was compiled and cleaned up by Gaulier and Zig-
nago (2010) and released to the public through the Centres d’Études Prospectives et d’Information
Internationales (CEPII). I will refer to this database as COMTRADE from here. See
www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/baci.htm.
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1.3.1.1 Dependent Variable: Multi-Year Unique Exporter Counts
The paper uses two definitions of exporter numbers Njk. The primary measure represents
the number of Chinese firms that exported good j to a destination jk between 2000 and 2006,
counting each exporter only once in the entire period. This definition reflects the equilibrium
number of exporters entering a potentially profitable destination. (The measure of entry
extends over multiple years because theory provides no clear guidance on how long it takes
to reach equilibrium).21 Furthermore, exports drop to zero and rebound in the following
year for many destinations. Defining entry on an annual basis may misrepresent markets
that simply run on a multi-year demand cycle. I use logged values of this unique exporter
count for the regressions.22
The second measure I use is gross entry from 2001 to 2006. This is the log of the difference
between [1] Njk the number of unique exporters over all years and [2] the number of unique
exporters observed in 2000, the first year in the data, which happens to be the year before
China joined the WTO. China’s WTO entry in 2001 marked a new regime of low trade
costs and easier export access, evidenced by an increase in aggregate exporter numbers from
around 62,000 in 2000 to more than 170,000 in 2006. By its construction, this measure of
gross entry in the new trade regime controls for undocumented destination attributes that
may influence export entry. For example, destinations with lower entry costs are more likely
to have exporters in 2000, and to have more exporters.
This alternative measure could be more relevant, as export restrictions that may have
distorted observed exporter counts were removed in the course of WTO accession. For
example, before WTO accession, trading license requirements barred Chinese firms below a
certain size from exporting directly (Ahn et al., 2011). In sum, exporter entry after 2000
was large, with ample variation across destinations, which helps the analysis.
21Later sections of the paper include tests with annual counts, which provide results comparable to typical
estimates using annual data. Defining exporter counts as gross entry is a better fit to the model because the
model remains silent about exits from destination after entry. Table I.A.4 relaxes this connection between
the model and the empirics, using annual exporter counts as the dependent variable. These include gross
entry and exit, by definition.
22For convenience, I call Njk gross entry in the tables that follow. The data show that exporters in 2000
represent only a quarter of the full set of observed unique exporters. Fortunately, China’s accession to the
WTO in 2001 suggests an alternative measure of gross entry in the era of liberalization, which I discuss in
the next paragraph.
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1.3.1.2 Key Variable: Demand Volatility
I measure demand volatility as the sum of the squared deviations of demand from a
linear trend over the years 1995 to 2005. The trend is calculated for the dollar value of each
destination’s annual demand – total imports from all countries in a given HS6 category.
As Chinese exports represent less than 13% of the global total in this period, this measure
mitigates concerns about reverse causality that may have resulted from defining volatility
with only Chinese export data. The growth trend estimation uses a linear regression, with
each destination scaled by total demand over all years to yield a scale-free measure for cross-
sectional comparisons. To get σ2jk, the volatility term, I estimate the trend and intercept for
each destination jk:23
For this exercise, the definition of destinations or destinations in the model is consistent
with the empirics. Each Qjk in the model corresponds to a specific product j and a country
k, just as destinations in the data are defined as the combination of a narrow HS6 product
and a country.
Formally, I run the following regression:24
Qjkt∑
tQjkt
= ζjkt+ αjk + εjkt (1.17)
Using the residuals, I calculate σ2, (for convenience, these equations show estimated terms






The incidental assumption in this setup is that exporters form expectations of future
volatility based on observed aggregate volatility. As described in the previous section, each
23 To avoid the bias that may result from imposing the same non-linear form on all demand trajectories,
I opt for a linear regression of historical trade levels on time. This measure directly interprets the model’s
definition of demand volatility. Some measurement error is expected, given that I use only 11 years of demand
history. However, using longer demand histories comes with the risk of including irrelevant information. On
a related note, almost all destinations served by Chinese exporters had positive imports in all years, reducing
concerns that observations clustered at zero would inflate the volatility measure.
24 I use dollar values instead of quantities for Q in the primary estimates of volatility. This was in part
because quantity data was missing for a large share of the old version of the COMTRADE data. It is also
in part because of concerns that quantities are mis-measured - the incentive to measure values accurately
is stronger for the customs authorities. On obtaining a more recent version of the COMTRADE data with
nearly complete estimates for quantities, I repeat the baseline regressions using a quantity-based volatility
measure and report the results in the robustness checks section 1.3.3.2.
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exporter’s expected revenue from a destination is proportional to the aggregate demand from
that destination, therefore volatility at the product-country level is a reasonable measure for
evaluating the profitability of each destination at the firm level.
After the main tests in the next subsection, I use the standard deviation of year-on-year
growth as an alternative definition. This alternate definition is also broadly consistent with
the model, and with other papers in the literature.
Nonetheless, the measure of demand volatility has the advantage of addressing the two
main challenges to measuring volatility for time series: (1) making the measure independent
of the size of each series and (2) separating baseline growth from volatility. I control for
size by scaling all series by the total value over all periods, and control for growth by
introducing the linear trend that best fits the data. Controlling for size ensures that the
volatility measure is comparable across series with different initial levels. For example,
using the standard deviation of historical values to compare the volatility of US aggregate
imports with Rwandan imports would lead to the flawed conclusion that US imports are
more volatile, simply because the absolute values are larger. (One could try to fix this by
using the coefficient of variation - i.e. dividing by the mean, but that still leaves concerns
about growth trends unaddressed).
Furthermore, defining demand volatility as deviations around a trend avoids mis-measurement
when the data include instances of zero demand. The common measure of volatility as the
standard deviation suffers from the problem of measuring growth from or to zero. If one uses
the mid-point growth measure of Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), growth at these instances
of zero will fall at the extreme values of -2 and 2. While those values are usable, they may
represent outliers that bias the volatility measure, especially if most growth observations are
clustered near zero. Measuring demand volatility as deviations from a trend simply avoids
this concern by used scaled levels, rather than transforming those levels into a growth index
before calculating the volatility of a series.
1.3.1.3 Key Variable: Destination Size
In estimating the effects of demand volatility, I use aggregate historical demand as an
indicator of product-country destination size. Conventional estimates of international trade
measure size as GDP. This would be appropriate for a model of trade where the countries
define market boundaries and firms’ narrow product specializations were not relevant to
competition. Using aggregate historical demand for each destination as a measure of its size
fits the structure provided by my model, one that emphasizes competition within narrow
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product categories and exporters’ choices of markets on that basis.
I define the terms as the logged sum of aggregate demand in each destination between
1995 and 2005. (I use the first 11 years of aggregate data available for the same reasons that
I use those years to measure demand volatility). In principle, this logged sum represents the
projected future demand for a destination. One only needs to assume that destination growth
gjk is consistent to use this history as a proxy for the projected aggregate demand over the
exporter’s planning horizon, (Q∗ in the model). Formally, the projected size of a destination
with average historical growth rate gjk is log(
∑




long as past growth rates are a reasonable proxy for expected growth rates, this measure
allows me to control for destination size in terms of its present value and growth.
This measure offers a finer level of control for testing export entry decisions than a
country-level measure like GDP. The regressions in this section will show that it explains
more of the variation in export entry than conventional variables like GDP and distance.
(This is in part because; historical demand is explained by GDP and distance, so that
the inclusion of current GDP in an estimation exercise that includes historical demand
provides little additional information). I run versions of the regressions that follow this
section without this market size variable and obtain results that are similar in sign, but
with larger coefficients. This is unsurprising, given the correlation between market size and
volatility (see Figure I.A.1). To avoid the implied omitted variable bias, the next section
reports only regressions that include this destination size variable.
1.3.2 Results
1.3.2.1 Demand Volatility and Exporter Counts
Table 1.1 summarizes the key variables.
About 40 unique exporters served the average destination between 2000 and 2006; with
35 of these being the firms that entered the destination after the year 2000. This num-
ber is highly skewed; both variables have a median value of 5. The variation in exporter
counts is large; products like buttons naturally had many producers, while airplanes had few.
Country-specific variations also existed; large ones like the US had more exporters. However,
countries and products alone leave much of the variation in the data unexplained. Unre-
ported regressions of export entry at the level of product-country destinations on product
and country fixed effects alone yield R2 values of 0.20 and 0.01 respectively.
Given that more than half of the possible destinations had zero Chinese exporters, the
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Table 1.1: Summary of Key Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Gross Entry 39.95 190.77 1 15643 397547
Gross Entry post-2000 35.38 168.38 0 13497 397547
Log(Gross Entry) 1.96 1.66 0 9.66 397547
Log(Entry post-2000) 1.91 1.63 0 9.51 387916
Destination Size 8.65 2.63 0 20.6 397547
Demand Volatility 0.053 0.086 0 0.91 380372
Chinese exporters sent goods to 397,547 destinations between 2000 and 2006. Only 380,372 had the two or
more non-zero observations required to compute demand volatility. 9,170 had no export entry after 2000.
Destination size is the log of total historical demand in the COMTRADE data.
Number of countries (205); products (4,902)
first order of inquiry is whether demand volatility is higher on average for those destinations
that had no Chinese exporters. Figure I.A.1 in the appendix suggests that the destinations
served by Chinese exporters tend to be larger and have lower demand volatility, but the
visual comparisons of distributions in that figure is only suggestive at best.
Table 1.2 presents the conditional expectation. As described in section I.A.2, destinations
with zero Chinese exporters have higher demand volatility on average. The specification
adopted is a linear probability model with a dependent variable that is 1 if no Chinese
firm exported to the destination between 2000 and 2006; it is 0 otherwise. Product fixed
effects address the fact that some items are more likely to be exported than others for time-
invariant reasons outside the model, and country fixed effects or variables like GDP and
distance address the fact that country-level factors also determine the prevalence of zeros in
trade.
The difference in the likelihood of having at least one Chinese exporter is about 20% on
average for two otherwise identical destinations with levels of demand volatility at the min-
imum and maximum, (i.e. 0.277*(0.8 - 0.0)). Increasing demand volatility by one standard
deviation corresponds to a 2.8% decrease in the likelihood that a destination is served by
Chinese exporters, after controlling for destination size and country features. The standard
deviation of demand volatility is 0.11 for this set of destinations. I control for market size
in columns 2 and 4 to address the concern that larger destinations will generally have more
exporters, as market size is correlated with demand volatility.25
Figure 1.2 shows that more Chinese exporters serve destinations with low demand volatil-
25I calculated demand volatility for 708,802 destinations. The balance of destinations were not usable
because the demand volatility variable is not defined for destinations with only one or two years of imports.
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Table 1.2: Demand Volatility and the Probability of Entry by Chinese Exporters
(Dependent Variable: 1[Number of Exporters in Destinations = 0])
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Demand Volatility 0.391*** 0.277*** 0.335*** 0.259***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)










Observations 573,997 573,997 708,802 708,802
R-squared 0.465 0.480 0.515 0.525
Country FE Y Y
Product FE Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 for destinations with no Chinese exporter. The units of
observation are destinations: unique HS6-product and country combinations.
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ity, on average. The plot sets the logged number of exporters that served destinations be-
tween 2000 and 2006 against demand volatility. The predicted averages in the plot control for
market size, country features and product-fixed effects. Each average is calculated separately
for 50 equal-frequency bins of demand volatility.26




























Predictive Margins of volat_v_50 with 95% CIs
Predicted unique exporter counts over 2000 - 2006. Estimated means and 95% confidence intervals after
controlling for market size, country factors and HS6 product fixed effects. Observations are destinations
grouped into 50 Quantiles, least to largest by demand volatility. Data Sources: China GAC Export Data
(2000-2006), COMTRADE
I estimate the following baseline specification:
log(Njk) = β0σ
2
jk + β1Xjk + αj + αk + εjk (1.19)
Xjk = a vector of gravity model variables e.g., GDP, distance
αj = product fixed effects
αk = country fixed effects
To identify the effects of demand volatility on export entry, this reduced form specifica-
tion plays on differences between destinations and the fact that certain products or countries
tend to have higher volatility. It is necessary to control for product-specific factors; the num-
ber of potential entrants and the sunk costs of entry vary significantly along this dimension.
26To interpret the graph, note that the average destination’s logged export entry is 1.96 (with a standard
deviation of 1.66). The curvature of the graph is addressed later in this section.
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For example, between narrowly defined HS6 product categories, the number of exporting
firms ranges from 1 for nuclear reactor fuel cartridges (HS 840130) to more than 40,000 for
miscellaneous plastic articles (HS 392690). Estimates of the Pareto Distribution parameter
also ranged from less than 5 to greater than 15, with varying degrees of fit for these prod-
uct categories. Applying product fixed effects in the cross-section helps to address these
differences.
Differences in export entry by country are expected, given factors like GDP, distance,
language and currency. Furthermore, differences in volatility by country exist, as shown in
Figure I.A.2. (Papers like di Giovanni and Levchenko (2012a); Koren and Tenreyro (2007)
provide similar evidence). To ensure differences in export entry due to these factors are not
conflated with demand volatility at the product-country level, I introduce either country
fixed effects or direct measures of these variables (for the year 2006).
The specification with product fixed effects can simply be described as a comparison for a
product like bicycles, using countries like Portugal and Greece that have similar GDP, GDP
per Capita and distance from China, if bicycle imports into these countries differ in terms
of demand volatility. The way the data is set up makes it possible to identify which country
has the higher level of demand volatility for bicycles, knowing that the similar comparisons
for other products are not guaranteed to be identical. Table 1.3 presents the results.
Fewer exporters enter destinations with high demand volatility, after controlling for the
common predictors of exporter numbers. The observed number of exporters is about 5.1%
lower on average for destinations one standard deviation above the mean. (The estimated
effect in Table 1.7 is 11% when demand volatility is measured with quantities not values).
Columns 1 and 2 show the number of unique exporters observed between 2000 and 2006 as
the dependent variable; the other columns use gross entry after 2000, the first year in the
data.
The results in Table 1.3 translate to about 2 fewer exporters in the average destination
if demand volatility increases by one standard deviation. (The response is calculated as
{1− exp[(−0.612) ∗ 0.086]}). The next paragraphs describe the findings further. They also
show how I identify the effects of demand volatility. Columns 3 and 4 use gross entry as
the dependent variable, i.e. the number of new exporters in a destination after 2000. The
columns have fewer observations because the log transform excludes destinations with no new
exporters after 2000.27 As previously discussed, gross entry in columns 3 and 4 measures
27Columns 1 and 3 also have fewer observations due to missing GDP, distance or other control variables
from the CEPII gravity dataset.
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Table 1.3: Exporter Counts and Demand Volatility:
(Dependent Variable: Log Number of Exporters in Destinations)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Log(Gross Export Entry) Log(Gross Entry Post-2000)
Demand Volatility -0.612*** -0.613*** -0.584*** -0.582***
(0.035) (0.032) (0.035) (0.032)
Destination Size 0.421*** 0.421*** 0.412*** 0.412***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log(GDP) 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)






Observations 272,926 371,531 266,915 363,381
R-squared 0.547 0.545 0.546 0.544
Country FE Y Y
Product FE Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Errors clustered by HS6 products.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The units of observation are destinations: unique HS6-product and country combinations, e.g., Ethiopian
imports of women’s cotton overcoats (HS 610220). Gross entry is the log of unique firms with recorded
exports to a destination between 2000 and 2006. The change in exporter count captures the difference
between all firms that served a destination and firms that served the destination in 2000. This difference
measures the net export entry that accompanied China’s trade liberalization from 2001 onwards. Control
variables used but not shown in the table include geographic remoteness and dummies for shared borders,
common languages and WTO membership. Missing observations in Columns 1 and 3 are because GDP data
is not always available. However, estimates on the largest common sample are almost identical to columns
2 and 4.
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how many exporters found a destination potentially profitable in the less restrictive trade
regime that started in 2001, the year of China’s WTO accession.
The last two columns of Table 1.3 agree in sign and significance with the first two, al-
though the estimated coefficient on demand volatility decreases. Destination size takes away
most of the statistical significance associated with gravity variables like GDP and distance.
The variable, which I measure as the logged sum of imports between 1995 and 2005, repre-
sents both observed and projected demand growth, like Q∗jk in the model. By its definition,
it also addresses concerns that historical average growth rates affect exporter entry.28 GDP
may not adequately represent the size of specific destinations, even if it represents market size
well in country-level gravity models. I do not show colonial relationships, WTO membership
and other gravity variables in the table to conserve space. The gravity model variables all
come from the year 2006.
The demand volatility measure varies in the cross-section across destinations, but not
over time. (This also matches the model and baseline empirical specification, which de-
scribed each destination destination with one demand volatility parameter and one measure
of export entry). To justify the implicit assumption that exporter estimates are not updated
over time, I provide two tests. First, in Section 1.3.2.3 I repeat the main regression using
demand volatilities defined over various periods and show that the predicted outcomes re-
main largely unchanged. Second, Section 1.3.3.1 shows that changing the weights allocated
to the deviation from trend in calculating demand volatility does not substantively alter the
findings of the paper. These tests suggest that demand volatility is itself a stable feature of
destinations, or that exporters do not substantially update their perceptions of destinations.
In identifying the effect of demand volatility, note that the demand data is a global
aggregate, which mitigates concerns about reverse causation, as described in the variable
definition. As mentioned earlier, product fixed effects capture differences in the γ adjustment
parameter, the mass and distribution of exporters Nj and θj, as well as the setup costs and
fixed costs associated with specific products. Country fixed effects also control for factors
that include exchange rates, exchange rate volatility, country size, trade costs and policies
like tariffs and trade agreements. Testing in the cross-section helps to avoid concerns about
28 A possible challenge to the definition of this variable is that total absorption each destination includes
imports and the domestic production. That poses no real problem for this paper, the fact that imports
and domestic production are generally close substitutes within the narrow product categories suggests that
imports can be used as a proxy for aggregate demand. Regressing destination demand on annual lagged
demand gives an R2 of 0.93, indicating that imports patterns are persistent or autocorrelated, even in the
absence of data on domestic production.
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other time-varying factors, as long as the variables I use are stable over the period under
review. Column 1 allows the GDP, GDP per capita and other gravity variables to explain
country-specific determinants of trade costs. The gravity model variables are either constant,
like distance, or highly auto-correlated.29 Columns 2 and 4 apply both country and product
fixed effects simultaneously.30 The country fixed effects absorb the gravity model variables,
as expected.
The foregoing shows that Chinese exporters entered destinations with lower demand
volatility in greater numbers. This is after accounting for product and country characteristics
that account for the potential costs and profits from exporting. The results hold whether
the dependent variable is a count of unique exporters or gross entry – the increase in unique
exporter counts between 2001 and 2006. As I do not consider how entry into multiple markets
may mitigate firm-level volatility, the estimated effects are on the conservative side.31
In describing whether trade levels fall with increasing demand volatility, one must con-
sider how much of its predicted effect lies on the extensive margin – the number of exporters
as shown above, or the intensive margin - exports per exporter. The model predicts that
more of demand volatility’s effects are observed in exporter entry – the extensive margin.
The higher expected prices associated with demand volatility imply lower expected demand
and profits, given non-zero sunk costs. In a world with heterogeneous firms, those with lower
productivity will generally self-select out of destinations with high demand volatility.
Table 1.4 presents the results. Higher demand volatility is associated with fewer ex-
porters, (exporter numbers shows the largest coefficients and the highest level of explained
variation in the table). Total exports from China summed across all years is lower for des-
tinations with high demand volatility (columns 1 and 2); with fewer exporters as predicted,
exports per exporter increase (columns 5 and 6). The coefficients in columns 3 and 5 sum
to column 1, as the regressions are linear in logs. Destination size explains much of the
29 Many small economies were missing GDP and GDP per capita, hence the differences in the number of
observations between the even and odd-numbered columns
30For computational efficiency, I follow the algorithm proposed by Guimarães and Portugal (2009) for
multiple high-dimensional fixed effects. This algorithm iteratively estimates the coefficients, unlike conven-
tional OLS estimation that directly calculates the matrix inverse. The coefficients represent a vector for the
selected fixed effects and independent variables that yield the least squared error, within a 1e-6 tolerance.
The effects are not fully interacted, as that would eliminate all degrees of freedom in the data.
31Most exporters serve more than one destination – and destinations are not perfectly correlated – one
must consider that entering two destinations simultaneously generally yields a portfolio volatility that is
lower than the demand volatility of either. (The upper bound of the portfolio volatility being the higher
of the two markets). This indicates that this paper’s predicted effects are muted. When β0 = [log(Njk) −
(β1Xjk + αj + αk)]/σjk in equation (1.19); if the true volatility perceived by exporters σ
∗
jk ≤ σjk, then the
true coefficient |β∗0 | ≥ |β0|
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variation in exporter counts in this table, just as in Table 1.3. Section I.B.2 develops the
model to show a relationship between equilibrium trade levels and demand volatility; the
relationships established in the model for both variables are found in this table.
Table 1.4: Exports and Exporter Counts vs. Demand Volatility
(Dependent Variable: Log Export Measure in Destinations)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Log(Exports) Log(Exporters) Log(Exports per
Exporter)
Demand Volatility -0.219*** -0.189*** -0.612*** -0.613*** 0.392*** 0.424***
(0.075) (0.067) (0.035) (0.032) (0.057) (0.050)
Destination Size 0.834*** 0.836*** 0.421*** 0.421*** 0.413*** 0.415***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log(GDP) 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Log(GDP per capita) 0.003 0.001 0.002
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Log(Distance) 0.008 0.002 0.006
(0.011) (0.006) (0.008)
Constant 4.176*** -1.645*** 5.821***
(0.159) (0.079) (0.113)
Observations 272,926 371,531 272,926 371,531 272,926 371,531
R-squared 0.490 0.488 0.547 0.545 0.390 0.387
Country FE Y Y Y
Product FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Errors clustered by HS6 products.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The units of observation are destinations: unique HS6-product and country combinations, e.g., Ethiopian
imports of women’s cotton overcoats (HS 610220). Exports in columns 1-2 are for all Chinese exporters.
Exporters in columns 3-4 is the log of unique firms with recorded exports to a destination between 2000 and
2006. It is the same number used for columns 1-2 of Table 1.3. Destination size is the log of total demand
from a destination between 1995 and 2005. Control variables used but not shown in the table include
geographic remoteness and dummies for shared borders, common languages and WTO membership.
In sum, trade levels are lower for destinations with high demand volatility, and most
of the effect comes from the extensive margin, represented by columns 3 and 4. Columns
1 and 2 of the table are consistent with the prediction in equation (1.29). The imperfect
matching of countries between the trade and CEPII gravity data set means that GDP and
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GDP per capita are missing for many observations. (Section I.A.1 describes the matching).
Unreported regressions on the even-numbered columns give nearly identical coefficients on a
sample restricted to those with no missing variables in the odd-numbered columns.
To assuage concerns that counts of unique exporters over multiple years may not be com-
parable to conventional estimates of gravity models with annual export measures, Appendix
Section I.A.4 presents regressions that include estimates with annual exporter counts, annual
control variables and country-year fixed effects. These show that the reported estimates are
not due to periodic shocks, or exchange rate volatility – other potential drivers of trade in
the literature. The first two columns of Table 1.4 represent firm level gravity model regres-
sions, (as do the first two of Table I.A.4). The two tables show that fewer exporters enter
destinations with high demand volatility.
Finding a consistent pattern of lower exporter counts with demand volatility suggests
that prices will be higher in those destinations. However, reliable tests of demand volatility’s
effect on prices are difficult with no data on quality, given the well-documented link between
prices and quality (Hallak and Schott, 2011; Hallak and Sivadasan, 2009). Regressions of
price on demand volatility yield statistically insignificant coefficients for the largest product
categories. This was after including various sets of controls that included gravity model
variables, product-year fixed effects, country year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. (See
appendix section I.A.8.)
Demand volatility compares favorably with conventional variables like GDP and geo-
graphic distance in predicting trade. I run separate regressions (reported in Table I.A.7) of
exporter counts on demand volatility, GDP, geographic distance and destination size, in the
absence of additional controls. The omitted-variable regressions involve only the dependent
variable, the selected variable and product fixed effects. The respective adjusted R2 values
are 0.29, 0.22, 0.22 and 0.54. Only destination size explains more exporter count variation
on this crude test.
1.3.2.2 Demand Volatility and Exporter Productivity Thresholds
Figure 1.3 supports the model’s claim that demand volatility filters out producers with
low productivity. The high costs of adjustment mean that in general, fewer firms will have
the profit margins required to succeed in destinations with high volatility. (As the data
allows no direct measures of productivity, I use producers’ market shares within product
categories as a proxy).
To facilitate comparisons in the cross-section, I compute each exporter’s share of Chinese
28




























The minimum market share of the exporters in each destination jk. I use firms’ share of exports within a
narrow HS6 product category as a proxy for productivity, so that destinations served by firms with the least
market share get the lowest value of this proxy for φ∗jk. The y-axis averages these minimum market share
measure for all destinations in each quantile. Destinations Grouped Into 50 Quantiles, Least to Largest by
Demand Volatility. Data Sources: China GAC Export Data (2000-2006), COMTRADE









. I represent the
productivity threshold φ∗jk by the smallest market share recorded by any firm in destination
jk. That is, for each destination, φ∗jk is represented by min(Shareij). Therefore, destinations
served by only the largest exporter in the product category will report a higher threshold
than the destination served by both the largest and smallest exporter, (if more than one firm
exports the product from China).
I use simple regression methods to check whether this measure of productivity thresholds
increases with demand volatility. The regressions mimic equation (1.19), replacing the de-
mand volatility measure with a dummy for each of 50 equal-frequency bins for destinations,
ranked by demand volatility. Product fixed effects control for differences in the distributions
of market shares by product. Section I.B.3 in the Appendix includes additional plots that
use other proxies for firm-level productivity. That section also includes results of regression
exercises that support the finding of higher productivity thresholds with increasing demand
volatility.
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The plot shows an increasing trend in the predicted size-rank of exporters with increasing
demand volatility; the standard errors suggest that the trend is statistically significant. In
other words, the destinations with the highest demand volatility have on average, exporters
that are among the largest producers for the related product. This is after controlling
for destination size, and variables like GDP and Distance. This supports the mechanism
proposed in the model that expectations of adjustment costs drive more low-productivity
firms away from the most volatile destinations.
1.3.2.3 Temporal Variations in Demand Volatility
The previous test steps assume that expected demand volatility does not change over
time from the exporter’s perspective. As this assumption is important to how I simplify the
estimation, I test it using the specification in (1.20):
log(Njk) = β0σ
t1−t2
jk + β1Xjk + αj + αk + εjk (1.20)
σt1−t2jk = Demand volatility for years t1 to t2
the other terms mirror the definitions in equation (1.19)
The variants of σt1−t2jk use (1995,2000), (2000,2005) and (2003,2008) as (t1, t2) pairs.
These shorter demand histories yield less precise estimates. The measure for (1995,2000)
gives more weight to historical demand before exporters in the data made their entry choices.
The two additional 6-year history samples draw on years that put more weight on in-sample
and after-the-sample data, i.e. 2000-2005 and 2003-2008. (I stop at 2008 because the severe
drop in trade across many products for 2009 is exceptional).
Table 1.5 shows that the assumption of stable expected demand volatility is not far-
fetched. The coefficient of the 1995-2000 measure is only one standard deviation away from
the 2003-2008 measure. The standard errors and explained variations are similar across all
three measures of demand volatility, whether the measure is weighted toward the past, or
toward the future. While the size of demand volatility’s coefficient is higher for the mid-data
sample, the sign and significance remain unchanged.
Compared to the predicted 5.1% change in exporter numbers from Table 1.4, the predicted
declines in exporter numbers using only 1995-2000 to measure demand volatility drops to
1.6% if only years 1995-2000 were used to form expectations. The respective predictions for
the other sample periods are 4.1 and 1.9%. Correlations between the measures of demand
volatility are 0.37 (95-00, 00-05), 0.44 (95-00,03-08) and 0.59 (00-05,03-08).
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Table 1.5: Export Entry with Past and Future Demand Volatility
(Dependent Variable: Log Number of Exporters in Destinations)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Log(Gross Export Entry) Log(Gross Entry Post-2000)
Dem. Volat.(95-00) -0.182*** -0.136***
(0.029) (0.029)
Dem. Volat.(00-05) -0.493*** -0.483***
(0.030) (0.031)
Dem. Volat.(03-08) -0.220*** -0.235***
(0.033) (0.033)
Destination Size 0.435*** 0.424*** 0.430*** 0.426*** 0.415*** 0.420***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 356,899 369,240 368,012 349,331 361,372 360,395
R-squared 0.545 0.544 0.544 0.545 0.543 0.543
Country-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Product FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Errors clustered by HS6 products.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The units of observation are destinations: unique HS6-product and country combinations, e.g., Ethiopian
imports of women’s cotton overcoats (HS 610220). Exporter counts represent the log of the number of unique
firms with recorded exports to a destination between 2000 and 2006. Gross entry post-2000 captures the
difference between all firms that served a product market and firms that served the destination in 2000.
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In sum, the paper’s main qualitative findings are robust to the period used for measuring
demand volatility. Had the model and estimates included updating of expectations by ex-
porters, the findings are expected to remain consistent. (Tables 1.3 and 1.5 broadly agree in
terms of the sign and significance of the estimated coefficients of demand volatility). Section
1.3.3.1 provides further evidence – using the demand history from 1995-2005, but applying
different weights to each year.
1.3.2.4 Non-Linear Responses to Demand Volatility
The non-linear form of σ2 in equation (1.14) suggests a test of the dependent variable on
higher orders of demand volatility, as well as its interactions with market size, among other
variables.
Table 1.6 includes the square of demand volatility as a regressor, as well as interactions
with destination size. (If the γ term is constant, the model implies a positive coefficient
on the squared volatility term. However, negative coefficients are possible if the adjustment
costs term is not a simple linear function of deviations from expectation).
The results confirm expectations of non-linearity. The coefficients of the squared demand
volatility term are statistically significant in all specifications. However, unlike what a naive
interpretation of the model would suggest, Table 1.6 indicates a steeper decline in exporter
counts at the higher levels of demand volatility. This suggests a more complex structure
to adjustment costs than I outline in the model. Concave relationships between demand
volatility and the log of exporter numbers are possible with adjustment costs that depend on
aggregate demand, or adjustment costs that are non-linear functions of squared deviations
from projected trend. (If demand volatility enters exporters’ considerations of profit strictly
as described in equation (1.14) and γ is a constant, the curve should be convex). The more
remarkable finding is that the higher order terms are non-zero and statistically significant.
Interactions with destination size also show consistency with the main predictions. While
the coefficient of the linear demand volatility term switches signs, the corresponding change
associated with the market size interaction is larger. The squared volatility measure remains
statistically significant and negative. Columns 4 to 6 repeat the same pattern for gross entry
from 2001.
This section’s results corroborate the predictions of the model for the effects of demand
volatility on the number of exporters. The estimated effects of demand volatility on exporter
choice are non-linear, and more exporters enter destinations with low demand volatility,
holding other factors equal. The next steps check the robustness of the main findings.
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Table 1.6: Exporter Counts and Interacted Terms of Demand Volatility
(Dependent Variable: Log Number of Exporters in Destinations)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Log(Gross Export Entry) Log(Gross Entry Post-2000)
Demand Volatility -0.613*** -0.301*** 3.294*** -0.582*** -0.231*** 3.321***
(0.032) (0.073) (0.142) (0.032) (0.074) (0.144)
(Demand Volatility)2 -0.687*** -0.529*** -0.777*** -0.637***
(0.131) (0.135) (0.132) (0.135)
Destination Size -0.503*** -0.495***
*Demand Volatility (0.016) (0.017)
Destination Size 0.421*** 0.424*** 0.442*** 0.412*** 0.415*** 0.433***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 371,531 371,531 371,531 363,381 363,381 363,381
R-squared 0.545 0.545 0.548 0.544 0.544 0.547
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Product FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Errors clustered by HS6 products.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The units of observation are destinations: unique HS6-product and country combinations, e.g., Ethiopian
imports of women’s cotton overcoats (HS 610220). Gross entry is the log of unique firms with recorded
exports to a product market between 2000 and 2006. Destination size is the log of total demand from
a destination between 1995 and 2005. The coefficients suggest that γ in equation (1.14) is a non-linear
functions of squared deviations from projected trend. If γ was a constant, as described in the model, the
coefficient of the squared σ2 term should be positive.
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1.3.3 Robustness Checks
This section addresses potential concerns about how exporter counts and demand volatil-
ity are measured. The appendix sections I.A.4 to I.A.6 include additional tests.
1.3.3.1 Demand Volatility Weighted by Recency
In estimating volatility, firms may ascribe greater weight to recent information (Bloom
et al., 2007). Therefore, recent shocks may carry a disproportionate share of exporter’s
demand volatility estimates, (or less in times of high uncertainty). Figure 1.4 tests the idea
by plotting the coefficient and R2 values obtained for definitions of demand volatility with
different weight indices η. The weights wt, indexed from 1 to 10 put more emphasis on
recent information with higher values of η; setting η to 1 reverts to the default scheme of
equal weights. By design, the weighting scheme does not affect destinations with uniform
deviations from the demand trajectory in all periods. (η specifies the relative size of the first










2(t− 1)(η − 1)
(H − 1)(η + 1)
, for t ∈ [H, 1], where η ∈ [1, 10] and
∑
wt = H = 11
(1.22)
To create the figure, I repeat the baseline regression in Table 1.3 for each weighted variant
of σ2 and collate the estimated coefficients and R2s.
The left panel of Figure 1.4 indicates that increasing the weight of recent information in
the estimation of demand volatility does not increase the explained variation in the number
of exporters serving a destination. (The R2 remain between 0.545 and 0.546). The right
panel remains consistent. The estimated coefficient of demand volatility on exporter counts
remains statistically significant, but decreases slightly in scale from the default estimate of
0.06 to 0.04 for index 10, the volatility estimate that ascribes 10 times the weight of the first
year (1995) to the most recent year of demand history (2005).
These results suggest that the particular period used to estimate demand volatility does
not affect the paper’s main qualitative predictions.
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(a) R2 values (b) Coefficient β0 on demand volatility
Estimates after controlling for Market Size, Country and HS6 Product fixed effects. The demand volatility
estimated with weight index 1 assigns equivalence to all periods, (as do all tables in the paper). The demand
volatility estimated with weight 10 assigns deviations in 2005 10 times the weight of deviations in 1995. The
weights are a linear density function. Data Sources: China GAC Export Data (2000-2006), UN COMTRADE
1.3.3.2 Alternative Demand Volatility Measures
Table 1.7 replicates Table 1.3, measuring demand volatility as the sum of squared devi-
ations from trend for quantities, not values in each destination. There are advantages and
disadvantages to this approach: using quantities helps the econometrician avoid conflating
exchange rates and price volatility with demand volatility, and quantities are a more faithful
representation of demand volatility from the model in Section 1.2. However, quantity data
is not always as reliable or available as data on trade values. The customs authorities that
collect trade data have a stronger incentive to collect accurate information on values, and
units of measurement for quantities are not always reported consistently by the original trade
data sources (Gaulier and Zignago, 2010).
The two measures of demand volatility are nevertheless similar, with the quantity measure
having a mean and standard deviation of 0.085 and 0.130, and the value-measure having 0.053
and 0.086. The quantity-based volatility measure is larger, as expected, given the inverse
correlation between prices and quantities. That inverse correlation ensures that the volatility
of prices and exchange rates, if any, reduces the observed volatility of export values relative
to the volatility of quantities.
The coefficients in Table 1.7 are consistent with the numbers in Table 1.3. The estimated
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Table 1.7: Export Entry with Quantity-Based Demand Volatility Measure
(Dependent Variable: Log Number of Exporters in Destinations)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Log(Gross Export Entry) Log(Gross Entry Post-2000)
Demand Volatility -0.882*** -0.889*** -0.866*** -0.871***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Destination Size 0.391*** 0.392*** 0.383*** 0.384***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log(GDP) 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)






Observations 280,060 381,196 273,567 372,373
R-squared 0.539 0.538 0.538 0.536
Country-Year FE Y Y
Product FE Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The units of observation are destinations: unique HS6-product and country combinations, e.g., Ethiopian
imports of women’s cotton overcoats (HS 610220). Exporter counts represent the log of the number of unique
firms with recorded exports to a destination between 2000 and 2006. The gross entry post-2000 captures the
difference between all firms that served a destination and firms that served the destination in 2000. Demand
volatility is constructed as in Table 1.3, but with quantities not dollar values of demand from 1995-2005
in each destination. Control variables used but not shown in the table include geographic remoteness and
dummies for shared borders, common languages and WTO membership.
36
effect sizes are also larger: increasing this measure of demand volatility by one standard devi-
ation corresponds to a 10.7% decline in exporter numbers, (calculated as 1-exp(-0.88*0.130)).
The quantity-based definition yields estimates with greater economic and statistical signifi-
cance than the value-based definition of demand volatility. This supports previous statements
in the paper that the estimated effects in Table 1.3 tend to be conservative.
Table 1.8 replicates Table 1.3, measuring demand volatility as the standard deviation
of annual growth rates of destinations. Section 1.2 summarizes the intuition behind this
new measure of demand volatility. For a destination with a constant growth rate, measured
demand volatility and adjustment costs would be zero, as the constant growth rate would
match exporters’ projections. The standard deviation of period-to-period growth is a com-
mon proxy for volatility, from finance and microeconomics (Guiso and Parigi, 1999; Sharpe,
1966) to macroeconomics and international trade (di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2009; Koren
and Tenreyro, 2007). It may not fit the model in this paper exactly, but it is fairly simple
to derive and explain. di Giovanni and Levchenko (2012b) use this measure to construct
export-weighted average measures of risk for countries, in a study that links trade volatility
to aggregate macroeconomic volatility. Koren and Tenreyro (2007) apply the same definition
to GDP volatility in explaining differences between rich and poor countries. I include tests
using this measure for consistency with related works on trade and volatility.
Table 1.8 shows that the estimated relationship between exporter numbers and demand
volatility is robust to using this popular alternative measure. For each destination, I measure
demand volatility as the standard deviation of demand growth between 1995 and 2005. The
mean and standard deviation of this new measure are 0.78 and 0.55 respectively. (Differences
between these numbers and Table 1.1 are indicative of how each measure is constructed).
The coefficients in Table 1.8 are consistent with the numbers in Table 1.3, both in sign and
significance. The predicted effects sizes are also similar: a 4.8% decline in exporter numbers
is expected for the average destination for a standard deviation increase in this measure of
demand volatility, compared with 5.1% in the first table. In sum, this new definition yields
results that broadly agree with the former definition of demand volatility.
I replicate Tables 1.4 to 1.9 using this measure and obtain the same pattern: slightly
smaller coefficients with the same sign and significance as the original measure.
Section I.A.5 in the Appendix presents results that show the main findings are robust to
the selection of markets used to define demand volatility. That section replicates Table 1.3
using two sets of demand histories to define demand volatility: product-country volatility
for Chinese goods, and destination volatility for the rest of the world. The first definition of
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Table 1.8: Export Entry with Alternative Demand Volatility Measure
(Dependent Variable: Log Number of Exporters in Destinations)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Log(Gross Export Entry) Log(Gross Entry Post-2000)
Demand Volatility -0.095*** -0.152*** -0.082*** -0.134***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012)
Destination Size 0.283*** 0.240*** 0.278*** 0.236***







Observations 311,337 362,490 304,545 354,337
R-squared 0.710 0.748 0.708 0.745
Product FE Y Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Errors clustered by HS6 products.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The units of observation are destinations: unique HS6-product and country combinations, e.g., Ethiopian
imports of women’s cotton overcoats (HS 610220). Exporter counts represent the log of the number of
unique firms with recorded exports to a destination between 2000 and 2006. The gross entry post-2000
captures the difference between all firms that served a destination and firms that served the destination in
2000. Demand volatility is constructed as the standard deviation of destinations’ annual growth rates from
1995-2005. Control variables used but not shown in the table include geographic remoteness and dummies
for shared borders, common languages and WTO membership.
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volatility corresponds to a model where Chinese exporters’ expectations of demand volatility
is linked to only the history of goods imported from China for any given destination. The
definition of demand volatility that excludes imports from China follows an alternative sce-
nario in which expectations neither correspond to firms’ own historic sales to a destination,
nor to past supply shocks from China.
The two sets of results in section I.A.5 yield the same finding as the previous tables
in the paper, we see that destinations with high demand volatility are served by fewer
exporters. The coefficients for the main variables in the tables retain their sign and statistical
significance, though there are small differences in the R2 values, as with the number of
observations. This is not unexpected, as the number of destinations with years of usable
history changes.
1.3.3.3 Poisson Regressions to Include Zeros
Tables 1.3 to 1.8 ignored destinations with zero exporters – the estimations used loga-
rithms of a count variable. Table 1.9 addresses concerns of possible bias from ignoring these
destinations with a Poisson regression. The inclusion of observations with zero entries after
2000 should accentuate the claims made in the previous section because demand volatil-
ity is higher on average for destinations with zero entry, as shown in Figure I.A.1. Those
destinations are part of this new regression.
The estimates using Poisson regressions with fixed effects are consistent with those from
Tables 1.3, and larger, as expected. Interpreting the coefficients in Table 1.9 suggests that
a 19% decline in the number of exporters should be associated with a standard deviation
increase in demand volatility from the mean, holding other factors constant. (The response
is calculated as {1 − exp[(−2.5) ∗ 0.086]}, using negative terms to represent the negative
predicted effect). The estimates are higher than the comparable numbers in Table 1.4.
The destinations with no Chinese exporters had higher levels of demand volatility and the
estimates are consistent with expectations in terms of size, sign and significance.
1.4 Discussions and Conclusion
This paper examines how the margins of trade are shaped by observed volatility – the
patterns of exogenous fluctuations in aggregate demand from potential export destinations.
The nature of these exogenous fluctuations is well documented (Carroll et al., 2011; Hall,
2004). Demand volatility has country and product-specific patterns, such that imports for
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Table 1.9: Exporter Counts and Demand Volatility: Poisson Estimates
(Dependent Variable: Number of Exporters in Destinations)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Gross Export Entry Gross Entry Post-2000
Demand Volatility -2.518*** -2.408***
(0.092) (0.093)
Destination Size 0.288*** 0.276***
(0.006) (0.006)
Observations 688,005 686,997
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Errors clustered by HS6 products.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The units of observation are destinations: unique HS6-product and country combinations, e.g., Ethiopian
imports of women’s cotton overcoats (HS 610220). All 708,000 destinations with measurable demand volatil-
ity were included, many of which had zero Chinese exporters. Product and country fixed effects limited
the usable observations to about 690,000. Gross entry is the log of unique firms with recorded exports to
a destination between 2000 and 2006. The gross entry post-2000 variable captures the unique number of
entrants from the year China joined the WTO.
some raw materials like steel are particularly volatile for most countries, and countries with
low GDP per capita generally have high import volatility, as documented by papers that
link national output volatility to GDP per capita.32 Nevertheless, neither product categories
nor countries as isolated variables explain most of the variation in the demand volatility of
destinations – unique combinations of products and countries.
I provide evidence that higher demand volatility in a destination leads to fewer Chinese
exporters and lower trade volumes. Further, I show that a notable share of the variation in
trade is explained by observed volatility. The R2 figures explaining the variable’s relevance at
the beginning of the paper come from Table I.A.7 in the appendix, which shows that demand
volatility’s explanatory power compares reasonably with those of established variables like
GDP and distance.
In showing a statistically significant first-order relationship between the extensive margin
of trade and demand volatility, this paper suggests a new factor that explains observed trade
32Papers in this vein hypothesize that aggregate volatility is due to the correlation between national policy
shocks and sectoral shocks, the capacity of economic institutions, as well as specialization in sectors that
are unusually volatile (di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2012b; di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2009; Krishna and
Levchenko, 2009; Koren and Tenreyro, 2007).
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volumes, prices and quantities. In explaining trade, demand volatility complements existing
explanations that rely on exporter productivity, geography and economic size (Anderson and
Van Wincoop, 2003; Melitz, 2003). As I show in Section I.A.7, import volatility is higher
in developing economies, consistent with the findings of di Giovanni and Levchenko (2012b)
and Koren and Tenreyro (2007). The paper’s main finding suggests that these economies
may be hurt by the absence of imported varieties.
The estimates of exporter responses to demand volatility use Chinese firm-level export
data. This choice was necessitated in part by the absence of a dataset that reports exporter
numbers for all countries. Furthermore, China is the world’s largest exporter, and its exports
are highly correlated with global exports. (The correlation is 0.995 for China’s aggregate
exports and the rest of the world’s between 2000 and 2006). Therefore, the empirical exercises
in the chapter should be informative about the global pattern of exporter behavior, which is
what the model describes.
As imports can be a source of productive efficiency in developing economies (Goldberg
et al., 2010; Connolly, 2003), the foregoing implies that low demand volatility can be an
advantage for producers. Firms in locations with low demand volatility can enjoy more
variety in inputs and possibly lower prices. This matters because imported inputs are a
common feature of production processes – for developing and developed economies alike.
One could extend this idea to assessing the impacts of trade diversification policies designed
to reduce aggregate economic volatility, as discussed in Cadot et al. (2011).
Rational economic agents respond to volatility, and firms engaged in international trade
are no exception. This paper extends the conventional model of trade to include adjustment
costs in the presence of stochastic demand. (Adjustment costs reflect the fact that demand
shocks affect unit costs: firms must pay overtime wage premiums and equipment deactiva-
tion costs when demand either peaks or crashes). These costs motivate exporters’ choices,
with clear implications for the number of firms that export, and the level of trade between
countries.
Firm level data on the universe of Chinese export transactions between 2000 and 2006
support this hypothesis: Fewer exporters serve destinations with high demand volatility.
The results are robust to how exporter numbers are counted – as the unique number of
exporters in all years, as the unique number of new exporters after 2000 when China adopted
liberalization policies in preparation for WTO membership, or as annual counts of exporters
in each of the years. The results are also robust to how demand volatility is defined, and
to several empirical specifications. Furthermore, the data confirm the model’s predictions
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about how the relationship between exporter counts and demand volatility is non-linear.
The estimated effects of demand volatility are statistically and substantially significant.
Increasing demand volatility by one standard deviation for the average destination in my
conservative specification predicts a 5% drop in the number of exporters that serve the
destination. The explained variation in exporter counts and predicted effects of this new
variable are comparable to those obtained from conventional predictors of trade like GDP
and distance.
These findings suggest further work to evaluate how volatility affects the development
process, given how instrumental trade has been to growth in the last half-century. The paper
also motivates an inquiry into how differences in labor and capital adjustment costs explain
the heterogeneity in producers’ responses to demand volatility.
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Appendix
I.A Empirics: Data, Variable Definitions and Supplementary Tests
I.A.1 Exporter-Level Data
Firm level export choices are taken from the universe of Chinese export transactions
between 2000 and 2006, collapsed to annual values for firms in each product-country. This
dataset identifies the year of trade, firms by unique IDs, the countries to which they export,
and the products sent to each destination. The full data set exceeds 24 million observations.
The raw data report the f.o.b. value of exports in nominal U.S. dollars in an unbalanced
panel over 7 years of more than 240,000 firms serving 390,000 destinations comprising 200
economies and about 4,100 HS6 product categories. This rich dataset provides no identifiers
for buyers in overseas markets, unfortunately. Thus, each destination conceptually stands
for one representative consumer.
To link this data to the destinations identified in the COMTRADE data, I match the
two sources on countries and product categories. The product categories are originally
reported as eight-digit HS categories in the firm-level data, of which the leading 6 dig-
its correspond to standardized categories.33 To ensure that the product category defini-
tions remain consistent over time, I convert all years to the 1992 HS standard using the
concordances provided by the UN at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/trade/conversions/
HSCorrelationandConversiontables.htm. The destination data that I describe next are
reported using the 1992 HS standard. I complete the matching between the two data sources
by mapping the country-codes in the export data to the standardized ISO categories used
by COMTRADE.
For Chinese exporters, 2000 to 2006 was a period of remarkable growth and entry into
33The 6-digit harmonized system (HS6) is a global standard used for reporting trade between most coun-
tries; revisions to its roughly 5,000 product categories occurred in 1996, 2002 and 2007. Each country may
have more detailed HS8 or HS10 categories that further refine the HS6 product categories
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foreign destinations. It spans China’s entry into the WTO at the end of 2001, which lowered
trade costs, reduced internally mandated barriers to trade and created export opportunities
for Chinese firms. The nominal dollar value of Chinese goods exports nearly quadrupled
to $968bn in 2006 from $250bn 2000. A large share of this growth was at the extensive
margin —the number of exporters went from 62,600 to more than 170,000. (Table I.A.1
decomposes this growth in exporter numbers into its intensive and extensive margins).34
Among firms that remained exporters, entry into new destinations was pervasive. Four out
of five exporters entered new product-country destinations in the average year.35
Table I.A.1: Exporter Dynamics in China: 2000 - 2006
Year Exporter Count Incumbents Entrants Leavers
A = B + C B = At−1 −D C D
2000 62,603
2001 68,347 52,201 16,146 10,402
2002 78,567 57,263 21,304 11,084
2003 95,627 68,506 27,121 10,061
2004 120,363 82,858 37,505 12,769
2005 143,583 103,724 39,859 16,639
2006 170,642 124,419 46,223 19,164
Exporter-ProdMkt Count Incumbents Entrants Exits
A = B + C B = At−1 −D C D
2000 1,782,803
2001 2,011,808 696,379 1,315,429 1,086,424
2002 2,464,544 828,853 1,635,691 1,182,955
2003 3,076,358 1,059,347 2,017,011 1,405,197
2004 3,827,074 1,307,810 2,519,264 1,768,548
2005 4,846,699 1,593,626 3,253,073 2,233,448
2006 5,895,393 1,907,010 3,988,383 2,939,689
Table I.A.1 also helps to justify the paper’s focus on export entry in Tables 1.3 to 1.6. The
first panel shows exporter numbers nearly tripled from 2000 to 2006. The last three columns
in each panel break down the annual changes into entry (column C), exits (column D) and
34See Ahn et al. (2011); Manova and Yu (2012) for fuller descriptions of how WTO accession reduced
trade costs for Chinese exporters.
35The average exporter in 2000 served 28 destinations - 13 countries and 7 HS6 products, while the
corresponding number for 2006 was 34 (16 countries and 8 products). Destinations had a skewed distribution
of Chinese exporter participation —40 firms on average served each destination. The median exporter count
was 5. The reported central moments exclude destinations with zero Chinese exporters.
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holdovers (column B). The increase in the number of exporters fits the pattern expected for
trade liberalization with China’s WTO accession.
Entry is also the dominant dynamic at the finer level of firm destination combinations
(in the second panel). Here, turnover rates are higher. The fact that many exporters exit
a destination in one year only to return in a later year suggests the need to redefine entry
over periods longer than a year.
I.A.2 Product-Country Destination Data
Global trade in nominal US dollar terms grew at an average annual rate of 7% to reach
$12tn in 2006, covering more than 220 countries and 5,000 HS6 products. Approximately
990,000 unique destinations registered imports in the COMTRADE database, though many
had zero demand in several years. The COMTRADE database indicates a moderate expan-
sion of destinations from 695,000 to 738,000 between 2000 and 2006. (In the same period,
destinations served by Chinese exporters increased by 64% – from 179,000 to 292,000).
The original data set reports more than 63 million observations of trade at the HS6
product level for importing and exporting country-pairs in years from 1995 to 2005. (The
full dataset goes to 2012, but only the first 11 years are usable as history because the firm
level data stops in 2006). I collapsed this data to importing country-HS6 combinations
for each of the years, noting that HS6 categories remain consistent over time. The UN
COMTRADE data is reporterd in the 1992 version of the HS6 system for all years (Gaulier
and Zignago, 2010). This collapsed form represents the history of imported demand into
each destination in the analysis. I expand the data to a balanced panel of 11 years for all
990,000 destinations. This identifies instances of zero-demand. (Missing data is coded as
zero). Market sizes and demand volatility come from this expanded data.
About 390,000 unique destinations were served at least once by Chinese exporters be-
tween 2000 and 2006. About 200,000 of these had no Chinese exporters in 2000 and only
show up later in the exporter-level data. It is important to evaluate the differences between
the destinations with Chinese exporters and the other destinations, of the 990,000 possibili-
ties. Some of the variables of interest in this comparison of destinations that drew Chinese
exporters include size and demand volatility.
Figure I.A.1 graphs the distribution of sizes and demand volatility simultaneously for all
destinations in the data, comparing those served by Chinese exporters with the remainder.
The density plots in Figure I.A.1 indicate that the regressions in the main body of the
paper provide broad coverage of destinations in terms of size and demand volatility. The
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Not Served by Chinese Exporters




















The scatter plot only shows a random 1% sample of the more than 900,000 destinations. The density plots
for market size and demand volatility use the full data set. Demand Volatility represents deviations around
the import trend as defined in Section 1.3.1.2, and market size is the log of the total USD value of imports
into the destination between 1995 and 2005.
Data Sources: China GAC Export Data (2000-2006), UN COMTRADE
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ranges of demand volatility and destination sizes covered by the two categories appear similar
in the graph. Nevertheless, from the distribution at the top of the graph, one sees that a
larger share of Chinese exporters – more than the global average – were concentrated
in destinations with low demand volatility. The average demand volatility for destinations
served by Chinese exporters is .053, while markets not served by Chinese exporters have an
average of .110. Table 1.2 makes the same point with linear regressions. The density on the
right panel shows that the destinations Chinese exporters serve are also larger on average.
To facilitate replication, here are country-level variables used but not reported in Tables
1.3, 1.4 and 1.8 to test the relationship between demand volatility and the number of Chinese
exporters that enter a destination. They are from Head et al. (2010).
Table I.A.2: Additional Regression Variables
VARIABLES N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
GDP 289801 10.06095 2.438002 4.258556 16.39586
GDP per Capita 288048 8.018416 1.572457 4.634483 11.11192
Log(Distance) 346217 8.989019 .5693675 6.925665 9.857974
Log(Remoteness) 346217 -9.105768 .4982548 -10.53251 -8.298696
Contiguity 346217 .0830606 .2759742 0 1
Language 346217 .0277225 .1641769 0 1
Legal Origin 346217 .1771115 .3817636 0 1
GATT/WTO 346217 .7430744 .4369386 0 1
GDP: GDP of the destination economy
GDP per Capita: of the destination economy
Distance: from China to the destination economy
Remoteness: Geographic remoteness, i.e. Destination’s GDP-weighted distance from all countries
Contiguity: Dummy indicating whether country has shared borders with China
Language: Dummy indicating whether country shares ethnic or official languages with China
Legal Origin: Dummy indicating whether country shares legal origin with China
GATT/WTO: Whether destination economy was a member of WTO
I.A.3 Product and Country Variation in Demand Volatility
Country-specific factors explain as much of the variation in demand volatility as product-
specific factors. This is consistent with the patterns observed for output volatility in Koren
and Tenreyro (2007).
Table I.A.3 presents linear regressions of demand volatility on destination size. The
first panel in the table is limited to destinations with at least one Chinese exporter, while
the second panel extends the regressions to include all destinations with aggregate demand
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volatility data. Although destination size explains a notable share of the variation in demand
volatility in the first panel, it is interesting to note that country-specific factors also explain
a larger share than product specific factors. This comes from a comparison of columns 1 and
2. When combined with destination size, the two sets of fixed effects explain comparable
incremental shares of the variation in the dependent variable, if one compares the R2 values
in columns 4 and 5.
Table I.A.3: Demand Volatility: Product and Country Fixed Effects
(Dependent Variable: Demand Volatility)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Destination Size -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.19***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 259,963 259,963 259,963 259,963 259,963 259,963
R-squared 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.20 0.31
Product FE Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y
For All Destinations
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Destination Size -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.19***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 708,802 708,802 708,802 708,802 708,802 708,802
R-squared 0.09 0.14 0.15 0.24 0.20 0.29
Product FE Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Errors clustered by HS6 products.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The units of observation are destinations: unique HS6-product and country combinations, e.g.,
Ethiopian imports of women’s cotton overcoats (HS 610220). Demand volatility is the sum of the squared
deviations of demand from a linear trend over the years 1995 to 2005. Destination size is the sum of aggregate
demand in each destination from 1995 to 2005.
The second panel of Table I.A.3 follows the same pattern as the first panel; smaller
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destinations tend to have higher demand volatility. (This called for the inclusion of market
size as a control in the regressions that I report in the main body of the paper). Furthermore,
product-fixed effects generally explain less of the variation in demand volatility if one does
not control for destination size. As expected, destination size is driven in part at the country-
level. Larger economies import more of most product categories.
I.A.4 Annual Exporter Counts and Demand Volatility
To exploit the annual variations in export flows and exporter counts, Table I.A.4 pro-
vides results of regressions structured after conventional gravity model estimations. The
regressions include estimates with country-year fixed effects in the even-numbered columns.
The results indicate that demand volatility decreases export volumes and exporter counts,
just as in Table 1.4. Unlike Table 1.4, the dependent variables here measure annual export
volumes and exporter numbers like most gravity model estimations.36 In this table, exports
per exporter decrease with increased volatility, another point of difference with the cumula-
tive version in the main body of the paper. However, this table does not include full-fixed
effects for China, only its GDP is included as an additional control for changes over time.
To address concerns about time-varying factors like exchange rate volatility, country-
specific shocks or trade deals, the even-numbered columns include country-year fixed effects.
These improve the estimated coefficients, usable observations and explained variation. A
caveat is necessary: The demand volatility term used in this table does not change over
time, nor do the country-level measures like GDP change within products for each country.
In other words, the estimated variables are not well matched. (Variants of this table that
include the destination size term, or a measure of logged annual imports from all destinations
also predict smaller exporter numbers with higher demand volatility, even if they do not
consistently predict lower volumes).
I.A.5 Other Measures of Demand Volatility
To avoid confronting criticism that that the measure of demand volatility does not reflect
the expectations of Chinese exporters, or is biased, this section repeats the estimates in Table
1.3 using two variations on the measure of demand volatility.
36 One could try to reconcile this to the model with claims that each year represents its own equilibrium;
a claim that requires justification, but that may change how demand volatility should be defined.
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Table I.A.4: Annual Trade Estimates with Demand Volatility
(Dependent Variable: Log Export Indicator in Destinations by Year)





Demand Volatility -2.619*** -2.398*** -1.201*** -0.921*** -1.418*** -1.477***
(0.084) (0.083) (0.040) (0.041) (0.056) (0.054)
Log(GDP) 0.687*** 0.343*** 0.345***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Log(GDP per Capita) -0.095*** 0.016*** -0.111***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
Log(GDP China) 2.983*** 1.848*** 1.134***
(0.051) (0.027) (0.034)
Log(Distance) -0.573*** -0.372*** -0.200***
(0.011) (0.005) (0.007)
Constant 19.190*** 8.133*** 11.056***
(0.275) (0.127) (0.186)
Observations 1,485,716 1,590,273 1,485,716 1,590,273 1,485,716 1,590,273
R-squared 0.435 0.442 0.570 0.575 0.329 0.340
Country FE Y Y Y
Product FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The units of observation are destination - years: unique year, HS6-product and country combinations,
e.g., Ethiopian imports of women’s cotton overcoats (HS 610220) in 2006. The dependent variable is log
(the number of firms with recorded exports to a destination) in each of the years between 2000 and 2006.
Destination size is the value of all imports into each destination, for the respective year.
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I.A.5.1 Chinese Aggregate Demand Volatility
First, I use only imports from China to estimate the volatility measure for each destina-
tion. This goes with the idea that Chinese goods are poor substitutes for other countries’
products, á la the Armington national differentiation narrative, so that in each destination,
there is a market for Chinese goods, and Chinese exporters expect demand fluctuations to
reflect the history of demand for only Chinese goods.






where εjkt is derived from:
Qjkt∑
tQjkt
= ζjkt+ αjk + εjkt
Qjkt is the sum of imports into destination jk from only Chinese sources in year t. I use
the Chinese component of the UN COMTRADE data for this purpose.
Table I.A.5 shows that destinations with high demand volatility have fewer exporters,
just as in Table 1.3. Destination size, GDP, and Distance keep the same signs as the com-
parable results from the body of the chapter, with more of the coefficients being statistically
significant in this specification.
There are other differences, all of which are reasonable for this specification. More of the
variation is explained by the right-hand side variables. (R2 values in Table I.A.5 are higher
by about 0.24 on average). There are fewer usable observations, as there are destinations
with multiple years of available demand history globally, but for which demand history for
Chinese exporters alone is not sufficient to construct a volatility measure.
One possible weakness of Table I.A.5 is that the results may be biased for destinations
served by only a few Chinese exporters. For those destinations, the measure of volatility
largely reflects shocks to the Chinese exporters; firm-level shocks not related to the destina-
tion’s attributes could make the measured volatility higher than its implicit value.
Nevertheless, the estimates support the main finding that exporters on average, enter
destinations with low demand volatility in greater numbers.
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Table I.A.5: Exporter Counts and Demand Volatility (China Only):
(Dependent Variable: Log Number of Exporters in Destinations)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Log(Gross Export Entry) Log(Gross Entry Post-2000)
Demand Volatility -1.140*** -1.113*** -1.081*** -1.062***
(0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020)
Destination Size 0.366*** 0.333*** 0.352*** 0.319***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log(GDP) 0.200*** 0.205***
(0.002) (0.002)






Observations 244,139 279,780 240,832 275,951
R-squared 0.784 0.814 0.777 0.805
Country-Year FE N Y N Y
Product FE Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The units of observation are destinations: unique HS6-product and country combinations, e.g., Ethiopian
imports of women’s cotton overcoats (HS 610220). Gross entry is the log of unique firms with recorded
exports to a destination between 2000 and 2006. The change in exporter count captures the difference
between all firms that served a destination and firms that served the destination in 2000. This difference
measures the net export entry that accompanied China’s trade liberalization from 2001 onwards. Control
variables used but not shown in the table include geographic remoteness and dummies for shared borders,
common languages and WTO membership. Missing observations in Columns 1 and 3 are because GDP data
is not always available. However, estimates on the largest common sample are almost identical to columns
2 and 4.
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I.A.5.2 Aggregate Demand Volatility: Rest of the World
Second, I use imports from the rest of the world, excluding China, to measure demand
volatility for each destination. Compared with Section I.A.5.1, this takes a different perspec-
tive in assuming that Chinese goods are substitutes for items in the same narrow product
category from other countries. By that reasoning, aggregate imports for each product-
country combination form a reasonable basis for setting expectations of demand fluctuations
for Chinese exporters.
The definition for demand volatility for this table is analogous to that for Table 1.3,
except that the Qjk used to construct the measure represents each destination’s imports
from all countries, excluding China. The exclusion implies that expectations of volatility
exclude exporters’ own sales and are tied to shocks exogenous to the exporting firm.
Table I.A.6 presents results that are largely similar to Tables I.A.5 and 1.3. As in the pre-
vious table, the main finding stands: exporters serve destinations with low demand volatility
in higher numbers. Destination size is also a statistically significant predictor of export entry
between 2000 and 2006, as in the two previous tables.
The differences between Tables I.A.6 and 1.3 follow the pattern seen in Table I.A.5 for
the most part. A greater share of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by
the right-hand side variables, and more of these have statistical significant coefficients, while
retaining the same sign as in Table 1.3.
In sum, the results are robust to definitions of demand volatility that exclude the history
of imports from China, or demand from the rest of the world. High demand volatility
is consistently linked to lower levels of export entry into foreign destinations by Chinese
exporters.
I.A.6 Comparing Demand Volatility with Other Predictors
Table I.A.7 shows simple OLS regressions of exporter counts on demand volatility, GDP,
Distance, and Destination Size. This regression with omitted variables provides only correla-
tions to facilitate comparisons. The correlations suggest that demand volatility is informative
for analyses of trade and exporter counts.
The R2 values reported in the table alone indicate that demand volatility compares favor-
ably with conventional predictors in explaining the variation in exporter counts. Comparing
each variable’s column and column 5, which includes all predictors, provides further evi-
dence. The sign and statistical significance of demand volatility remains consistent between
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Table I.A.6: Exporter Counts and Demand Volatility (Rest of the World):
(Dependent Variable: Log Number of Exporters in Destinations)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Log(Gross Export Entry) Log(Gross Entry Post-2000)
Demand Volatility -0.967*** -0.900*** -0.930*** -0.869***
(0.033) (0.029) (0.033) (0.030)
Destination Size 0.251*** 0.216*** 0.245*** 0.211***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log(GDP) 0.262*** 0.260***
(0.003) (0.003)






Observations 331,153 385,885 324,042 377,196
R-squared 0.695 0.736 0.693 0.733
Country-Year FE N Y N Y
Product FE Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The units of observation are destinations: unique HS6-product and country combinations, e.g., Ethiopian
imports of women’s cotton overcoats (HS 610220). Gross entry is the log of unique firms with recorded
exports to a destination between 2000 and 2006. The change in exporter count captures the difference
between all firms that served a destination and firms that served the destination in 2000. This difference
measures the net export entry that accompanied China’s trade liberalization from 2001 onwards. Control
variables used but not shown in the table include geographic remoteness and dummies for shared borders,
common languages and WTO membership. Missing observations in Columns 1 and 3 are because GDP data
is not always available. However, estimates on the largest common sample are almost identical to columns
2 and 4.
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Table I.A.7: Comparing Demand Volatility and Conventional Predictors of Trade
(Dependent Variable: Log Number of Exporters)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)






Destination Size 0.431*** 0.421***
(0.003) (0.003)
Constant 2.286*** 1.938*** 1.917*** -1.822*** -1.717***
(0.003) (0.011) (0.041) (0.026) (0.047)
Observations 371,531 289,801 346,217 371,531 276,459
R-squared 0.287 0.217 0.215 0.544 0.546
Product FE Y Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Errors clustered by HS6 products.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The units of observation are destinations: unique HS6-product and country combinations, e.g., Ethiopian
imports of women’s cotton overcoats (HS 610220). The dependent variable is the log of the count of unique
firms with recorded exports to a product market between 2000 and 2006. Destination size is the value of all
imports into each destination in 2000-2006. The other variables follow conventional definitions.
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columns (1) and (5). Of the other variables, only destination size explains as much of the
variation in exporter counts.
I.A.7 GDP per Capita and the Volatility of Imports
How does demand volatility as observed by exporters relate to economic development?
Figure I.A.2 suggests that in the context of trade, import demand volatility declines with
increasing GDP per capita. The trend in the graph is downwards, indicating a negative
correlation between the volatility of imports and GDP per capita. Not reported in this
paper is a graph that shows a strikingly high correlation between the volatility of imports
and exports. The small island nations on the right of the graph like Bermuda (BMU),
Vanuatu (VUT) and Palau (PLW) also follow the trend, even if it appears shifted. The
pattern is comparable to plots of output volatility against GDP per capita in related papers
(di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2012b; Koren and Tenreyro, 2007). The vertical axis shows
the standard deviation of each country’s year-on-year aggregate import growth, while the
horizontal axis represents the GDP per capita in 2006.
Economic output is generally more volatile in low-income economies (Koren and Tenreyro,
2007; di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2009; Krishna and Levchenko, 2009). Some pointers
on the direction of causation come from di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009), which shows
that openness to trade generally increases aggregate output volatility; trade is usually a
higher share of output for smaller economies. Krishna and Levchenko (2009) and Koren and
Tenreyro (2007) both provide evidence that low-GDP economies tend to specialize in volatile
sectors, with the former attributing this tendency to the quality of institutions.
From the perspective of firms importing inputs for industrial processes, the reduction
in exporter counts associated with demand volatility matters. Where fewer exporters are
available to supply the inputs required for industrial production, the resulting higher prices
for those inputs discourage potential growth in the related productive sectors. Several papers
show that imports are critical to economic growth and the expansion of exports in developing
economies (Goldberg et al., 2010; Bas, 2009; Chevassus-Lozza et al., 2013).
I.A.8 Demand Volatility and Prices
Table I.A.8 tests for a relationship between prices and demand volatility separately for
each of the UN broad economic categories or BEC goods classifications. The classifications
are important for this paper, given how the contributions of each of these imported categories
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The unit of observation is a country, represented by its 3-letter ISO code. The vertical axis shows the
volatility of imports over 1995-2005 and the horizontal axis shows 2006 GDP per capita. Here, the volatility
of imports is the sum of the deviations of imports from trend at the country-level, as in equation (1.18).
Data Sources: UN COMTRADE, CEPII (Head et al., 2010)
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to economic development differ (Jones, 2011). Imports of capital goods have been cited often
as a source of productivity growth in developing economies (Eaton and Kortum, 2001; Lee,
1995).
Table I.A.8: Demand Volatility and Prices, by Broad Economics Categories
(Dependent Variable: Log Unit Prices)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Capital Goods Consumer Goods Intermediates
Demand Volatility 0.099** 0.079* -0.080*** -0.077** -0.014 0.023
(0.040) (0.042) (0.030) (0.032) (0.022) (0.022)
Prod. Mkt. Size -0.021*** -0.012*** -0.022*** 0.000 -0.013*** -0.005***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Log (GDP) 0.009*** 0.176* 0.027*** -0.022 0.019*** -0.009
(0.002) (0.100) (0.001) (0.087) (0.001) (0.054)
Log(GDP per cap) 0.022*** -0.128 0.027*** 0.096 0.023*** 0.043
(0.002) (0.096) (0.002) (0.080) (0.001) (0.052)
Log(Distance) 0.009** -0.604 0.019*** -3.412 0.015*** 0.106
(0.004) (41.277) (0.002) (215.224) (0.002) (35.871)
Constant 2.450*** 0.033 0.101***
(0.054) (0.039) (0.027)
Observations 2,123,105 2,123,105 10,752,290 10,752,290 8,214,698 8,214,698
R-squared 0.964 0.964 0.920 0.920 0.919 0.919
Firm-Product-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Errors clustered by product-year.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The units of observation are unique combinations of firms, HS8 products, destination countries and years,
e.g., exports of women’s cotton overcoats (HS 61022000) to Ethiopia in 2006 by firm #311996528A. The
dependent variable is the log of value divided by quantity for each observation. I used the finer HS8 rather
than HS6 product categorization was used because the units for measuring quantity are consistent within
HS8 but not HS6 categories. Repeating the regressions for products with only one type of quantity unit
within HS6 categories gives substantially similar estimates. The classification into capital, consumer and
intermediate goods follows the UN’s correspondence between HS6 products and broad economic categories
(BEC).
The results indicate that prices are higher for capital goods in destinations with high
demand volatility, if only slightly so. This result holds even in the absence of explicit controls
for product quality, which could matter for a category with quality differentiation potential
like capital goods. Prices are lower on average with high demand volatility for consumer
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goods, which also tend to have quality differentiation potential but represent a larger share
of exports. The estimated effect of volatility on prices is not as clear for intermediate goods
and other products that do not fit into any of these three categories (like automobiles).
While the findings for these other categories do not conform to the model, they could be
explained by related works that imply destinations with low GDP per capita receive lower
import prices (Manova and Zhang, 2012; Hummels and Klenow, 2005).
The coefficients of other variables in Table I.A.8 are consistent with related work on
prices in international trade; prices increase with GDP per capita for the specifications that
are statistically significant, increase with distance and show mixed effects with GDP.
The firm-product-year fixed effects address several potential concerns with the estimate,
including possible changes in HS8 categories from one year to the next (Amiti and Freund,
2010), quality differentiation by firm (Manova and Zhang, 2012) and product differences.
That prices vary by product is rudimentary, but when some HS8 products are reclassified
to other categories from one year to the next, it is important to include fully-interacted
HS8-year effects as a control, even if the reclassifications affect only a small share of product
categories. This pair interacted with firms to create fixed effects that reflect consistent
differences due to firm productivity, and investments in quality. The country fixed effects
address country-specific factors that may consistently affect prices like exchange rates, but
are not captured by GDP, distance or GDP per capita.
I.B Model Features
I.B.1 The Envelope Theorem Allows Optimal q∗ = E(q)
Exporters maximize expected profits in the model by working with two parameters: [1]
they set prices p, which is equivalent to setting quantities q in monopolistic competition and
[2] they set production scale q∗, given that deviations of q from q∗ are costly, as defined in
equation (1.2).
The Envelope Theorem justifies my approach of treating this optimization as a one-
parameter choice, with the second parameter, in this case q∗ fixed at the optimal level.
Formally, if profits are a function of both the production scale q∗ and prices (which predicts
actual quantities sold), the set of optimal profits with respect to prices should be at values
of q∗ that maximize profits.
Formally, one may define profits as the objective, prices as the parameter that determines
profits and the production scale q∗ as the maximizer. In optimizing, i.e. setting the derivative
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equal to zero, the derivative of the profit objective with respect to the production scale equals
the partial derivative of profits with respect to prices or quantities, holding the maximizer
fixed at its optimal level. Expected profits E(Π) is a function of both p and q∗:
max
p





Prices should map one-to-one to quantities, given equation (1.5), thus one can maximize the
preceding equation with respect to q.
In the main body of the paper, I assume production scale will always be set to E(q), and
justify the claim with the Envelope Theorem. Here I provide the formal derivation. The
optimization exercise fixes quantities and prices for trade in monopolistic competition, with


























=⇒ q∗ = E(q) (1.26)
This leaves us with a one-parameter optimization, as long as the production scale is fixed at
expected quantities. (One can generalize equation (1.26) to a set of production scales, one
for each period of the exporter’s planning horizon).
The Envelope Theorem has also been applied to the analysis of incentive constraints in
contract theory and non-convex production problems (Milgrom and Segal, 2002).
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I.B.2 Trade Volumes with Demand Volatility
In equilibrium, trade volumes are the integral of firm level sales over the distribution of
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jk (ε− θj − 1)
]
(1.29)
Equation (1.29) implies that trade should decrease with increasing demand volatility.
The slope of X with respect to σ2 in levels and logs should be negative. However, the ε,
Q and P , τ and S terms may lead to estimated effects that are smaller than the extensive
margin. This pattern is consistent with the assertion in Chaney (2008) that if trade levels
change due to changes in costs, the extensive margin dominates.
The intensive margin on the other hand, depends on the productivity distribution. In
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practice, it should depend on the combination of the productivity slope parameter θj and
the elasticity of demand ε. For example, exports per exporter
Xjk
Njk
may rise if high demand
volatility leads to higher prices that reduce demand, but the slope of the productivity distri-
bution is high enough that the changing export productivity threshold leaves few exporters
to meet demand, leading to higher exports per exporter. In principle, it is independent of
demand volatility.
Formally;
ln(Xjk)− ln(Njk) = ln
[
−θjεSjk










The relationship in (1.30) is a distinctive feature of the Pareto distribution of productivity
(or the class of power laws in general). For these productivity distributions, any change in
the exports per exporter that would have resulted from the changes in prices due to demand
volatility is perfectly offset by the change in the number of exporters. This requires the
usual assumption of large numbers of atomistic exporters. In the firm level data, the average
product is associated with 1300 exporters; the median has 400. In sum, deviations from
a Pareto productivity distribution and a small pool of potential exporters may skew the
findings away from the prediction in (1.30). However, it is still expected that the extensive
margin dominates the intensive margin, regardless of the exact nature of the productivity or
the size of Nj. Chaney (2008) derived a similar relationship between trade levels and trade
costs.
Total exported value to destination jk is the integral over the distribution of productiv-
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Equation (1.32) shows why the extensive margin is prominent.
I.B.3 Demand Volatility and Exporter Size Thresholds
One implication of the model is that destinations with higher demand volatility also have















As demand volatility σ2 increases, so does φ∗. This has two implications: first, that
more volatile destinations have fewer exporters, holding other factors constant, and that
those exporters on average will be the most productive within their product categories. This
complements a similar argument for productivity thresholds and sunk costs in related papers
(Helpman et al., 2004; Melitz, 2003).















where φjk represents the lowest index of productivity for firms in destination jk,
the index could be market share or the number of destinations in 2006
Xjk = variable(s) representing market size
α = product or country fixed effects
σ̂2jk = demand volatility or dummy indicating one of 50 quantiles for demand volatility
Figure I.B.1 presents a pattern that is similar to the trend observed in Table 1.3 in the
main body of the paper. In the first panel of the figure, we see that the minimum number
of destinations served by firms selling goods to a location jk is higher for destinations with
high demand volatility. Taking the number of destinations served by a firm as a proxy
for productivity follows the finding in ? that the most productive firms serve more export
destinations. (Note that the number of destinations in this first panel is limited to 200, as
only destinations for the specific product j are considered). For example, say firm C sells
chocolate to 140 countries, coffee to 15 countries and cream to 60 countries, while firm D
sells chocolate to 20 countries, and coffee to 100. Both firms sell chocolate to the US in
this example. Firm C is taken to be the more productive chocolate exporter and the ’least
productive’ firm in the US market for imported chocolate is firm D with 20 destinations, if
firms C and D are the only sellers to the US. If only firm C sells chocolate to Australia, then
that destination registers an exporter threshold proxy of 140 - for the destinations getting
chocolate from C. The graph shows that destinations with high demand volatility tend to
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be limited to the largest exporters that serve the most destinations.
The second panel of Figure I.B.1 presents a stronger pattern for the relationship between
the minimum number of destinations served by firms and demand volatility. The measure
of productivity in this panel of the graph uses all destinations served by firms, rather than
the number of destinations within a given product. This alternative measure recognizes
that many exporters are multi-product firms, so that their productivity within a narrow
product category may not fully represent the ability to compete. For the example in the
last paragraph, firm D is still the least productive exporter in the US chocolate destination,
but the measure of productivity is 120 (100 coffee+ 20 chocolate). In the same vein, if
both exporters sold coffee to the US, Firm D would still be least productive for the US
coffee destination, as its 120 destinations is fewer than firm C’s 215. For the measure in the
left panel, Firm C would have been the least productive firm and the measure of minimum
productivity would be 15. For this measure of productivity, the same pattern of higher
productivity thresholds for destinations with high demand volatility is observed.
































































The minimum number of destinations served by exporters in each destination jk. The number of destinations
served by an exporter is a proxy for its productivity, so that a destination served by only the most productive
firm gets the highest value of this measure. The y-axis averages these threshold counts for all destinations
in each quantile. Destinations Grouped Into 50 Quantiles, Least to Largest by Demand Volatility. Data
Sources: China GAC Export Data (2000-2006), COMTRADE
The increase in thresholds associated with demand volatility in the right panel of Figure
I.B.1 appears mostly in the upper half of the 50 volatility quantiles used for the plot. The first
half of the panel may not indicate a strong relationship because, as the model indicates, the
effect of demand volatility on profits is non-linear. Nevertheless, the first order implications
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of both panels in the graph consistently agree with the paper’s main finding.
Table I.B.1 presents the results of the exercises described in equation (1.33). As expected,
columns 2 and 3 of the table show that the threshold for firm productivity, measured by the
number of destinations firms serve, is higher in destinations with high demand volatility. I
control for destination specific drivers of the exporter threshold with destination size, as used
for other estimates in the paper. I also include country and product fixed effects to represent
product or country-related factors broadly determine the exporters that can access a foreign
destination. While demand volatility does not yield statistically significant predictions if
the firm share of output for a product is the assumed measure of productivity, in column
2 the fewest destinations served by firms in a destination increases by a number that is
statistically significant at the 90% level. A difference in demand volatility of 0.086, i.e.
one standard deviation, should correspond to a 0.05 increase from the mean of 3.8 in the
threshold of markets served within each narrow product category. The table also predicts
that larger markets are expected to have lower minimum export thresholds, in line with the
literature.37.
Column 3 of Table I.B.1 completes this exercise, showing that the minimum thresholds
for destinations with high demand volatility are higher. Given the mean value of 262 for
destination counts and standard deviation of 0.086 for demand volatility, a difference in
demand volatility of one standard deviation should correspond to an increase of 30 in the
threshold of destinations served.
The increase in φ∗ associated with demand volatility in (1.11) implies that the average
rank should be higher for destinations with high demand volatility. The higher threshold
implies a marginal increase in the average productivity, and size of observed exporters.
37Repeating the regression with firm shares multiplied by 1000 to scale up the variable, given its mean of
0.0017, yields 0.493 as the coefficient on σ2jk - positive but not statistically significant.
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Table I.B.1: Demand Volatility and Export Thresholds
(Dependent Variable: Minimum Market Share and Destination Counts for Firms in jk)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
Demand Volatility 0.000 0.616** 347.170***
(0.002) (0.270) (41.265)
Market Size 0.000 -0.414*** -55.225***
(0.000) (0.018) (2.421)
Observations 285,675 285,661 285,661
R-squared 0.377 0.235 0.086
Country-Year FE Y Y Y
Product FE Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The units of observation are destinations: unique HS6-product and country combinations. The dependent
variable in column 1 is the minimum share of exports within a product category provided by any firm in the
destination represented by an observation. Firm share of exports within a product category is a proxy for
productivity in this column as in Figure 1.3. (The average market share is 0.0017, so the zero coefficient is
unsurprising). In column 2, it is the minimum number of destinations within the product category served
by any exporter with sales to a given destination. In column 3 it is the minimum number of destinations
served by any exporter with sales to a given destination. The count of export destinations for the firms are
not limited to any products for this column.
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CHAPTER II
The Impact of Exporting and Foreign Investment on
Product Innovation: Evidence from Chinese
Manufacturers
Chapter Abstract
To understand the drivers of product innovation at the firm level, I compare the effects of
foreign direct investment and exporting on product innovation using a rich firm level database
of manufacturing and industrial enterprises. The chapter focuses on product innovation, as
it is vital to economic development. Estimates from linear regressions and propensity score
matching tests show that learning-by-exporting is a stronger predictor of product innovation.
Firms that receive foreign investment also tend to engage in more product innovation, but
not at the same level as the firms that export. Additional tests confirm that as they start and
stop exporting, firms change their patterns of investment in the drivers of product innovation
- fixed capital and research.
2.1 Introduction
Emerging countries are no longer content to be sources of cheap hands and
low-cost brains. Instead they too are becoming hotbeds of innovation . . . They are
redesigning products. . . They are redesigning entire business processes to do things
better and faster than their rivals in the West. Forget about flat – the world of
business is turning upside down.
The Economist Magazine - (Masters of Innovation: 2010)
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In developing economies, exporters and foreign owned firms contribute disproportionately
to product innovation.1 The mechanism behind this pattern is not clear, nor is it clear that
technology transfer through foreign ownership translates to more product innovation at the
firm level compared to homegrown efforts. It is clear however, that product innovation is
vital to development. Economies that consistently create more varieties have better growth
outcomes (Hummels and Klenow, 2005). This may explain the interest of policymakers in
developing economies charged with promoting innovation-driven private-sector led develop-
ment in export promotion and foreign investment (FDI). I compare the relative efficacy of
these two well-known approaches.2
China is an excellent case for this study: it has grown to be the world’s largest exporter,
is the number one FDI destination among developing economies, all while expanding the
scope of its industrial output (Amiti and Freund, 2010; Hu and Jefferson, 2002). Chinese
exporters featured in 85% of US imported manufactured goods categories in 2005, (up from
9% in 1972) (Schott, 2008). Firm level evidence buttresses the point. In the Chinese annual
survey of manufacturing firms between 2005 and 2007, 13% of firms reported creating new
product varieties and 10% by value of aggregate output in the data was from the product
varieties that were new to the firms. Thus, one cannot ignore product innovation in the
narrative of China’s growth experience.
To understand the firm level drivers of product innovation in China, this paper compares
two firm categories – exporters and foreign-owned firms. The literature on product inno-
vation motivated this comparison. Gorodnichenko et al. (2010) and Damijan et al. (2010)
indicate that exporters tend to do more product innovation, while others attribute product
innovation to foreign ownership, e.g. (Guadalupe et al., 2012). There are good reasons for
both arguments, and the reverse could be true. Firms that start exporting may learn the
methods required for product innovation, as may firms that receive foreign capital. Like-
wise, large, productive firms may be more likely to introduce new products, export and find
foreign owners.
I measure the effects of exporting and FDI using propensity score matching estima-
tors. This approach uses selection on observed characteristics of firms to address concerns
about endogeneity in the relationship between product innovation and exporting or foreign
1Several papers provide evidence that exporters undertake more product innovation, most notably Gorod-
nichenko et al. (2010). Others show that foreign ownership leads to product innovation (Guadalupe et al.,
2012). These papers suggest that product innovation from either exporting or foreign ownership is due to
technology transfer through international relationships.
2Section 2.2 discusses the relationship between product innovation and economic growth briefly.
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ownership (or FDI). Effectively, I limit comparisons of product innovation by exporters or
foreign-owned firms to firms with very similar observed characteristics. I used a set of con-
trol variables that was large and relevant enough that one could plausibly argue that any
difference between exporters and non-exporters with the same set of characteristics was close
to random. For example, in comparing only firms in the same industry and with nearly the
same size, the approach addresses concerns that larger, more innovative firms in a particular
sector are more likely to experience the exporting ‘treatment’ (Bernard and Jensen, 2004;
Aitken et al., 1997) or the foreign ownership ‘treatment’ (Guadalupe et al., 2012). I use
Chinese firm level data from the NBS annual survey of industrial enterprises between 2005
and 2007.
I find that export participation leads to a higher likelihood of product innovation. The
matching estimates show that new products are a greater share of output for exporters:
20% for exporters, versus 14% for non-exporters with matched propensities. New products
are 12.9% of the output of majority foreign-owned firms, compared to 19.0% for Chinese-
owned peers chosen to control for selection into FDI status (i.e. foreign ownership).3 This
provides an interesting contrast to papers that find higher levels of product innovation for
foreign-owned firms in other contexts like Eastern or Western Europe, e.g. (Commander and
Svejnar, 2011; Guadalupe et al., 2012). The differences suggest that context may determine
the level of product innovation that foreign owners undertake.
I emphasize two causal mechanisms for product innovation – research and development
(R&D) and investments in fixed capital. This builds on earlier papers that provide evidence
of a positive correlation between exporting and R&D, e.g., (Lileeva and Trefler, 2010; Aw
et al., 2008, 2000). I use difference-in-differences estimates to show that on average, both
of these inputs to product innovation increase as firms start exporting, and decrease for the
firms that stop exporting. The same pattern does not register for foreign ownership.
I organize the rest of the paper as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the related literature,
while the subsequent section covers the methods, data and results. The paper concludes in
Section 2.4 after several robustness checks in Section 2.3.6.
3Tables 2.1 and 2.4 delve further into these comparisons. In the main results, I show that these differences
between categories do not depend on whether I measure the intensity or the incidence of product innovation.
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2.2 Related Literature
This paper focuses on the direct impacts of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) on
firms that exported goods or received foreign capital respectively. (I will not discuss spillovers
from FDI and exporting; if these exist, they are likely to bias my estimates toward zero and
leave the main findings unchanged. It is reasonable to expect that the direct impacts of FDI
and export participation vastly exceed the spillover effects).
2.2.1 Product Innovation
Product innovation is vital to economic development. It is no accident that larger
economies produce and consume greater numbers of product varieties, as documented by (Hum-
mels and Klenow, 2005). This follows the Schumpeterian view of development (Schumpeter,
1942); economies grow because firms successfully create new varieties as the old ones disap-
pear. Madsen (2008) finds support for a Schumpeterian growth hypothesis that links R&D
and the creation of new product varieties to economic growth. That paper used interna-
tional data from OECD economies. The argument in that paper builds on earlier work like
Segerstrom (1991), which motivates an unambiguous positive relationship between innova-
tion and economic growth. Benhabib et al. (2014) also provides a model of firm-level growth
that is driven by innovation in a related paper. Other papers provide formal models and evi-
dence that link product innovation to welfare through consumers’ love of variety e.g., (Broda
and Weinstein, 2006; Krugman, 1980).
In the Chinese case, product innovation helped increase the scope, volume and sophisti-
cation of aggregate exports (Amiti and Freund, 2010; Schott, 2008). For firms, the creation
of new varieties adds new profit streams and increases the utilization of human and physical
capital (Bernard et al., 2011; Eckel and Neary, 2010). They can also help to diversify a
firm’s portfolio against potential adverse product-specific shocks. Given the importance of
product innovation to growth, especially for China, this paper tries to understand the factors
driving the creation of new varieties, starting from its well-documented drivers – FDI and
exporting. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to compare these two drivers
of product innovation in the Chinese context.
In considering exporting as a potential driver of product innovation, this paper comes
close to the learning-by-exporting literature, which I describe next.
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2.2.2 Exporting and Product Innovation
Much of the work on learning-by-exporting focuses on revenue productivity, notable ex-
amples include (De Loecker, 2013, 2007; Clerides et al., 1998). Most of these papers argue
that in equilibrium exporters are more productive because firms learn to be more productive
as they export, contrary to the view that exporter are larger because the most productive
firms self-select into exporting.
Few papers have tested learning-by-exporting with respect to product innovation. One
is Damijan et al. (2010), which examines whether the higher level of product innovation
by exporters is due to selection, or learning-by-exporting. (That paper found evidence in
support of learning-by-exporting, using Slovenian data).
Gorodnichenko et al. (2010) provides evidence that exporters engage more in product
innovation, identifying the causal mechanism as information exchange through vertical link-
ages to foreign firms. Their tests use 2002 and 2005 data from a set of World Bank’s firm
level surveys in 27 transition economies from Eastern and Central Europe. Others have
reported similar results for Italy (Bratti and Felice, 2012; Castellani and Zanfei, 2006) and
Slovenia (Damijan et al., 2010).4 This paper extends the research objective of Gorodnichenko
et al. (2010) to Chinese industrial enterprises, in combination with the question of foreign
investment’s impact on product innovation.
2.2.3 FDI and Product Innovation
Guadalupe et al. (2012) uses selection on observed variables to test for the effects of
foreign investment on product innovation, but does include a comparison with exporting, like
this paper. Furthermore, their paper does not test for a causal mechanism that drives product
innovation in foreign-owned firms. Furthermore, we define product innovation differently:
I define product innovation as a continuous measure of output share, while the Guadalupe
et al. (2012) paper uses a dummy that indicates whether a firm introduced new products.
Despite these differences, their conclusions are similar to what I find.
Several earlier works suggest that FDI or foreign ownership should lead to more product
innovation (Girma et al., 2012; Iacovone et al., 2009; Girma et al., 2008; Lai, 1998). The rea-
sons offered by this literature include: [1] Foreign owners support subsidiaries’ R&D efforts,
[2] FDI enables access to needed credit or finance for innovation, [3] foreign multinationals
4All these papers support the learning-by-exporting hypothesis. That said, one must emphasize the
distinction between the product innovation and productivity dimensions of learning-by-exporting. Keller
(2004) reviews the debate on learning-by-exporting for productivity.
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transfer their innovations to subsidiaries to facilitate low cost production. As a parallel to
the learning-by-exporting literature, papers that link FDI to productivity have a history that
goes back to Iacovone et al. (2009); Javorcik (2004); Djankov and Hoekman (2000); Aitken
and Harrison (1999).
2.2.4 Exporting and FDI’s Effects on Product Innovation
This paper contributes to the literature by directly comparing the direct impacts of
exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI) on product innovation. The papers cited
above generally examine the role of trade in product innovation, without exploring the effect
of foreign ownership. The following papers argue that foreign investment promotes product
innovation, also without providing a comparison to exporting (Guadalupe et al., 2012; Girma
et al., 2008). Note that I use the term ‘foreign ownership’ to describe FDI in most of the
paper; the term seems more relevant to firm level descriptions.
Commander and Svejnar (2011) compare the effects of foreign ownership and exporting
like this paper, but for the ratio of sales to inputs. In their analysis, both exports and
foreign ownership are associated with higher efficiencies or throughput ratios. However, the
foreign ownership variable takes away the statistical significance of the export variable in
a regression model with both variables. Furthermore, this paper’s context is China, while
Commander and Svejnar (2011) looks at Eastern Europe.
The tests that follow recognize that FDI and exporting are not orthogonal features of
firm level data. The prevalence of export-platform FDI implies that in many cases, exports
happen because of FDI. Conversely, one can make the case for foreign investment that follows
a successful exporting relationship. In the main tests for the effects of exporting, I introduce
control variables for foreign ownership. Similarly, I control for firms’ export orientation in
testing for the effects of foreign ownership on product innovation. Examples of the first
scenario include Kneller and Pisu (2007) which uses aggregate data for Europe and Sun
(2009), which uses Chinese firm level data to show that FDI increases exports as a share of
total output.
2.3 Methods, Data and Results
This section reports three sets of results: (1) OLS regressions that test the effects of FDI
and exporting on product innovation, (2) Propensity Score Matching tests that show the
same idea more robustly and (3) tests that show drivers of product innovation before and
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after export entry.
The baseline OLS exercise helps to establish that FDI and exporting as drivers of inno-
vation are relevant to the Chinese context, as documented in the literature. It is a simple
comparison of foreign-owned and exporting firms with all other firms in the data. Corre-
lation between these categories and product innovation does not imply causation, so I use
propensity score matching (PSM) to mitigate bias that may result if the firms most likely
to introduce product innovations based on their observed traits, are also likely to be foreign
owned or exporters.
In principle, being an exporter or foreign-owned leads to product innovation because
these categories of firms do things differently – using new methods, equipment, or processes.
Therefore, in Section 2.3.5 I further support the claim of a causal relationship between
exporting and product innovation by testing whether firms that start exporting also change
their pattern of spending on innovation drivers. The innovation drivers I use for this paper
are R&D and asset investment outlays. (I show before these tests that the selected drivers
are strong predictors of product innovation).
2.3.1 Data
The data comprises all annual surveys of Chinese industrial firms from 2005 to 2007.
China’s National Bureau of Statistics compiled this firm level data. The sample approx-
imates a census of all firms with revenues greater than 5 million Yuan (about $600,000),
supplemented with a stratified random sample of firms below this threshold. The entire
dataset is an unbalanced panel of 763,036 firm-year observations, covering over 329,000
unique firms. 55% of the firms are present in all three years, while another 20% show up in
at least two.5
I identify exporters from the reported sales and exports values for each firm-year. Foreign
ownership is determined from the reported components of ownership capital. The data cover
a period of strong export participation and foreign investment for Chinese firms: this was
after China’s WTO accession in December 2001. To illustrate the significance of the timing,
the number of firms in the data increased from 249,028 to 311,186 between 2005 and 2007,
5Before these assessments, I dropped 12,293 observations with one or more of these issues: negative
sales, negative ownership capital, foreign capital that exceeded total ownership capital, and exports that
exceeded sales. (These observations accounted for 1% of the output observed in the data). This was after
I excluded observations for industries outside manufacturing, to avoid comparability issues. The relevant
Chinese two-digit industry codes are between Food Manufacturing(14) and Instruments and Office Equipment
Manufacturing(41).
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and the share of those numbers that were exporters in 2007 was 25%. Firms with majority
foreign ownership were 8% of the sample in 2007.6
Only a minority of firms undertake product innovation - 90% of firm-year observations
registered zero new products. The nearly 76,000 observations with positive values of new
products belong to 45,340 firms that count for 115,315 of the total firm-year observations.
(The firms that undertook product innovation between 2005 and 2007 did so in only 2 of 3
years on average).
To preview whether product innovation co-occurs more with foreign ownership or ex-
porting, one could sort the data into four groups that combine the two sets of categories:
from Chinese-owned non-exporters to Chinese-owned exporters and from foreign-owned non-
exporters to foreign-owned exporters. A non-parametric comparison of average innovation
intensities for these groups provides the first hint of what to expect in the results.
Table 2.1 summarizes the differences in levels of product innovation for the four exclusive
subgroups created by the two categories of interest. New products as a share of total output
value vary between these groups, with the exporting sub-groups having higher averages.
Foreign owned firms do not appear to undertake more product innovation than the average
firm according to the table, although they are larger and more likely to export. The pattern
for size and propensity to export is in line with the literature, e.g. (Guadalupe et al., 2012;
Commander and Svejnar, 2011; Gorodnichenko et al., 2010).
The numbers in Table 2.1 imply that the two sets of categories are meaningfully distinct,
i.e. foreign ownership is not nearly a perfect predictor of export participation and vice versa.
The distinction is necessary for any meaningful comparison of the nature proposed by this
paper.
Table 2.1 also provides the first hint of a reasonable overlap between exporters and non-
exporters, as well as firms with and without foreign ownership. (The overlap is necessary
for the tests that match on observed characteristics in subsequent sections of the paper).
24% of exporters have foreign capital, more than a third of foreign-invested firms do not
6The dataset reports firms’ ownership capital in each of six source categories - individual, collective,
national, other corporations/legal persons, non-Chinese foreign and Chinese-foreign i.e. Hong Kong, Macau
and Taiwan. The first four categories correspond to private and state-owned sources of funds from mainland
China. I define foreign-owned firms as those with majority stakes from non-Chinese sources, i.e. outside
mainland China, Hong-Kong, Macau and Taiwan. I do not consider capital from Hong Kong, Taiwan and
Macau as foreign. The strong historical ties and similar business cultures suggest that these locations should
be considered Chinese. An additional rational for defining foreign capital as I do is round tripping. Xiao
(2004) suggests that, to avoid regulation, some persons invest funds from mainland China through entities
in these locations, so that ownership is only nominally from outside mainland China. Sections 2.3.7 and
appendix section II.C report estimates with alternative definitions of foreign ownership.
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Table 2.1: Group Summaries
Group Attribute 2005 2007
Chinese-owned Non-Exporter Product Innovation .058 .056
Group Share of Total Output .410 .448
Number of Firms 151,975 205,033
Group of Share of Total Number .677 .719
Chinese-owned Exporter Product Innovation .173 .207
Group Share of Total Output .421 .380
Number of Firms 54,134 57,156
Group of Share of Total Number .241 .201
Foreign-Owned Non-Exporter Product Innovation .054 .043
Group Share of Total Output .031 .033
Number of Firms 5,966 7,911
Group of Share of Total Number .027 .028
Foreign-Owned Exporter Product Innovation .130 .135
Group Share of Total Output .138 .140
Number of Firms 12,264 14,966
Group of Share of Total Number .055 .053
export and more than a quarter of wholly Chinese-owned firms participate in the export
market. As foreign-owned firms and exporters are larger than average, there are reasonable
odds of finding large non-exporters as a comparison group for exporters of any ownership
category - several large foreign-owned firms should help to populate the counterfactual cate-
gory. Similarly, large foreign-owned firms would have no small measure of comparably large
Chinese-owned firms as a comparison group. (To illustrate output per firm comparisons;
exporters being 29% of firms, accounted for 55% of output in 2005 and the 8% of firms that
were foreign-owned in the same year accounted for 17% of output).7
Other variables of interest that are not summarized above include R&D, and investments
in production assets. (I use these in Section 2.3.5). First, one must note that R&D is fairly
uncommon. Barely more than 10% of observations register any R&D expenditure.8 Like
R&D, investments in production assets is another measure for which the majority of firms
7 From the group estimates, one may deduce that 4% of total output in all years was new to the producing
firms. Here are other summary statistics not in the table: 27.4% of firm-years involved exporting, 8% involve
foreign ownership, and the hypothetical average firm employed 193 persons to produce 103 million Yuan of
output per year.
8 61 observations were dropped for reporting negative R&D expenditure. Note that the full dataset has
more than 763000 observations.
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report zero. (I take the measure from firms’ reported cash outlays for asset investments - this
data set is restricted to 2005-2007 in part because the investments variable is not available
for years before 2005). These two variables can be considered inputs into the process of
product innovation. Exporters have higher average values for these innovation inputs, as
section 2.3.5 will show.
Some firms switched exporting or foreign-ownership status between 2005 and 2007. These
‘transition firms’ help with the estimation procedures that follow the OLS regressions and
propensity score estimation in the next two subsections.
2.3.2 Baseline Estimates - OLS
The simple OLS approach below provides the first formal test of the paper’s main ques-
tion. It is easy to interpret. It reports the conditional mean share of output due to new
products, or the likelihood of undertaking product innovation with exporting and foreign
ownership as competing explanatory factors.
Formally,
Product Innovationit = α + βExportingit + γFDIit + Spst + εit (2.1)
Product Innovation measures the share of output represented by products each firm
produced only for the first time that year. It could also be a dummy to show firm-years
with positive product innovation.9 Defining product innovation as the share of output that
is new to a firm follows other papers in the literature like Girma et al. (2012). Using a
dummy variable to represent product innovation also follows other papers in the literature
(Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer, 2013; Guadalupe et al., 2012; Gorodnichenko et al., 2010).
While these measures suffer the same weakness as any firm-level index that is survey-based,
their strength lies in how they correspond closely to the outputs of firms innovative pro-
cesses. (This represents a contrast to previous work that focus on inputs into innovation
processes like R&D). Furthermore, the measures directly addresses the objective raised in
the introduction to the chapter of creating new varieties for the benefit of consumers.10
9Being tax-irrelevant, this measure comes with fewer concerns about misreporting. Nevertheless, the
definition is firm specific - one firm’s new product may be another firm’s staple. The official guidance
advises firms to report only substantially new products under this heading. If the measure is misreported
in a particular manner for certain firms or industries, the firm-fixed effects in the section 2.3.6 estimates
address the concern.
10 The firm fixed effects used in the baseline analysis and subsequent tests address concerns about reporting
bias in this survey data, even if it differs across firms, so long as the bias is fixed over time.
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Exporting is a dummy variable equal to one for firm-years with non-zero exports. By
comparison, FDI indicates whether the share of a firm’s capital owned by entities outside
China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau exceeds 50%. The introduction to this section
motivated the definition of foreign capital sources. Desai et al. (2004) motivated the choice
of majority-ownership as the threshold for indicating foreign ownership. Their paper argues
that majority- or wholly owned foreign affiliates experience more technology transfer from
parent companies than minority-owned affiliates. εit is the error term.
Other control variables include industry, year and province: the Spst term represents
fully interacted province p, industry sector s and year t fixed effects. The default level
of product innovation is usually industry-specific. For example, makers of cotton yarn are
not expected to introduce new product varieties at the same rate as the firms that turn
the yarn into clothing. (Hering and Poncet, 2010)’s description of the persistent and large
differences between Chinese provinces in terms of economic development and R&D motivated
this specification, as did the possibility of year-to-year changes in the investments that
support product innovation. I leave out other variables to avoid clutter in this first-stage
comparison of the firm categories.
Table 2.2 reports positive relationships between product innovation and Exporting. FDI
shows a similar pattern. The conclusions do not depend on whether one measures product
innovation as a share of output, or with a dummy variable. Column 1 of the table suggests
that new products as a share of exporters’ output will be twice the average for firms in the
same sector, province and year. To interpret this term, consider that product innovation’s
mean value in the data is 3.9%, while 28% of firms export in the average year. Column 4
reports nearly identical predictions: firms that export are 13% more likely to introduce a
new product on average, compared to non-exporters. By comparison, 10% of firm-years in
the data register product innovation, which implies that exporters have about twice the rate
of the average firm.
Column 2 reports on the FDI term, yielding a lower R2, and a coefficient that indicates
new products are 0.3% higher as a share of output for foreign-owned firms’, relative to firms
in the same sector, province and year. The direction and size of the coefficient agree with
prior works, e.g. (Guadalupe et al., 2012; Girma et al., 2008). 8% of firm-years fall in this
majority foreign-owned category. Column 5 suggests that 0.5% more of the foreign-owned
firm-years report product innovation.
Columns 3 and 6 include FDI and Exporting in the same regression. The point estimates
strongly suggest that exports had a much bigger impact on innovation, and the FDI variable’s
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Table 2.2: Comparing Innovation: Exporting vs. FDI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Product Innovation Product Innovation > 0
Exporter 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.126*** 0.133***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
FDI 0.003*** -0.012*** 0.005*** -0.045***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.029*** 0.040*** 0.030*** 0.065*** 0.099*** 0.066***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 760,777 760,777 760,777 762,883 762,883 762,883
R-squared 0.081 0.072 0.081 0.141 0.110 0.142
Province-Year-Sector FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Product innovation measures new products as a share of total output. This is the dependent variable in
Columns 1-3. In columns 4 -6 the dependent variable is a dummy that indicates whether product innovation
is greater than zero. The Exporting and FDI variables indicate exporting and majority-ownership by foreign
entities respectively. Not shown are the coefficients for fully interacted two-digit industry, province and year
fixed effects.
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contribution changes signs to negative. A comparison with Commander and Svejnar (2011)
is interesting: In that paper, the coefficient of the export variable effectively became zero
when an FDI variable was added to the regression. The reverse is observed here. Differences
in the role of export-platform FDI as well as the nature of the transition to trade in Eastern
Europe may be responsible for this difference - which invites a separate study to compare
drivers of product innovation in China and Eastern Europe.
This exploratory step is highly informative, but comes with many caveats: province, year
and sector-fixed effects are the only controls, and the observed correlation does not clearly
account for the possibility that the most innovative firms may self-select into exporting or
foreign ownership. The next step approaches the question using a propensity score matching
estimator.
2.3.3 Tests that Controls for Selection into Exporting or FDI
To mitigate concerns about self-selection, I use a propensity score matching estimator
to measure the effect of foreign ownership and exporting on product innovation. Some
definitions are in order: The causal effect of exporting on product innovation is the difference
between the average performance of firms given the export treatment and comparable non-
exporters. (This is the average treatment effect on the treated observations). Propensity
score matching relies on contrasts between exporters and non-exporters that are similar on
observed measures. The approach relies on having a robust set of descriptors for firms,
such that differences between matched exporters and non-exporters that are not captured
by the observed traits used for matching should be essentially random, i.e. the Conditional
Independence Assumption.11
I use 12 variables suggested by the literature for this matching process. The first set
of variables are related to size and productivity. Size is a consistently positive predictor of
exporting and foreign ownership in related studies (Arnold and Javorcik, 2009; Greenaway
and Kneller, 2007; Bernard and Bradford Jensen, 1999). I apply the following measures of
size in the data: the value of total assets for each firm-year and a simple count of the number
of employees. I also follow Arnold and Javorcik (2009) in using productivity to predict foreign
ownership. I use the same measures to predict export status: total output per asset value, in
logs, and output per employee, in logs. Like the same paper, I also use firm age, the square
of age and state ownership as predictors of FDI at the firm level. State-owned firms and
older firms generally tend to be less open to foreign investment and exporting.
11Leuven and Sianesi (2012) explains methods and tools for propensity score matching further.
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Other variables that I use to predict exporting and foreign ownership status describe the
sector, location and nature of investments by the firm. Firms that spend more on R&D as
a share of sales are expected to innovate more, while having higher propensities to foreign
ownership and exporting. I also use vintage, the ratio of the book value of equipment to their
original purchase values. All firms in the sample are required to use the same accounting
standards, so the measure provides a relatively uniform measure of capital equipment vintage.
I also consider investments in human capital, recorded as employee training expenses divided
by the total wage bill. Firms with high investments in employees’ skills are expected
to innovate more and export more. Finally, I use categorical variables to represent each
observation’s province and four-digit sector. Provinces capture proximity to foreign markets,
ports, as well as the Special Economic Zones and Open Coastal Cities that were established
to promote Chinese exports. Sectors are represented by categorical variables for the 445
industry groups aggregated at the US-equivalent of four-digit codes. (Appendix section II.A
has a summary table for these variables).
While evaluating the propensity to export, I include a variable to capture the fraction
of ownership capital owned by foreign entities. Similarly, the test step for FDI includes a
measure of export intensity. One could argue that exporting firms get more visibility to
potential foreign investors, and that linkages to foreign investors increase the likelihood of
exporting. This also follows the convention in Arnold and Javorcik (2009).
Table 2.3 show that these observable characteristics are different for foreign-owned firms,
as well as exporters. (The propensity scores used for matching are estimated in columns 1
and 3). More productive in terms of output per employee tend to be exporters or foreign-
owned firms, as are firms that have equipment of recent vintage and spend less on employee
training as a share of wages. The two categories also tend to produce less output with each
yuan of total assets. Firms with more employees tend to be exporters, while foreign owned
firms tend to have less. R&D is higher on average for exporters, but it is less for foreign-
owned firms. Foreign owners tend to acquire younger firms, (which agrees with the finding
in Arnold and Javorcik (2009)), while exporters tend to be older. As expected, firms that
are more export-intensive also tend to be foreign-owned, while firms with a greater share of
foreign ownership also tend to be exporters.
The business literature suggests that foreign investors make the decision to select over-
seas affiliates on observable characteristics like these, which makes the selection of variables
in this paper a good starting point for estimating propensity scores. Similarly, the size, pro-
ductivity, location, industry and knowledge investment variables used in this paper represent
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Table 2.3: Predicting Exporting and FDI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exporter Dummy Foreign Ownership Dummy
Output per Employee 0.106*** 0.230*** 0.072*** 0.124***
(0.003) (0.011) (0.005) (0.007)
Output per Asset Value -0.022*** -0.126*** -0.083*** -0.132***
(0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005)
Log(Assets) 0.070*** -0.131*** 0.259*** 0.162***
(0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.007)
Log(Employee No) 0.265*** 0.354*** -0.017*** 0.009
(0.003) (0.011) (0.005) (0.007)
Vintage -0.353*** -0.359*** -0.788*** -0.941***
(0.011) (0.038) (0.015) (0.022)
Log(R&D) 0.035*** 0.017*** -0.036*** -0.045***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Training Expenses -0.314*** -0.053 -0.445*** -0.389***
(0.037) (0.111) (0.060) (0.090)
Log(Age) 0.117*** 0.221*** -0.265*** -0.346***
(0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.006)
Foreign Ownership Share 1.043*** 0.536***
(0.007) (0.043)




Constant -3.552*** 2.849 -3.293*** -1.509***
(0.143) (89.357) (0.191) (0.250)
Observations 760,567 61,207 694,327 198,681
Pseudo-R2 0.268 0.148 0.232 0.175
Exporters Only Y
Foreign-Owned Only Y
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The table reports probit coefficients and standard errors for an empirical model that uses an exporting
dummy as the dependent variable in columns 1-2 and majority foreign ownership for columns 3-4. Columns
1 and 3 report the propensity scores for all the usable observations, while columns 2 and 4 are for targeted
subsets of the data. Column 2 shows that the propensity to export is similar on most observable firm traits
for firms that majority foreign-owned, while Column shows that the propensity to be foreign-owned follows
a similar pattern for exporters. The output per assets and employee variables are measures of productivity,
while the log assets or employee numbers are measures of firm size. Vintage represents the age of firm assets,
R&D and training expenses measure investments in knowledge or human capital. To estimate the propensity
to export, I include a variable that measures foreign owners’ share of firm capital, and for the propensity
for foreign-ownership, I include a measure of exports as a share of sales. A dummy that indicates whether
the majority of a firm’s capital is state-owned is also used to predict export status. Province and industry
fixed-effects applied to all columns not shown. 86
the common predictors of exporting activity in the economics literature. In sum, the list of
matching variables - including location and 4-digit sectors not shown in the table, provide
some support for the conditional independence assumption.12
I match exporters and FDI recipients to their nearest-neighbors. Nearest neighbors are
the counterfactual items whose propensity scores are most similar to the reference obser-
vation. The propensity score is the predicted value of the exporting or FDI dummy in a
first-stage probit regression using the ‘treatment’ variables that I describe in the next para-
graph. Table 2.4 presents the propensity score matching estimates, which show the effects
of export participation and foreign ownership in columns 1 and 2 respectively.13
This matching estimate of the treatment effects shows that export participation predicts
an additional 6.1% of outputs that are new products (19.9% for exporters versus 13.8%
for comparable non-exporting firms). Firms with majority foreign ownership under-perform
relative to their peers. New products account for 12.9% of their output, compared to 19.0%
for Chinese-owned firms with similar propensities. Understandably, foreign-owned firms
are larger and more likely to do R&D, so the innovation benchmark is set higher than for
exporters.
To address the possibility that only foreign-owned exporters account for the estimated
effects of exporting, I repeat the propensity score tests on the subset of the data that is
foreign-owned only. (This gives 7,527 observations on the common support, much less than
the 90,461 used in column 1 of Table 2.4). Among foreign-owned firms, exporters enjoy
a product innovation advantage that is comparable but less than that in the full sample
(5.0%); suggesting that this subset’s average cannot account for all the export treatment
12It is noteworthy that the signs and statistical significance of coefficients in columns 2 and 4 largely mirror
those in columns 1 and 3 of Table 2.3. The implication is that using subsets of the data do not change the
pattern of export or foreign ownership propensities. Among foreign-owned firms, those with high output
per employee, high R&D, newer equipment and more employees are more likely to be exporters. Similarly,
among exporters, the propensity to be foreign-owned follows a pattern that is similar to the population of
firms.
13The simple nearest-neighbor match suits this paper’s purpose. The number of observations is large,
with many firms in the control and treatment categories sharing similar observable attributes. Therefore,
one expects counterfactuals that roughly approximate each tested firm-year. If the overlap between control
and treatment items was worse or observations fewer, one could have considered kernel matching or other
N-neighbor matching to average out the control observations used.
The results from N-nearest neighbor matching are largely similar. (I use N=3 and N=5, but do not
report these to conserve space). Abadie and Imbens (2009) and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) explain the
advantages of N-nearest neighbor matching over simple nearest neighbor matching.
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Table 2.4: Innovation vs. Exports and FDI: Propensity Score Matching
Dependent Variable: Product Innovation Product Innovation> 0





Constant 0.138*** 0.190*** 0.262*** 0.355***
(0.002) (0.04) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations on Common Support 90,461 78,499 82,932 73,337
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Product innovation – the dependent variable measures new products as a share of total output. Columns
3 and 4 use a dummy as the outcome variable. The reported effects are the estimated average treatment
effects on treated observations (ATT).
The Exporting and FDI variables indicate exporting and majority-ownership by foreign entities respectively.
Section II.A of the appendix summarizes the variables used to correct for self-selection.
effect in Table 2.4. (See Section 2.3.4 for these results).14
Section II.A in the appendix supports these results by showing that the sample selected
for matching is balanced in terms of the observed covariates, and graphically illustrates
the common support on the propensity score for firms that received the export or foreign
ownership treatments.
Comparing the results of this set of tests with the baseline OLS estimates, the 6.0%
difference obtained from the matching setup in column (1) is more than the 3.8% from the
OLS regression for exporters. It is reassuring to see the two tests yield coefficients with the
same sign.
14 The summary statistics on firms that change exporting/foreign-ownership are also informative. For the
61,000 observations that represent majority foreign-owned firms, new products represent 4.7% of output,
while the comparable share is 6.3% for the 2,300 observations representing foreign-owned firms that changed
status from non-exporter to exporter. While the product innovation measure is 6.8% for the 209,000 ob-
servations representing exporters, the 3,400 observations in the subset that changed from Chinese-owned
to foreign-owned exporters reported an average of 5.8%. The data in no way suggests that foreign-owned
exporters are primarily responsible for the main findings.
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2.3.4 Tests on Subset of Data: Foreign-Owned Firms Only
Table 2.5 reports the estimated effect of exporting on product innovation for the subset of
firms that are foreign-owned. Like Table 2.4, this table uses propensity score matching esti-
mates. The controls or counterfactuals for each observation are the most similar observations
in terms of characteristics that predicted selection into the treatment.
Table 2.5: Innovation by Exporter Status: Foreign-Owned Firms Only






Observations on Common Support 12,010 12,010
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The product innovation measure represents new products as a share of total output. Columns 3 and 4 use a
dummy as the outcome variable. The reported effects are the estimated average treatment effects on treated
observations (ATT). The Exporting variable is a dummy that indicates firm-years with non-zero exports.
Section II.A describes the variables used to correct for self-selection.
Within the group of majority foreign-owned firms, exporters on average have an ad-
ditional 5.0% of outputs that are new products. (17.4% for exporters versus 12.0% for
comparable non-exporting firms). The difference is statistically significant, with a t-statistic
of 3.84. Using the product innovation dummy as the outcome of interest yields a starker
difference between exporters and non-exporters. The gap of 15% between these two sub-
groups is also statistically significant; 38% of foreign-owned exporters create new products
while only 23% of comparable non-exporters do so. (The equivalent results on the subset
of exporting firms yield negative coefficients on the foreign ownership dummy, which is not
surprising, given the clear differences in the summary statistics from Table 2.1).
As expected, the propensities for matched estimates were well balanced. Within the
category of foreign-owned firms, exporters and non-exporters were similar in terms of size,
location, employee numbers and other observed traits. The 7,527 observations on the com-
mon support, is smaller than the 90,461 used in column 1 of Table 2.4 largely because
foreign-owned firms are less than 8.5% of the sample. Similar gains in product innovation
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for exporters are observed if the sample was chosen to be all firms with any level of foreign
ownership. I do not tabulate those results to avoid clutter.
In sum, even within the group of foreign-owned firms, exporters introduce more product
innovations. This remains consistent this paper’s conclusion that while foreign ownership
may lead to product innovation, the effect of exporting on product innovation is larger.
2.3.5 Mechanisms for Product Innovation
Given the findings that link higher levels of product innovation to exporting, this section
explores possible mechanisms that enable product innovation. Intangible factors associated
with exporting or foreign ownership may drive the decision to create new products, but the
act of creating new products must require measurable changes to the factors of production.
Examples of those tangible changes could be investments in R&D to develop or improve
products. It could also be investments in equipment to change production processes and
methods.
In other words, I ask whether firms learn product innovation by investing in R&D and
new production assets. The focus on these two potential mechanisms is arguably justified
by the context. Aggregate R&D as a share of GDP in China was growing throughout this
period. At the firm level, investing in R&D clearly indicates a commitment to learning,
which could translate into product innovation. In the same vein, asset purchases could
reflect technology diffusion through the acquisition of assets with embodied knowledge, as is
well documented for China (Brahmbhatt and Hu, 2010; Augier et al., 2013). A large number
of Chinese producers import their production equipment, which usually embodies associated
production methods (Woo, 2012).15
To the extent that exporting is the causal driver for product innovation, it should also
be causal to these changes in production, observed and unobserved. In other words, if
firms learn to undertake actions like R&D necessary for innovation as they export, the
observed measures of these mechanisms should increase when firms begin to export, grow
as firms continue to export and decline for firms that stop exporting. Figure 2.1 illustrates
this pattern of learning-by-exporting. (In contrast, the selection hypothesis would predict
small increases on transition into the treatment, and no changes thereafter). Following the
argument in De Loecker (2007), R&D and new assets could be mechanisms that firms learn
15 Other causal drivers of product innovation may exist outside the two that are central to this section of
the paper. The approach to estimating the causal relationship in equation (2.2) addresses the possibility of
other unobserved causes that do not change in the short run.
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This graph is purely illustrative. It was not created from real data.
as they export, and in learning, become more productive.
Formally, for a set of mechanisms that lead to product innovation Z:
Zit = γi + λt + βSit + ε̄ist (2.2)
S represents the exporting or foreign ownership treatment status; γ helps to address
selection - it is the average difference between exporters and non-exporters (or foreign vs.
domestically owned firms). β is the parameter of interest, it measures the extent to which
firm i changes Z because its ownership or exporting status changed. Z represents the set of
causal factors like R&D, and investment in fixed capital. Firms may not report all elements
of Z in the data.
β = E(Zafter,treated − Zbefore,treated + Zafter,untreated − Zbefore,untreated) is the identifying
assumption in (2.2), i.e. E(ε̄) = 0. This is reasonable, especially if one includes firm fixed
effects.
In other words, R&D spending and asset investments should experience a positive shock
right about when a firm starts to export, the positive trend should continue on a reduced
scale for firms that keep exporting and one should see an incomplete reversal of the increased
patterns of investment for firms that stop exporting. The reversal should be incomplete if
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those that stopped learned from their export experience.
Testing this idea is a regression model that extends the specification used by Bernard
and Bradford Jensen (1999) and De Loecker (2007). The primary differences in this case
are: (1) I test for innovation drivers, not productivity on the left hand side, and (2) I include
lagged values of the dependent variable to reduce concerns about endogeneity.
Formally:
lnZit = a+ lnZit−1 + β1Startit + β2Stayit + β3Stopit + β4Sizeit + eit (2.3)
Start, Stay and Stop capture all the possible treatment status options for a firm in (2.3).
For the exporting treatment, Start indicates firms that do not export in year t−1 but export
in year t and Stay denotes firms that export in year t− 1 and continue to export in year t.
Stop flags firms that exported in year t − 1, but failed to register exports in year t. X is a
placeholder for the matrix of firm characteristics that include size, industry and location. To
interpret the regression, one should consider that only observations in 2006-2007 are usable:
of these, 4% of observations fit the starting exports category, 25% fall in the Stay category
and 4% are observations corresponding to firm-years where exporting stopped. Firm-years
unrelated to exporting make up the remaining 67% of observations.
Given a causal relationship between exporting or foreign ownership and R&D for example,
one must still show R&D is causally linked to product innovation. Correlation would be
sufficient if reverse causation were impossible. In this case, it is possible that firms undertake
R&D or asset purchases after embarking on a course of product innovation for another reason.
Formally:
Product Innovationit = αi + α2Zit + ε̂it (2.4)
Firms fixed effects αi help to identify the relationship in (2.4) as causal. (This approach
also mitigates bias due to omitted elements of Z that are firm specific). If α2 > 0 in (2.4)
and β > 0 in (2.3), one could argue that the variables in Zit are possible mechanisms
through which exporters or foreign-owned firms undertake product innovation. The rest of
this section focuses on estimating (2.3) and (2.4).
I rely on a Tobit empirical specification for (2.2) as relatively few firms undertake research
and development. R&D expenses are greater than zero for only 83,176 of the 763,036 firm-
year observations in the data. These expenses are attributable to 45,340 firms. Even these
firms do not spend on R&D in every year; they account for 127,883 observations, which
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Table 2.6: Changes at the Export and FDI Transitions
Before After Before After
VARIABLES Exporting Exporting FDI FDI
Group Averages
Product Innovation .049 .077 .044 .050
I(Product Innovation > 0) .104 .206 .094 .106
R&D 475.93 773.75 464.47 632.10
I(R&D > 0) .133 .165 .113 .127
Log(Asset Investments) 7.322 7.572 7.286 7.421
I(Asset Investments > 0) .243 .262 .282 .295
N 15726 5688
suggests that for them, R&D expense occurs on average in about 2 of 3 years. I use the
cash flow into investments reported in the data to represent asset investments - the value of
this measure is positive for about 20% of observations, although they tend to be higher for
exporting firms.
Table 2.6 presents some non-parametric comparisons before the regression exercises. It
shows differences in exporting, R&D and asset purchases for firms that changed exporting
or FDI status. Only 15,700 and 5,700 firms fit each of these categories, but those numbers
are large enough to be instructive in this summary table format. As the dataset is a short
3-year panel, no distinction is made between firms that started exporting in 2006 or 2007.
The table provides suggestive evidence of a strong relationship between the transition to
exporting and product innovation, with exporting having a stronger association than FDI.
20% undertake product innovation in a year they export, compared to 10% for the same firms
before exporting. (The comparable numbers are 10.6 and 9.4% for foreign ownership). Table
II.B.1 in the appendix provides further support, with propensity score matching estimates
at the transition to and from exporting/FDI. The share of output due to new products also
increases in Table 2.6, while an additional 3% of firms start spending on R&D in the year of
exporting relative to the year before exporting. About 12.7% of firms that received foreign
capital undertake R&D; in the year before receiving foreign capital the fraction is 11.3% – so
the incidence of R&D increases with foreign ownership, just not as much as with exporting.
The complimentary measure relies on the idea that for industrial firms, new equipment are
strongly associated with new production processes and product innovation. To capture this,
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I measure asset investments: using the recorded value of cash outflows into investments.16
The question of interest here is whether positive values of asset investments are correlated
with product innovation and exporting.
Table 2.7 shows that product innovation increases for firms with R&D and assets invest-
ments, status notwithstanding. To avoid discarding the nearly 90% of observations with zero
R&D expenditure, I represent this firm-year attribute with two variables: One variable takes
a value of zero if reported R&D is zero but is the log of R&D expense otherwise. I include a
dummy variable for non-zero R&D expense in the OLS regression to address potential bias
from the prevalence of zeros. This is less of an issue for asset purchases, but I use a similar
dummy as a precaution. I also controlled for size - measured as the log of total asset values
and employee numbers. I also kept the usual dummies for fully interacted 2-digit industry
year, as well as province dummies.
Column 1 of the table indicates that conditional on having any R&D expense, firms that
do more R&D also tend to do more product innovation. For example, if the average firm
increases its R&D spending by one standard deviation (1.9), it would increase its output of
new products by 25% and its likelihood of product innovation by 2%. Firm fixed effects help
to address concerns about endogenous R&D or reverse causality. The set of firms that do not
report any R&D at all tend to engage in some product innovation after controlling for firm
size in the first two specifications. This supports the argument that firms may have other
approaches to product development like staff training that are not reported in a separate cost
category like R&D. (If the regression was run without the I(R&D) dummy, the coefficient
on the Log(R&D) variable remains positive and statistically significant). In summary, the
evidence suggests a role for R&D in product innovation, with indications that other factors
also play a part in product innovation. Column 4 mimics the pattern in Column 1 for the
product innovation dummy.
Columns 2 and 5 suggest that having asset investments predicts slightly higher levels
product innovation. This is true after controlling for firm size and whether the firm made
any investments at all. (Asset investments occur for only about a third of the observations in
the data). The estimated coefficients on this variable are statistically significant, even if the
coefficients of the dummy variable are not as distinguishable from zero. Large firms in terms
of assets and employees do not appear to be most likely to introduce product innovations,
but new products are a greater share of output for these large firms.
16 As these are industrial firms, for outlays to be recorded as investments, they must be for equipment or
equally durable productive assets.
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Table 2.7: R&D and Asset Purchases Increase Product Innovation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Log(New Product) I(Product Innovation)
Log(R&D) 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.010***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
I(R&D > 0) 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Log(Asset Investments) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
I(Asset Investments) 0.004*** 0.003** 0.005* 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Log(Total Assets) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.005*** 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log(Employees) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000 0.004*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Constant -0.004 -0.011 -0.006 0.091 0.042 0.090
(0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.058) (0.062) (0.058)
Observations 760,777 760,777 760,777 762,883 762,883 762,883
R-squared 0.788 0.787 0.788 0.754 0.754 0.754
Prov. FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The product innovation measure follows the definition in the rest of the paper: new products as a share of
total output. Columns 4-6 use a product innovation dummy as the dependent variable. Logged values of
R&D and Asset Investments for each firm year are the key control variables (I include a dummy variable if
the reported value is zero - the I() items. In those cases, the logged variable is set to zero). The dummy
variables that indicate when these variables are zero address possible concern about bias due to the zeros in
the RHS variables. I also include size controls – the log of total assets and the log of total employee numbers.
To interpret these OLS estimates, it helps to know that the mean values of the Log(New Product), I(Product
Innovation), Log(R&D) and Log(Assets Investments) variables are 0.92, 0.09, 0.71 and 5.78 respectively. 90
and 60 % of the observations had a value of zero for R&D and Asset Purchases.
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Columns 3 and 6 combine the two key variables and their dummy indicators and yield
estimates that are consistent with the other specifications in Table 2.7. Firms that undertake
R&D tend to do product innovation and investing in assets predicts product innovation,
although the coefficients of the size variables are not statistically significant in the Column
6 - suggesting that the incidence of product innovation may not be linked to size after one
controls for inputs like asset investments and R&D.
Table 2.8 links exporting and foreign ownership to R&D and asset investments. Column
1 shows R&D, while Column 2 shows asset investments. The annual survey dataset reports
both the depreciated and original or purchase values of fixed assets. Therefore, it is possible
to track net asset purchases using their reported original values for fixed assets in 2006-2007.
I estimate equation (2.3) with the net purchases data.17
Firms’ patterns of spending on innovation inputs change in the period that they start
exporting. The Tobit specification in Table 2.8 shows that R&D for the average firm increases
by almost an order of magnitude when a firm starts exporting and continues to increase for
firms that remain exporters. (Using the average value for the R&D variable 455 and the




). That group in turn,
invests more than firms that stop exporting. The firms that stop exporting still invest more
than firms with no export record. That positive difference suggests a positive effect from
their past export experience. (Their R&D spending is more than 200% above average).
Asset investment patterns do not follow the trend exactly, but remain broadly consistent:
firms that start exporting invest more than the average non-exporter, while those that stop
exporting reduce their investments. Experienced exporters invest in equipment at higher
rates than new exporters or non-exporters, arguably because exporting provides new growth
opportunities. That said, the three-year panel data can only provide limited support for
claims about investment trends in the long run. The size controls behave as expected; firms
that are larger in terms of assets or employees also undertake more R&D and investments
in fixed assets.
In contrast, firms that start FDI do not spend on R&D more than the average firm.
Their level of asset investments actually falls below the average domestically owned firm
17To use net asset purchases in place of gross asset purchases, I only need to assume that asset sales
are small relative to purchases.(Note that the paper argues for a link between product innovation and new
equipment purchases rather than net investments). Negative asset purchases are rare in the data, consistent
with this assumption. Using net purchases, i.e. gross asset purchases minus disposals, biases the dependent
variable towards zero, which implies that my estimates are conservative. If foreign-owned or exporting firms
were upgrading equipment, which requires the disposal of old assets, one expects those firm categories to
have higher-than-average disposals, hence more conservative estimates of asset purchases.
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Table 2.8: Innovation Drivers by Stage of Export/FDI Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variables: R&D Asset Purchases R&D Asset Purchases
Started Exports 3,347.525*** 26,332.042***
(363.363) (6,106.260)
Stayed Exports 2,875.744*** 46,722.274***
(182.941) (2,935.440)
Stopped Exports 1,254.035*** -12,574.655**
(401.223) (6,322.127)
Started FDI -4,895.070*** -14,372.539
(640.465) (9,450.938)
Stayed FDI -5,016.336*** 8,941.144**
(278.767) (4,322.030)
Stopped FDI -4,222.461*** -34,973.959***
(677.583) (10,105.218)
R&D, Lagged 1.126*** 1.125***
(0.002) (0.002)
Asset Investments, Lagged 0.101*** 0.101***
(0.003) (0.003)
Constant -95,297.229*** -1449025.224*** -97,851.472*** -1469633.267***
(923.096) (14,876.781) (922.512) (14,851.725)
σ 27,249.671*** 521,751.713*** 27,241.946*** 521,782.902***
(53.514) (1,167.716) (53.489) (1,167.825)
Observations 437,768 437,768 437,768 437,768
Prov. FE Y Y Y Y
Ind.-Year FE Y Y Y Y
Size Controls Y Y Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variable is the value of R&D and asset investments undertaken in each firm-year. The main
explanatory variables are firms’ foreign ownership or export status. I also use lagged values of the dependent
variable to mitigate concerns about endogeneity. The σ captures the Tobit specification’s equivalent of the
square root of residual variance.
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after controlling for other factors. The estimated effect of the change in ownership status is
statistically significant, and supports a narrative in which foreign investors ship the R&D
arms of their Chinese affiliates elsewhere. Similar patterns obtain for remaining majority
foreign-owned or reverting from foreign-owned to domestic ownership. Asset investments
have a slightly different pattern, firms in the first year of foreign ownership on are not
distinguishable from the average firm on this measure. However, firms that remain foreign-
owned past the first year have asset investments more than twice the average of 4,660 yuan,
after controlling for other factors. As expected, firms that revert to domestic ownership from
foreign investors decrease their investment outlays.
The pattern of lower R&D spending by foreign-owned entities is consistent with the
literature - multinationals generally prefer to keep R&D centralized where they have stronger
intellectual property protection (Fernandes and Tang, 2012; Branstetter et al., 2006). In
contrast, locally owned exporters generally do not have the option to outsource their R&D.
Their spending on R&D and assets therefore reflects their efforts to update production
processes as they compete in global markets.
These differences in patterns of R&D growth experienced by exporters may lend some
credence to the Economist magazine’s claim: Exporters in developing economies are staking
their claim on the innovation terrain.
2.3.6 Learning with Corrected Biases
To address concerns that the regression coefficients in Table 2.8 are biased upwards
because of self-selection, the next two paragraphs present the results of tests that match
treated observations to counterfactuals with similar observed attributes (propensity score
matching).
Table 2.9 presents results consistent with the findings of the OLS step. Each ‘treatment
condition’ is tested separately. In the spirit of matching propensities for the treatment and
control groups, the control group was selected to match each treatment: Observations with
the Start treatment were matched to others who were similarly not exporters in the previous
period. Stay was matched against new exporters and those that had stopped exporting, while
those with the Stop treatment were compared with firms that had no exporting history.
As in Table 2.8, firms that start exporting invest more in R&D and fixed production
capital than their non-exporting peers. (774 for new exporters vs. 668 for their non-exporter
peers). The estimate in Table 2.9 is not statistically significant for first-year exporters. For
firms in first year as foreign-owned, the sign is opposite and the coefficient is statistically
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Table 2.9: Matching Estimates by Stage of Export Participation
VARIABLES Log(R&D) Log(Asset Investments)
Started Exports 156.244 1762.503***
(144.959) (789.824)
Stayed Exports 602.194*** 3383.571***
(170.850) (1645.369)
Stopped Exports -143.509** -885.979
(78.417) (843.667)
Started FDI -210.047*** -1168.146
(93.668) (2087.223)
Stayed FDI 77.412 4999.749
(181.583) (4548.513)
Stopped FDI -113.867 -1355.626
(130.826) (1380.328)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The reported effects are the estimated average treatment effects on treated observations (ATT). For
these propensity score matching exercises, the counterfactual for each row was limited to comparable firm-
years as follows: Started ∗ was matched to observations not foreign-owned or an exporter, and Stayed ∗
to observations with a history of exporting or foreign ownership, but currently not in a second consecutive
year in that status. Stopped ∗ was matched to either non-exporters or firms with no foreign ownership in
that year. The dependent variables are the reported values of R&D and asset investments. The number
of treated observations were 15,724, 110,260 and 17,100 respectively for Columns 1 of Exports. The FDI
segment had 6,757, 35,394 and 5,636 treated observations. The numbers vary by segment because the match
was limited to items on the common support. The matching variables include firm size, output per assets
and employee, as well as 4-digit industry dummies. Further detail on the mean outcomes for treated and
untreated items, the control items on common support and balancing tests for the matching variables are
available on request from the author.
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significant. In the first year that a firm becomes majority foreign-owned it invests less in
R&D than comparable Chinese-owned firms. This is consistent with Table 2.8, and supports
the suggestion that when firms start exporting, they learn to do R&D. Chinese firms that
become foreign-owned may actually reduce their R&D efforts if the parent company opts to
locate R&D efforts elsewhere, to maintain better control over intellectual property rights.
While firms that start exporting out-invest peers in terms of production assets, the difference
is not statistically significant for firms in the first year of foreign-ownership status.
The estimates in Table 2.9 were not intended to measure the effects of each transition,
but to show how firm spending changes with each transition in export or FDI status. Firms
that remained as exporters spend more on R&D than new exporters and firms that stopped
exporting – the comparison group for this exercise. Similarly, spending on assets investments
is higher for firms that stay as exporters in a statistically significant sense. Firms that
remained majority foreign-owned, compared with new or formerly foreign-owned firms do not
register any statistically significant difference in their spending on R&D and asset purchases.
Firms that stop exporting invest less in R&D and new capital than other non-exporting
peers. The difference is small enough that it is not statistically significant at the 99% level,
however. This may imply that characteristics like output per employee or other matching
variables drive the learning suggested by Table 2.8. It does not invalidate the claim alto-
gether, just how it is interpreted. Firms that changed from majority foreign ownership report
lower outlays on both measures, but not with any level of statistical significance. These firms
spend roughly the same on R&D and asset investments as comparable Chinese-owned firms.
2.3.7 Other Empirical Specifications
The definition of foreign capital excluded funds from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan
(HMT) throughout this paper. This definition was motivated by the similarity of business
cultures, technology and connections in the region.
Nevertheless, I show below in Table 2.10 that the coefficients of the OLS tests in Tables
2.2 and 2.8 would remain mostly unchanged if foreign capital were redefined to include
funds from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. (The implication is that the two categories of
foreign capital sources in the data are not inherently associated with different propensities
for product innovation). For the PSM tests, matching estimates for both versions of the
model are broadly similar, showing that firms increase R&D and asset purchases when they
enter the export market, invest more as they remain exporters, and reduce the pattern if
they stop exporting, but not to the level of firms that never exported.
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Table 2.10 only indicates that the conclusions of this paper should not change, even if
the definition of foreign capital had been more expansive from the start. In fact, I expect
any other definition of foreign capital to enhance the contrast between the effects of trade
and foreign investment presented in Tables 2.4 and 2.8.
Table 2.10: Comparing coefficients for FDI with HMT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Product Innovation Product Innovation > 0
Exporter 0.039*** 0.044*** 0.126*** 0.145***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
FDI with HMT -0.001 -0.019*** -0.007*** -0.065***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.029*** 0.040*** 0.031*** 0.065*** 0.101*** 0.070***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 760,777 760,777 760,777 762,883 762,883 762,883
R-squared 0.081 0.072 0.082 0.141 0.110 0.146
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variable in columns 1 - 3 is new product’s share of total output, while columns 4 - 6
use a dummy that is 1 if new products represent a positive share of outputs. FDI with HMT is a categorical
variable that switches from zero to 1 if more than 50% of ownership is from outside mainland China. Foreign
capital in this table is defined to include Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan (HMT). In sign and significance,
the results are comparable to Table 2.2
The appendix includes tests of the match quality for all the propensity score-based tests
in the previous section.
2.4 Conclusions
This paper compares the direct impacts of exporting and foreign ownership (FDI) on
product innovation. FDI and export promotion are the two main channels that developing
economies have adopted to lead private sector growth; hence the motivation to evaluate their
relative merits in promoting product innovation (Harding and Javorcik, 2011; ?). Firms with
an interest in stimulating product innovation may also consider the same question as a matter
of strategy.
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Using propensity score matching methods and rich firm level data, this paper shows
that exporting causes firms to engage in greater levels of product innovation. The find-
ing lends support to the ‘learning-by-exporting’ hypothesis presented in Bratti and Felice
(2012),Damijan et al. (2010) and De Loecker (2007). FDI does not yield the same impact on
product innovation, in terms of either incidence or intensity. In some specifications, foreign
ownership actually leads to less innovation and less spending on items like R&D. In a devel-
oping economy like China, the absence of a positive relationship between FDI and innovation
may be due to foreign owners’ efforts to protect intellectual capital by moving R&D abroad
(Fernandes and Tang, 2012; Branstetter et al., 2006). Those firms could also be reducing
innovation efforts in the developing-economy subsidiary to avoid effort duplication.
I further explore potential pathways for the relationship between exporting and inno-
vation, using innovation inputs like R&D and asset purchases, as R&D predicts product
innovation in this context. Exporting or foreign ownership may drive the decision to create
new products, but the act of creating new products must require measurable changes to
these or other innovation inputs. Estimates from that exercise indicate that firms that start
exporting undertake more R&D and invest more in new production assets. These results
also suggest that firms learn from exporting – firms that stop exporting spend more on
R&D and new assets than the average non-exporter, even if less than new or continuing
exporters. In all specifications, firms that change from Chinese to foreign ownership reduce
R&D spending on average. Their asset purchases are higher than average, but less than the
comparable number for new exporters.
The contrast between these findings and Commander and Svejnar (2011) suggest that
context may matter for whether foreign investment leads to product innovation. On the
other hand, exporting consistently predicts higher levels of innovation efforts like R&D and
better product innovation outcomes. In a context where a foreign owner only wants the low
production cost of a location like China, foreign ownership may actually leads to lower levels
of product innovation. The owners’ priorities determines whether the firm undertakes costly
innovation efforts.
Relating these findings to papers like Commander and Svejnar (2011) and Guadalupe
et al. (2012) that find a positive relationship between product innovation and foreign owner-
ship in European contexts signals the potential for additional work on how context, property
rights and economic development influence technology transfer through ownership.
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Appendix
II.A Covariate Balancing and Common Support
The key variables are summarized in Table II.A.1.
Table II.A.2 reports the standardized bias before and after matching for the results
reported in Table 2.4. The group averages for the variables used to predict exporting and
FDI are generally within the 5% bias range that is considered reasonable (Caliendo and
Kopeinig, 2008). This ranges in absolute terms from -0.2% for variable the output asset
ratio to -8.8% for the foreign share of ownership. (The corresponding range for FDI is -0.4%
and -4.4% for Employees and Assets respectively).
The quality of common support for covariates can also be shown as a histogram of
propensity scores for each of the firm categories. Figure II.A.1 represents both Exporting
and FDI categories’ propensity scores. The upper histogram in red shows the distribution
of propensity scores for exporters (or foreign-owned firms). As expected, this histogram falls
to right of the lower or blue histogram of untreated observations. The firms that exports, or
those that are foreign owned tend to have higher predicted probabilities of being exporters
(or foreign-owned).
Tables II.A.3 and II.A.4 report the standardized bias before and after matching for the
exporting and FDI results reported in Table 2.9. The matching between the control and
treatment groups is excellent, with bias being less than 5% in all cases except for Output
per employee and Foreign Share of Ownership for the Stay Exporting variable and for 9 of
the 28 tests for FDI.
II.B Product Innovation Before and After Exporting or FDI
Table II.B.1 provides more details findings in support of the summary in Table 2.6 that
product innovation increases in the first year of exporting for firms that become exporters.
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Table II.A.1: Summary of Key Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
year 2006.08 0.813 2005 2007 763036
Product Innovation 0.04 0.163 0 1 760930
Exporting 0.274 0.446 0 1 763036
FDI 0.08 0.272 0 1 763036
FDI with HMT Capital 0.163 0.37 0 1 763036
Export Share of Sales 0.167 0.337 0 1 760992
Foreign Share of Ownership 0.085 0.262 0 1 763036
Asset Purchases Index 0.365 0.291 0 1 763036
State-Owned Dummy 0.088 0.283 0 1 763036
Started Exporting 0.036 0.186 0 1 437841
Stayed Exporting 0.252 0.434 0 1 437841
Stopped Exporting 0.039 0.194 0 1 437841
Started FDI 0.013 0.113 0 1 437841
Stayed FDI 0.07 0.255 0 1 437841
Stop FDI 0.012 0.109 0 1 437841
Age 9.282 9.104 1 126 763036
Log(Age) 1.898 0.806 0 4.836 763036
Employees 192.794 810.633 1 188151 763036
Log(Employees) 4.337 1.288 0 12.145 763036
R&D Expenses 454.727 16747.735 0 7142497 763036
Equipment Vintage 0.698 0.208 0 1 763036
Equipment (Original Value) 39782.204 532832.116 1 157000000 763036
Equipment (Current Value) 29484.101 355024.556 1 76589209 763036
Total Assets 82449.921 775616.848 1 154000000 763036
Log(Total Assets) 9.776 1.397 0 18.852 763036
Output 102839.952 908177.022 0 186000000 763036
New Product Value 12634.049 376061.876 0 110000000 763036
Sales 100776.006 898002.239 0 187000000 763036
Exports 22308.734 441338.881 0 181000000 763036
Paid up Capital 19685.688 156928.073 0 17512000 763036
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Table II.A.2: Balancing Test for Propensity Score Matching Variables
Predictors of Exporting
Means t-test
Variable Treated Control %bias t p > |t|
Output/Total Assets 1.5738 1.5765 -0.2 -0.29 0.771
Output/Employees 6.1047 6.1443 -3.5 -4.48 0.000
Foreign Share of Ownership .17867 .20366 -8.8 -8.93 0.000
State-Owned Dummy .08919 .08761 0.5 0.72 0.471
Log(Total Assets) 11.54 11.522 1.1 1.34 0.181
Log(Employees) 5.5823 5.5187 4.6 5.86 0.000
Equipment Vintage .65905 .66529 -3.3 -4.34 0.000
Log(R&D) 6.1893 6.1547 1.6 1.93 0.054
Employee Training .01378 .01403 -0.4 -0.71 0.479
Log(Age) 2.2552 2.2174 4.6 5.97 0.000
Predictors of Majority Foreign Ownership
Means t-test
Variable Treated Control %bias t p > |t|
Output/Total Assets 1.5869 1.6055 -1.5 -0.94 0.348
Output/Employees 6.4284 6.4654 -3.2 -1.85 0.064
Export Share of Sales .38399 .37957 1.3 0.69 0.489
Log(Total Assets) 11.615 11.684 -4.4 -2.67 0.008
Log(Employees) 5.2847 5.2905 -0.4 -0.24 0.808
Equipment Vintage .64691 .64471 1.2 0.72 0.473
Log(R&D) 6.1767 6.2185 -1.8 -1.10 0.271
Employee Training .01099 .01165 -1.1 -1.22 0.221
Log(Age) 1.9825 1.9722 1.4 0.93 0.353
Please see descriptions of each variable at the beginning of this section of the appendix
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Table II.A.3: Balancing Test for Propensity Score Variables: Transition Test I
Predictors of Started Exporting
Means t-test
Variable Treated Control %bias t p > |t|
Output/Total Assets 1.5281 1.5178 0.8 0.24 0.810
Output/Employees 5.925 5.9263 -0.1 -0.04 0.972
Foreign Share of Ownership .13155 .13907 -3.0 -0.67 0.505
State-Owned Dummy .09321 .09587 -0.9 -0.25 0.803
Log(Total Assets) 11.622 11.607 1.0 0.26 0.798
Log(Employees) 5.7027 5.6865 1.3 0.36 0.721
Equipment Vintage .6641 .66567 -0.8 -0.24 0.811
Employee Training .0156 .01577 -0.3 -0.10 0.918
Log(Age) 2.2718 2.2646 0.9 0.26 0.798
Predictors of Stayed Exporting
Means t-test
Variable Treated Control %bias t p > |t|
Output/Total Assets 1.5474 1.579 -2.7 -2.25 0.024
Output/Employees 5.9308 6.0291 -10.2 -7.75 0.000
Foreign Share of Ownership .17727 .20722 -10.0 -6.44 0.000
State-Owned Dummy .10083 .10293 -0.7 -0.55 0.584
Log(Total Assets) 11.995 12.026 -1.9 -1.45 0.146
Log(Employees) 6.1769 6.1311 3.6 2.76 0.006
Equipment Vintage .62876 .62543 1.8 1.50 0.135
Employee Training .01259 .01286 -0.7 -0.74 0.457
Log(Age) 2.4545 2.3972 7.5 6.07 0.000
Predictors of Stopped Exporting
Means t-test
Variable Treated Control %bias t p > |t|
Output/Total Assets 1.5485 1.5306 1.4 0.35 0.729
Output/Employees 5.8648 5.8697 -0.5 -0.12 0.908
Foreign Share of Ownership .0759 .08364 -3.6 -0.75 0.453
State-Owned Dummy .1368 .12554 3.3 0.80 0.423
Log(Total Assets) 11.375 11.417 -2.7 -0.64 0.519
Log(Employees) 5.5437 5.564 -1.7 -0.41 0.683
Equipment Vintage .656 .65473 0.7 0.16 0.870
Employee Training .01713 .01743 -0.6 -0.17 0.866
Log(Age) 2.3614 2.3585 0.4 0.09 0.928
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Table II.A.4: Balancing Test for Propensity Score Variables: Transition Test II
Predictors of Started FDI
Means t-test
Variable Treated Control %bias t p > |t|
Output/Total Assets 1.6976 1.6848 1.1 0.15 0.877
Output/Employees 6.1857 6.2 -1.6 -0.22 0.826
Export Share of Sales .343 .3436 -0.2 -0.02 0.982
State-Owned Dummy .07126 .08551 -4.4 -0.77 0.442
Log(Total Assets) 11.923 11.895 1.8 0.26 0.794
Log(Employees) 5.8305 5.8129 1.3 0.20 0.842
Equipment Vintage .64612 .63734 4.8 0.70 0.481
Employee Training .01038 .00969 1.6 0.61 0.544
Log(Age) 2.1074 2.175 -9.8 -1.60 0.110
Predictors of Stayed FDI
Means t-test
Variable Treated Control %bias t p > |t|
Output/Total Assets 1.6572 1.7246 -5.8 -2.06 0.040
Output/Employees 6.3125 6.4117 -10.1 -3.09 0.002
Export Share of Sales .37451 .37824 -0.9 -0.31 0.755
State-Owned Dummy .08289 .0575 8.5 3.21 0.001
Log(Total Assets) 11.947 12.094 -10.2 -3.26 0.001
Log(Employees) 5.7729 5.8381 -5.1 -1.68 0.093
Equipment Vintage .60634 .60716 -0.4 -0.15 0.882
Employee Training .01157 .00977 4.5 1.49 0.135
Log(Age) 2.1783 2.1604 3.3 1.06 0.288
Predictors of Stopped FDI
Means t-test
Variable Treated Control %bias t p > |t|
Output/Total Assets 1.63 1.6816 -4.3 -0.55 0.581
Output/Employees 5.9498 5.9698 -2.2 -0.28 0.783
Export Share of Sales .33614 .38017 -12.6 -1.44 0.152
State-Owned Dummy .11799 .14749 -8.4 -1.13 0.258
Log(Total Assets) 11.711 11.73 -1.2 -0.16 0.876
Log(Employees) 5.8332 5.8516 -1.4 -0.18 0.856
Equipment Vintage .61518 .60384 6.0 0.77 0.444
Employee Training .01034 .01078 -0.9 -0.22 0.825
Log(Age) 2.1231 2.1793 -8.4 -1.13 0.257
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Figure II.A.1: Graphing Covariate Match Quality
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
(a) Exporting (b) FDI.
(FDI also leads to increased product innovation in the first year, though not on the same
scale). Each ‘treatment condition’ is tested separately. As with Table 2.9, the control groups
were selected to match each treatment: Observations with the Start treatment were matched
to others who were similarly not exporters in the previous period. Stay was matched against
new exporters and those that had stopped exporting, while those with the Stop treatment
were compared with firms that had no exporting history.
The results show, as expected, that new products as a share of output increase by an
average of 3.8% for firms in their first year of exporting, compared to firms with similar
observable traits. Firms that remain exporters undertake more product innovation that those
that are new or that stopped exporting. On the other hand, firms that stopped exporting
undertake slightly more product innovation than non-exporters, but this difference is not
statistically significant.
The same effect is not obvious for foreign investment. There is no statistically significant
difference between firms in their first year of foreign ownership and comparable peers with
matched propensities for FDI. On the contrary, new products as a share of output is less
for firms with more than one year of foreign ownership, compared with other firms that are
newly or formerly foreign-owned.
II.C More Tests with FDI Defined to Include HMT
Table II.C.1 shows that the coefficients in Table 2.9 of section 2.3.6 should remain largely
unchanged if foreign capital was redefined to include funds from Hong Kong, Macau and
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Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The reported effects are the estimated average treatment effects on treated observations (ATT). For
these exercises, the counterfactual for each row was limited to comparable firm-years as follows: Started ∗
was matched to observations not foreign-owned or an exporter, and Stayed ∗ to observations with a history of
exporting or foreign ownership, but currently not in a second consecutive year in that status. Stopped ∗ was
matched to either non-exporters or firms with no foreign ownership in that year. The dependent variables
is product innovation – new products’ share of the firm’s output. The number of treated observations
were 15,724, 110,260 and 17,100 respectively for Columns 1 of Exports. Columns 2 of that segment had
6,757, 35,394 and 5,636. The numbers vary by column because the match was limited to items on the
common support. The matching variables include firm size, output per assets and employee, as well as
4-digit industries. Further detail on the mean outcomes for treated and untreated items, the control items
on common support and balancing tests for the matching variables are available on request.
113
Taiwan. In showing how firms change their investments in R&D and fixed assets as they
become foreign-owned, keep that status or leave it, the estimates remain remarkably consis-
tent with those of Table 2.9. Columns 1 and 2 reflect the values in Table 2.9 while the last
two columns use the new definition of foreign ownership. Note that there are twice as many
observations that are foreign-owned by this new definition, compared to the old. That is,
firms in the first year of majority foreign ownership by this definition invest less in R&D than
comparable Chinese-owned firms. One reason Chinese firms that become foreign-owned may
reduce their R&D efforts is to avoid duplication of efforts by the foreign parent. It appears
that foreign owners from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau are no more inclined to keep R&D
in mainland China than other foreign owners. Similarly, firms that start majority foreign-
ownership out-invest their peers in terms of fixed production capital. The estimates are not
statistically significant, just like in Table 2.9.
For the firms that remain or stop being majority foreign-owned, the estimates in Table
II.C.1 are remarkably similar to estimates with the original foreign ownership definition.
The one exception is that firms that leave the foreign-owned status in the new definition
under-invest in assets relative to comparable foreign-owned entities and the difference is
statistically significant. In other words, the new definition does not help the argument in the
literature that foreign ownership promotes innovation and the asset investments associated
with product innovation.
In sum, Table II.C.1 suggests that the conclusions of this paper are robust to many
definitions of foreign capital.
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Table II.C.1: Comparing coefficients for FDI with and without HMT
FDI definition: (without HMT) (with HMT)
VARIABLES R&D Asset Investments R&D Asset Investments
Started FDI -210.047*** -1168.146 -171.522* -4018.628
(93.668) (2087.223) (97.164) (2673.713)
Stayed FDI 77.412 4999.749 265.349 1070.389
(181.583) (4548.513) (99.501) (2890.818)
Stopped FDI -113.867 -1355.626 -391.639 -7710.459***
(130.826) (1380.328) (149.841) (2599.643)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: HMT stands for Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. The estimates in Columns 3 and 4 use foreign
ownership definitions that include capital from these sources outside the Chinese mainland. Columns 1 and
2 replicate the results in Table 2.9. The propensity score matching approach also follows the pattern in
that table, the counterfactual for each row was limited to comparable firm-years as follows: Started FDI
was matched to observations not foreign-owned, Stayed FDI to observations in the first year of foreign
ownership or that was majority foreign-owned in the previous year, Stopped FDI was matched to firms
no foreign-owned in that year. The dependent variables are R&D and asset investments . The number of
treated observations were 6,753, 66,902 and 5,635 respectively. The numbers vary by column because the
match was limited to items on the common support.
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CHAPTER III
Bridging the Enforcement Gap in International Trade:
Explaining Participation in the New York Convention
on Arbitration1
Chapter Abstract
International trade transactions come with a peculiar hazard – there are no common
courts or legal jurisdictions to enforce contracts if disputes arise, unlike commerce inside
national borders. Distance, language and cultural disparities further complicate contract
enforcement for international trade. A 1958 United Nations treaty, the New York Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (NYC) addresses this
enforcement gap. NYC signatory countries commit to enforce the outcomes of private ar-
bitration between importers and exporters. This makes private international arbitration a
viable legal alternative, supported with state enforcement like national courts. Surprisingly,
many countries waited decades to join the NYC despite the obvious benefits. This puzzle
presents an opportunity to examine treaty membership as a policy adoption problem - how
the costs and benefits of membership lead to delays in participation. The model of policy
adoption in this paper makes it possible to compare the roles of trade interactions, social
contagion or peer effects and internal barriers in the timing of membership decisions. Tests
of the model’s predictions indicate that countries are more likely to join when their regional
trade partners do - trade by itself does not fully explain this pattern. I also estimate sig-
nificant effects for internal barriers to policy adoption, using systems of government and
legal origins as proxy. Democracies on average join earlier, and countries with socialist legal
origins have the shortest average delays to joining the treaty.
1Versions of this chapter have been circulated as coauthored with Prof. Scott Masten. The chapter started as a research
project under his supervision: the original idea arose from our conversations and the project has progressed with his guidance.
He is not listed as a co-author here at his own suggestion.
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3.1 Introduction
International trade transactions come with a peculiar hazard – there are no common
courts or legal jurisdictions to enforce contracts if disputes arise, unlike commerce inside na-
tional borders. Distance, language and cultural disparities further complicate the challenges
of contracting for international trade. Even if the parties agree to arbitration or the courts of
one party’s country, the problem of enforcement remains; it may be difficult or impossible to
secure performance or damages if the losing party resides outside the controlling jurisdiction.
In sum, the legal options present a dilemma: Dim prospects of recovery for awards made in
domestic courts that the counter-party may not recognize, versus the potential for biased
judgments in the courts of the partner’s host country.
To bridge this enforcement gap, a 1958 United Nations conference produced the Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, known as the New
York Convention (NYC). Countries that sign the NYC treaty agree to enforce the judg-
ments issued by arbitrators to resolve private commercial disputes arising from international
trade. The benefits to signatories are several; businesses get relatively fast and high-quality
adjudication from arbitrators of their choice and governments have fewer cases congesting
the courts. The convention also provides the opportunity to send a credible signal that a
national government supports honest trade. Surprisingly, many countries waited decades to
join the treaty, despite the obvious benefits. Large trading economies like the U.S. and the
U.K. joined in 1970 and 1975, more than a decade after the first members. Treaty member-
ship was only 51 out 155 possible countries in 1978, two decades after the initial signatures.
By comparison, in the first two decades of GATT, the World Trade Organization’s prede-
cessor founded in 1948, 75 countries became members, despite GATT’s more stringent entry
requirements. (Figure III.B.2 in the appendix illustrates the comparison of WTO and NYC
membership).
This paper asks why countries delayed entry into the treaty, given the apparent benefits
of NYC membership. The exploration follows a model of treaty membership that recognizes
multiple sources of incentives for countries to participate. The model is rich enough to
embody many of the traits of seminal models of product adoption like Bass (1969) and
models of influence or diffusion in the microeconomics and policy literature (Golub and
Jackson, 2010; Young, 2009; Shipan and Volden, 2008; Simmons and Elkins, 2004).2
2The rich body of work on peer effects, contagion and diffusion spans many fields – from economics to
political science and beyond. Space constrains this paper to citing only a limited number.
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The paper has two main objectives: showing that treaty participation is endogenous, and
highlighting the role of peer effects. In showing that participation in the NYC is endogenous,
the paper enables better estimates of the effects of participation on trade. I show that
participation and the timing of membership are not random – they are related to countries’
trade relationships, legal origins and the nature of traded goods. This complements papers
that measure the impact of NYC membership on trade. (See Berkowitz et al. (2006), for
example). This study may also help other efforts to understand the impact of membership
for other treaties, e.g. the WTO, although differences in the WTO’s entry procedures call
for additional model features.3
In the context of international governance, identifying peer effects is important for many
reasons. If one considers peer effects, initiators of international treaties may recognize that
the success of a treaty depend as much on whether influential countries are the first to
join as on the benefits of the treaty to the average country. Furthermore, governments
adopt policies with significant economic impact like smoking bans or motorcycle helmet
laws, largely in response to their neighbors’ actions Lee and Lee (2011); Bramoullé et al.
(2009); Lee (2007). This chapter aims to describe the drivers of membership in a trade
treaty with the legal significance of the NYC, where peer effects are a possibility. (I use
contagion and peer effects interchangeably in this context; the first term is less common
in the economics literature except for papers on financial crisis, but is preferred by related
papers like Young (2009) and Simmons and Elkins (2004).)
Specifically, I ask whether peer effects play a role in countries’ decision to join the NYC.
The data suggests that the answer is affirmative. Following the basic structure in Young
(2009), contagion produces participation patterns shaped like an S-curve. The intuition
behind the structure is straightforward: in a model of contagion or peer effects, the hazard
of participation is proportional to interactions between members and non-members. That
hazard is lowest when most countries fall in one category, and it peaks when members and
non-members are in equal proportion.
In Figure 3.1, a relatively featureless model of contagion explains 90% of the variation in
total NYC membership over time. Participation follows the S-curve predicted by a model
of contagion. The model behind Figure 3.1 implies that a country joins only because others
have joined. That model identifies no specific incentives faced by potential treaty members,
3Membership in the NYC requires only a signature by an eligible country. (See discussion of eligibility
section 3.2.1). GATT/WTO membership on the other hand, requires all WTO members to agree on the
terms of each new member’s accession through negotiations.
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The plot shows actual NYC membership in year t as circles and model predictions as hollow squares. The
model uses only the number of eligible countries N , current members n and time t to predict changes to





= constant+ γt+ εt.
(I do not show Nt, which changed as new countries were formed, or former colonies gained political inde-
pendence).
Data Source: UNCITRAL (2014)
nor does it describe costs or frictions that delay entry, if any. The model is agnostic with
respect to the specific nature of interactions that promote membership and how interactions
of any kind translate to treaty participation. Nevertheless, the level of fit between this basic
model of contagion and the data is noteworthy.
Interpreting the level of fit in Figure 3.1 depends on how one defines interactions between
treaty members, or whether interactions contribute to the hazard of joining the treaty. First,
the skeptical position that interactions do not contribute: If it was true that countries join at
an exogenous rate that does not depend on interactions, the rate was constant over time, the
number of countries is fixed, and all countries were equally susceptible, Figure 3.1 would be a
linear plot. If membership was strictly exogenous but countries were not equally susceptible,
the curve would be consistently concave. The most susceptible countries would be first to join
and the slope of the curve would be decreasing (or at least non-increasing). Neither of these
scenarios involve a specific explanation for an exogenous constant driver of participation, if
any exists. In either case, if an exogenous membership process was part of a mix of factors
driving membership, the linear or concave plot they would generate should contribute to the
degree of fit that one observes in the figure.
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Second, if treaty participation was only due to interactions between countries, Figure 3.1
offers a narrow set of assumptions about how those interactions cause countries to join the
treaty. The model behind the figure does not identify whether the interactions responsible
for treaty participation is having shared borders, a common language or the simple act
of observing other countries’ membership status. Interactions are assumed equally likely
between any two parties, and all interactions contribute equally to the likely of a non-
member joining the treaty. Justifying these assumptions is difficult – bilateral relations
between government can hardly be described as uniform.
Figure 3.2 extends the basic model of contagion behind the previous figure. It shows
the predictions of a model in which treaty members’ share of trade drives the likelihood of
non-members joining the treaty. The regressions underlying the figure suggest that NYC
members’ share of trade explains more than 95% of changes in membership over time. (Sec-
tion 3.3 describes this model). While interactions between countries drive membership in
both models, trade determines the weight given to interactions in Figure 3.2. By this rea-
soning, countries with no NYC trade partners have zero incentive to join. In Figure 3.1, the
share of a country’s trade with NYC members is irrelevant to the treaty-joining decision,
only their numbers matter. The model in Figure 3.2 looks less like an S-curve because trade
between NYC members and non-members should be constantly increasing – trade between
any pair of transactors is equally likely in the model.
The model represented in Figure 3.2 allows for the possibility that countries that join
the treaty because it lowers trade costs or provides benefits in the nature of a network
good. One could crudely describe the benefit of NYC membership in this model as free
contract enforcement insurance for firms in member countries. Any non-member that trades
with NYC members has an incentive to join for the ‘free insurance’ that it represents to its
trading firms. If that country joins, all its trade partners that are not NYC members in turn
have an incentive to join. However, there is no logical reason why narrowly defined economic
incentives must be the only driver of treaty membership.4
The two figures make the case for a hybrid model of treaty participation. Earlier models
of decision-making with more than one driving mechanism include the relatively successful
Bass (1969) model of product adoption. That model proposed that purchases of durable
4There is a testable difference between membership motivated by ’free contract insurance’ on the one hand
and social learning, contagion or imitation on the other hand. Membership motivated by the insurance or
cost incentive will not respond to changes in the membership of countries that are not active trade partners
of a potential members. Membership driven by interactions reflects the influence of other countries, even if
they are marginally trade partners or not trade partners at all.
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The plot shows the number of NYC members in each year t as circles. The squares show the prediction
of a model that uses only the number of eligible countries N , NYC members’ share of global trade, and
the number of current members n to predict changes to membership. The predictions represent the best-fit





= λ(NY Ctradesharet ∗ t) + εt. Trade data is only available up to 2006.
Section 3.3 explains the assumptions and estimates further.
Data Source: UNCITRAL (2014), Head et al. (2010)
goods reflect an innovation rate due to product advertising and a diffusion rate due to
interactions between current and potential product users. This paper’s hybrid model differs
in how it proposes richer interactions between decision makers, given that trade interactions
are primarily between businesses, not the governments that ultimately make the membership
decision. It also recognizes that trade is not the only reason behind interactions between
national governments, even if the NYC treaty is limited to trade.5
In exploring how countries adoption policies, treaties or innovations, this paper considers
three approaches: [1] Countries join to allow their firms the economic benefits of trade with
5 Aral et al. (2013) provides another model in this hybrid category, one that emphasizes peer influence,
while allowing higher levels of influence for peers with more similar traits. Papers like Young (2009) and
Shipan and Volden (2008) emphasize the diffusion mechanism, based on mechanisms that include learning
and social contagion.
I also considered the possibility that countries join the NYC as a requirement for joining other groups,
motivated by interactions of the coercive sort described in Shipan and Volden (2008). A simple test of
whether NYC participation is linked to WTO membership does not support this argument. (The WTO is
the only better-known trade agreement with a comparable number of signatories). A correlation of entry
sequence rank for the two agreements yields a coefficient of 32% for the 128 countries that signed up to
both organizations. Rank is based on GATT dates for countries that joined before 1995. It is not clear that
countries join the NYC because they need to join the WTO/GATT.
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partners from NYC member countries. [2] Countries join because of social contagion or
interactions with NYC members outside of trade between firms. [3] Countries join when
the benefits of participation sufficiently exceed the political costs or internal barriers to
participation. The costs of political action should be related to system of government and the
legal system. These broad responses can be explored in detail while taking advantage of the
remarkable fit between the aggregate membership trend and models driven by interactions
between countries.
Other non-trade factors can also be identified or included in the estimation framework
that flows from these answers. For example, considering political costs or internal barriers
has two benefits: it recognizes that country-specific propensities may vary, and it addresses
the skeptical argument that interactions play no part in membership from earlier in this
section. If interactions played no part in membership, then internal barriers to participation
should explain all the variation in the data. In other words, with a model this flexible, an
observer has more room for trying to learn what best explains the data.
The empirical section of this paper uses a hazard model to estimate the relative contri-
bution of the aforementioned drivers to the timing of countries’ decision to join the NYC.
The main findings from those exercises are:
• Countries are more likely to join the treaty when their regional trade partners are
members. The findings are consistent with the predictions of a model of peer influence.6
• Surprisingly, the share of trade with NYC members by itself is not a significant driver
of membership after controlling for the NYC membership of RTA partners.
• Country-specific traits influence the hazard of treaty participation.
– Countries with differentiated goods as a greater share of trade join sooner
– There is weak evidence that democracies join sooner on average,
– Countries of socialist legal origin join the treaty sooner, on average.
6The argument for peer influence comes with the caveat that further work is required on how countries’
policy choices depend on those of the parent-countries or colonial metropoles. Though more than 190
countries were eligible to join the treaty in 2014, only 87 had that privilege in 1958 - most had not even
been founded. The argument for peer influence in this paper rests largely on an empirical model that does
not consider the NYC status of parent-countries like Yugoslavia on the choices of countries like Serbia that
emerged from its split, nor on the NYC status of colonial metropoles - in part because only four countries
account for most colonial relationships. Table III.A.4 clearly suggests further research into how the NYC
status of ’parent-countries’ influence the choices of the countries they spawned.
122
The findings are relevant to several questions in the literature. First, Masten and Prüfer
(2014) show that formal adjudication is a substitute for reputation-based enforcement, espe-
cially when trade is expanding. This paper provides an opportunity to take this hypothesis
to the data. Specifically, one could test the hypothesis that the propensity to join the treaty
is higher for countries with higher shares of trade with new or distant partners, or countries
with trade situations that are generally contract-intensive.
The model in the paper also contributes to the product/policy adoption literature. Its
hybrid nature includes elements of the Bass (1969) model of product adoption – choices are
private even if the treaty is a network good because every country that joins increases the
value of participation for current and potential members. However, it is flexible enough to
recognize that countries may join for reasons other than taking trade contracts beyond the
bounds of reputational enforcement. In that way, it complements the papers on contagion
or policy diffusion (Aral et al., 2013; Young, 2009; Shipan and Volden, 2008).
The next section presents related literature and some background on the treaty. It is
followed by sections that model treaty participation and empirics that test the model’s
predictions.
3.2 Background and Related Literature
3.2.1 Background on the New York Convention
It is surprising that many countries took decades to join the NYC.7 There are no real
barriers to entry, unlike the WTO where current members may hold up would-be joiners
in negotiations (Bagwell and Staiger, 2011). (See additional notes on the WTO in Section
3.2.2). Any eligible state may ratify or accede to the NYC, usually through an act of
Senate or Parliament. A geographic unit may become eligible for NYC membership at
formation, independence or when it otherwise obtains treaty-signing powers. The responsible
UN secretariat notifies current members when new members join.8
Membership in the NYC directly addresses the issue of legal jurisdiction for international
trade contracts. Signatory countries agree to enforce awards made by arbitrators against the
party to a contract dispute that belongs in their jurisdiction. Trading parties only need to
7Ultimately, the NYC became one of the most successful international treaties, with 140 members by
December 2010. On membership, it is one of the top seven treaties of the 1313 multilateral agreements in
the (The treaty database shows memberships up to the year 2000; at that time the NYC had 124 signatories).
8Appendix Section III.A.1 in the appendix explains membership eligibility as defined by the NYC charter.
It also provides data sources for countries’ membership and eligibility dates.
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agree on arbitration as the dispute resolution mechanism.9 The threat of state enforcement
of arbitral outcomes represents an implicit guarantee that is usually sufficient for effective
contracting between international trade partners based in signatory countries.10
The NYC treaty effectively allows the use of formal arbitration in place of self-enforcement
based on reputation. Self-enforcement based on reputation is the default mode for interna-
tional trade in the absence of court-enforceable contracts. (The history of international trade
expansion on the basis of reputation or self-enforcement extends to the Law Merchant or Lex
Mercatoria in Western Europe’s Middle Ages (Masten and Prüfer, 2014), and to Maghrebi
traders in North Africa and the Middle East (Goldberg, 2005)). However, the ability of rep-
utation and trader networks to provide security relative to a formal court system is likely to
decrease with increasing geographic and social distance. The scope of trade under reputation
is limited, and with it, the realization of scale and specialization economies.11
Independent arbitration panels offer the formality of a court, faster average case resolution
times, and uniform legal procedures that generally do not depend on a contracting party’s
country. Effectively, they reduce favoritism and procedural disparities in the resolution
of contract disputes. Several scholars claim that most international trade contracts refer
possible disputes to arbitration.12 Nevertheless, international arbitration by itself does not
address two critical issues: how to force a recalcitrant party to participate in arbitration,
9 Quoting the United Nations body that oversees the Convention:
The Convention’s principal aim is that foreign and non-domestic arbitral awards will not be
discriminated against and it obliges Parties to ensure such awards are recognized and generally
capable of enforcement in their jurisdiction in the same way as domestic awards. An ancillary
aim of the Convention is to require courts of Parties to give full effect to arbitration agreements
by requiring courts to deny the parties access to court in contravention of their agreement to
refer the matter to an arbitral tribunal.
The treaty allows specific limited exceptions: e.g. contravention of public policy in the jurisdiction of
enforcement. Governments generally have no sustained incentive to protect private citizens that violated an
international contract.
10 The NYC applies strictly to disputes between private parties. It is different from the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which administers disputes between private parties
and governments.
11 The alternative formal arrangement for contract enforcement is reliance on the domestic courts of one
party to a trade contract, but that puts the other party at a disadvantage in terms of distance, familiarity
with the legal system, and potential local bias. It should be clear that participation in the NYC by a
government only gives firms the option of dispute resolution through private arbitration, no imposition is
made on importers and exporters.
12Leeson (2008) claims that more than 70% of contracts have an arbitration clause, citing a survey by
Casella (1996). The arbitration fora to which these contracts refer disputes are easily accessible. They are
in more than forty-seven countries, with the most popular being the International Chamber of Commerce
(Paris) and the London Court of International Arbitration (Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, 2011).
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and how to enforce arbitral decisions against a losing party.
The foregoing shows why the NYC addresses the enforcement gap, a gap that becomes
more important as international trade expands beyond firms’ social and business circles. (The
same principle applies if a country changed its trade portfolio from a standard commodity like
wheat to differentiated goods like automobiles). Article II of the Convention requires courts
in member states to recognize and enforce agreements to submit disputes to arbitration,
and Article III obliges courts to recognize and enforce awards resulting from arbitrations
occurring in other states. In principle, the New York Convention provides the necessary
institutional support to secure international bargains. This favors businesses looking to
expand the scale or scope of imports and exports, especially when trade is near the limits of
self-enforcement. (Masten and Prüfer, 2014; Dixit, 2003).
The treaty generally finds support with the private sector. Appendix Section III.B.4
shows that at least in the US, the private sector lobbied for the treaty. In a sense, the
treaty’s offers contract enforcement insurance for all firms that agree to use arbitration in
international trade disputes. The cost of arbitration is the analog of the deductible expense
for firms. Countries act as insurers for their resident firms’ trade partners. This analogy
illustrates how this treaty favors trading firms. National governments should also favor the
treaty, given how more private sector trade could create higher government revenue.
Nevertheless, arbitration under the auspices of the NYC costs signatory countries a mod-
icum of sovereignty. By signing the treaty, a country agrees to enforce agreements and
awards made possibly outside its jurisdiction, using its own legal resources. The willingness
of countries to do this may vary, given the different systems of laws that exist, the fric-
tions that exist within different systems of government and the attitudes of governments to
international cooperation.
20 governments signed the treaty in June 1958 – the NYC came into force for those
first signatories in June 1959. These founding members were a diverse array of countries
that included Germany, France, India and the Philippines. Appendix Table III.A.1 shows
membership dates by country, it also shows the dates countries first became eligible so that
one can measure the delay to membership. Membership in the treaty increased to 140 in
2010 (144 in 2014).
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3.2.2 Related Literature
3.2.2.1 Modelling Treaty Participation (Policy or Product Adoption)
The literature on the adoption of policies and products goes back more than a half-
century. These include studies of how Iowa farmers adopted hybrid corn seeds (Ryan and
Gross, 1943), to more recent papers in economics that consider herd behavior in financial de-
cision making (Banerjee, 1992) or households’ decision to use personal computers (Goolsbee
and Klenow, 2002). Earlier in the business literature, Bass (1969) described the purchase of
durable goods with an empirically successful imitation-based model.13
Much has been published on the subject in the political science literature. The studies
extend from cities’ adoption of smoking bans (Shipan and Volden, 2008), through states’
decision to run lotteries (Berry and Berry, 1990), to the international adoption of financial
liberalization policies (Simmons and Elkins, 2004).
On policies related to international trade, a few papers have studied factors like past
colonial relationships that facilitate or obstruct WTO membership (Copelovitch and Ohls,
2012; Cattaneo and Braga, 2008). Wagner (2010) provides a robust model of accession to
the Montreal Protocol, which emphasizes spillover effects of early joiners on other countries.
Others like Baldwin and Jaimovich (2012) suggest the possibility of contagion in countries
participation in regional trade agreements.14
This paper builds on these works by considering treaty adoption as a special case. Exam-
ining contagion in the context of international relations provides the opportunity to examine
13Exploring the difference between rational learning and ’unsophisticated imitation’ holds great research
potential, but that is not the goal of this paper. The chapter attempts to stay close to the script in Masten
and Prüfer (2014) in addressing the factors that motivate countries’ adoption of trade policies like this treaty.
Whether the potential drivers of peer influence are rational or not is not explored.
14Given the WTO’s popularity, one must make an effort to distinguish the NYC from the WTO. The WTO
is about reducing trade costs in the form of tariff and non-tariff barriers, while the NYC focuses on facilitating
arms-length trade by making legal recourse enforceable. The WTO always had more members than the NYC,
in part because it was initiated ten years earlier. (Figure III.B.1 plots membership over time for the two
treaties). I am not aware of a paper with the explicit objective of evaluating factors that drive membership
in the WTO, like this paper does for the NYC. As mentioned earlier in this paper, modelling membership
in the WTO requires consideration of current members’ holding up would-be members. Modelling NYC
participation gets at the question of peer effects without this wrinkle. Nevertheless, such an exercise would
be interesting given the volume of work debating whether GATT/WTO membership increases trade, (notable
examples in this literature include Tomz et al. (2007); Subramanian and Wei (2007); Rose (2004)).
Furthermore, the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO should not be confused with that of the
NYC. The NYC is strictly for contractual disputes between private parties, while the WTO is for disputes
between national governments. (Even if a WTO dispute is initiated by a government in the interest of a
particular firm, the dispute is usually about trade policy and not about a particular contract between two
private firms).
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how countries influence one another, and whether the role of international institutions in
economic processes like trade.
3.2.2.2 Estimation Model Choice
The literature on contagion in the context of policy or production adoption has always
leaned on research describing biological diffusion or the spread of diseases (Aral et al., 2013;
Young, 2009; Jackson and Yariv, 2007). Young (2009) describes this linkage in building a
formal model of contagion from the basic elements of epidemiology’s susceptible-infected-
recovered (SIR) framework.15 Problems of this form lend themselves to estimation using
logit models for the simplest cases, or duration models more generally.
This paper follows the majority of the related literature in specifying duration models
(also known as hazard models). A duration model helps to address the concern that the data
is right-censored. It is not sufficient to know the membership status of countries in 2014.
Estimates that ignore the lag to participation will err in comparing countries like Venezuela
and Kazakhstan – both joined in 1995, but Venezuela had been eligible since the treaty’s
founding, while Kazakhstan did not become a country until the nineties. Other papers that
make a case for applying duration models to similar research questions include Simmons and
Elkins (2004) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992).
In considering a duration model, I also recognize that several variables that motivate
membership are time-varying; the number of NYC members being the primary example. Sev-
eral papers discuss estimating parameters for the class of duration models with time-varying
factors, (see Simmons and Elkins (2004) and Jenkins (1995), for example). Furthermore,
interactions between countries may not be uniform, such that the incentive created for coun-
try B by country A’s participation depends on the characteristics of the A-B country-pair.
These considerations guided the choice of an empirical model.
The next section presents a formal, if simple, model of countries adopting a trade treaty
like the NYC.
3.3 Model
Explaining NYC membership decisions is challenging, not least because it implicates
organizations and governance at multiple levels: businesses involved in international trade,
15Carroll (2001) provides another notable usage of the SIR model in economics, using it to represent the
diffusion of macroeconomic expectations.
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private arbitration tribunals, state courts, international organizations (the UN), and for
ratifying treaties, national governments. I focus on two of those levels: businesses and
governments.
Consider a set of N countries, each populated by Fi firms, (i ∈ 1, ..., N). At time t, nt
countries belong to a treaty that benefits only firms in member-countries. For each non-
member country, the potential benefit of joining is proportional to the sum of each of its
resident firms’ private benefits from joining the treaty. For the firms, treaty benefits repre-
sent the net cost of an insurance policy that guarantees the execution of contracts with trade
partners in NYC member countries. (If one calls NYC membership free contract enforcement
insurance for firms, the expected cost of appearing before arbitration is the deductible ex-
pense). National governments that are responsive to the private sector’s interests will want
to join, as long as there are gains from trade and trade with NYC members is significant.
The hazard of joining will be proportional to the value of NYC’s benefits to each country’s
importers and exporters.
National governments may also want to join the treaty in response to peer effects or
contagion. Like individuals, governments may be susceptible to peer influence, so that treaty
adoption behaves like contagion. (The mechanism mimics the workings of a susceptible-
infected (SI) model of infectious disease transmission). The rationale behind conforming to
a norm could be the intangible cost of being a ‘pariah’ state, or the desire to be one of the
crowd, in order to gain the social influence that comes with being part of a trend (Aral et al.,
2013; Golub and Jackson, 2010; Young, 2009).
The timing of entry depends on the combination of these incentives, as well as the respon-
siveness of the decision-makers to the incentives. One could also describe responsiveness in
terms of barriers. Governments have competing priorities – one expects high priority items
will take less time and low priority items to encounter long delays. In the language of dis-
ease transmission, if the barrier to transmission is low, then most countries will join quickly.
Some countries may have a high barrier before taking action on treaty membership, so that
the decision is delayed, despite the benefits conforming to a global norm or the economic
benefits of contract enforcement guarantees to firms.
The next subsections explain these mechanisms further.
3.3.1 Contagion
The data argues for treaty adoption through contagion. The participation curve visually
resembles an S-curve, which is typical of systems where changes in status are driven by in-
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teractions between non-members and members in a given population. The hazard is initially
low when the proportion of members is low, increases to a maximum when the relative pro-
portions of members and non-members are equal, and decreases again as the proportion of
non-members falls.16
Contagion can be explained as the outcome of a polling process for countries that are
either members or non-members of a treaty. (Say there are nt members out of N countries
at time t). Hypothetically, each country polls every other country on their membership
status in each period. It decides to join with a non-negative probability proportional to
the fraction of members in the population P (t) = nt/N . The fraction of countries joining
in each period or the hazard rate is initially low because few non-members meet members
in the early rounds of polling, given that there are few members. Eventually, the hazard




= γP (1− P ) (3.1)
All countries are equally influential in the diffusion process, and mixing between countries is
perfect. Each interaction between a member and a non-member increases the probability of
the non-member switching status. γ represents that marginal contribution to the probability
of joining the treaty.17
16Appendix Section III.D presents a formal test that the data plot in Figure 3.1 is indeed S-shaped.
17 This model is equivalent to the basic epidemiological model of contagion. As countries never revoke the
treaty, the susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model simplifies to an SI model.
The trivial baseline for the model is one where membership is not driven by interactions, but occurs
stochastically at some rate γ. Young (2009) motivates his paper with this baseline, which helps in defining
γ later in this paper. It also sets up a notable feature of this model i.e. membership decisions are not
guaranteed, but occur with a non-negative probability. In the baseline, all countries join eventually. If γ is
heterogeneous, the more responsive countries with high γs should have shorter average entry delays.
Equation (3.1) also mirrors the form presented by the Bass (1969) model of product adoption,
dP
dt = γ[P (1− P )] + p̂(1− P ), i.e. if one sets the innovation rate p̂ to zero. That is, the Bass Model is an SI








= γt+ A (3.2)
where A is the odds ratio at time t = 0,





Figure 3.1 represents equation (3.3), which clearly follows a logit form. Section 3.4 shows
that this naive model of contagion with a constant γ explains about 90% of the variation in
treaty membership over time. To continue the polling analogy, P (1 − P ) in equation (3.1)
is the share of poll questions asked across the membership divide.18
The γ parameter may be country-specific, such that some countries have high γi and are
more responsive to interactions with NYC members. National attributes that may deter-
mine the responsiveness of government, or the propensity to join the treaty may include the
system of government and trade as a share of the national economy. For example, a country
in constant political gridlock, or dictators wary of commitments to the international commu-
nity will generally be less responsive to participation incentives like interactions with NYC
members. In general, those countries will take longer to join the treaty. With heterogeneous













With N countries and n members, so that (1 − P ) = (N − n)/N , equation (3.5) reverts to
(3.1) if γi was constant.
Furthermore, interactions between countries are not uniform. Countries belong to differ-
ent regional agreements, commonwealths and other fora for negotiation that make it possible
18 N2 questions are asked in each period, of which NP ∗ (N − NP ) are between the n = NP members
and N − n nonmembers.
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to observe other countries’ NYC status, or to relate on the basis of membership in the treaty.
Regional trade agreements represent a notable forum for negotiating and observing trade pol-
icy between countries. That countries in these agreements belong to the same geographic
region also means that members often share boundaries, language and other traits that could
facilitate contagion. For example, it is more likely that Argentina would emulate Brazil, its
MERCOSUR partner, rather than a distant country like China, even if the latter were large.
One cannot claim that equation (3.5) only represents contagion through imitation. The
interactions in the equation could represent trade. Trade by itself captures interactions
between private parties - importers and exporters, not necessarily governments. Yet, one
expects that the level of trade affects government choices on policy, either directly because
governments want the benefits of trade, or indirectly, because trade prompts governments
to come together at forums like regional trade agreements to discuss policy.
The next paragraphs shift the focus to trade as the primary mechanism that promotes
membership in the NYC treaty.
3.3.2 Treaty Membership Motivated by Trade
Treaty participation driven by trade will follow the form described by contagion, with
weighted interactions. By definition, trade is a form of interaction between countries. There-
fore, to estimate the trade benefits of NYC membership, one must recognize that those ben-
efits derive from interactions, much like the hazard of participation in the polling analogy
from the previous subsection.
Consider the N countries mentioned at the start of this section, each with Fi firms,
i ∈ [1, N ]. If wij is country j’s known share of country i’s trade,
∑
j 6=iNY Cj ∗ wijτ is
country i’s hazard of joining. NY Cj = 1 indicates that country j is a member and τ
captures the value of NYC membership benefit per dollar of trade.
That hazard is not distinguishable from the polling analogy in equation (3.5). In the
polling analogy, the trade share wij could be used as weights for each bilateral interaction.
The weights will range from zero to one, so every country is polled, but the opinion of non-
trade partners are completely discounted. In this scenario, the country-specific hazard of
participation will be
∑





j 6=iNY Cj ∗ wij. The modified marginal probability of joining is γ̂ and wj is
country j’s share of global trade. Replacing τ with γ in the previous paragraph shows that
the two approaches are equivalent.
The model can be extended to include contagion effects due to trade directly, as well as
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other interactions. If only one of these two set of incentives is at work, then the estimation
step should yield a zero parameter for the other.






NY Cj(wijτ + κ)] (3.6)
κ is the relative contribution of factors not directly proportional to the level of trade.
Figure 3.2 represents equation (3.6). Setting non-trade weights κ = 0 and the enforcement
gap parameter τ = 1 yields equation (3.5).
The rest of the paper will focus on estimating γ, κ and τ . It is important to check whether
κ is greater than zero – this addresses the question of whether state actors are subject to
peer influence. This line of research was championed by Shipan and Volden (2008); Simmons
and Elkins (2004).
The responsiveness of governments is captured by the γ term - with responsiveness to
economic interests as a special case. The value of the term should be influenced by attributes
of national attributes like legal origins or system of government. If for example, all democ-
racies equally favor the treaty but parliamentary democracies are more efficient, then their
average γs should be higher. Similarly, if democracies are on average more pro-trade than
monarchies, then monarchies will have lower γs. (The political costs of treaty membership
are also couched in this term, so if monarchies and democracies are equally pro-trade, but
the political costs are less in monarchies, then democracies will have lower γs).19 Accom-
modating systems of law to new requirements can be a complicated and time-consuming
undertaking. Governments have competing demands on their time and will act on a pro-
posal, even when no opposition exists, only when pressures reach a level sufficient to move
the issue ahead of others.
The τ term represents the enforcement gap – the benefits of treaty membership, con-
ditional on trade, or more precisely, the net benefits of formal adjudication over informal,
reputation-based enforcement. One expects this term to be influenced by the nature of trade
– trade with proximate longstanding partners needs courts or arbitration less than trade
with new distant partners. Similarly, trade in undifferentiated goods like wheat on global
exchanges is expected to require less contract adjudication than trade in differentiated goods
like clothing and airplanes. This follows the arguments in Nunn (2007) and Berkowitz et al.
19III.B.4 explains this point further.
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(2006) that some goods are more contract-intensive.
The next section takes equation (3.6) to the data, first in the aggregate, then later with
country-specific variables.
3.4 Empirics
In describing how and when countries join the NYC, this paper will consider:
[1] Internal frictions to policy adoption
[2] The enforcement gap, or factors that make reputational enforcement less valuable than
formal arbitration
[3] Interactions through trade and at other fora, e.g. regional trade agreements (RTAs).20
There are three parts to this section: [1] I estimate equation (3.2) on the assumption
that trade with NYC members does not contribute to countries’ NYC decision (i.e. setting
κ = 1 and τ = 0 in equation (3.6)); this provides baseline estimates for the responsiveness of
governments. [2] I allow non-zero values for τ , while forcing all countries to have the same
value of γ and τ ; this allows claims about whether non-trade drivers of membership are
statistically significant, and [3] I allow some country-level heterogeneity in the τ parameter.
First, I describe the data used for these estimates. The main variable of interest is the
delay to membership. I define this as the number of years between when a country became
eligible to join the treaty and when it actually joined –for the countries that joined before
December 2010. (The empirics that do not require trade data use membership through
2014). A longer lag or delay implies a lower hazard of treaty participation. For the first set
of estimates, I simply compare the number of member countries with eligible countries in
each year following 1958. The UNCITRAL website provided membership dates. Appendix
Section III.A.1 explains the variable in detail, and describes sources for eligibility dates.
Table 3.1 presents a summarized version of the data in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, but includes the
related trade volumes and trade features.
NYC members increased from less than a quarter of eligible countries and a third of
global trade in 1958 to nearly three quarters of all countries in 2006. At that time, imports
and exports from NYC members represented 99% of the global total. These numbers in-
dicate that NYC members have always had larger than average trade shares, an early sign
20 Figure III.B.1 in Appendix Section III.B.2 shows that the increase in the number of RTAs was largely
contemporaneous with the growth of NYC membership. Comparing the efforts required to establish RTAs,
relative to joining the NYC, which only requires a unilateral signature, it is reasonable to accept that
countries do not form RTAs because of NYC membership.
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Table 3.1: NYC Members over Time
Eligible NYC Total Trade NYC Rauch Colonial
YEAR Countries Members (‘000 USD) Trade Share Diff’d Share Trade Share
1958 81 20 204,593 0.32 0.175
1968 124 39 489,892 0.46 0.48 0.122
1978 149 55 2,720,496 0.79 0.50 0.083
1988 158 73 5,853,784 0.93 0.61 0.084
1998 186 119 1.18e+07 0.97 0.66 0.078
2006 187 139 2.58e+07 0.99 0.60 0.067
The Eligible Countries column represents the number of member and non-members states that qualify to
join the treaty. (Appendix Section III.A.1 defines eligibility in detail). NYC Share represents the fraction of
global imports and exports that originated or terminated in NYC member countries. Diff’d Share represents
the Rauch differentiated goods’ share of trade. This data was derived from Feenstra et al. (2005), which
starts in 1962. The table stops at 2006, the last year of trade for the Head et al. (2010) data.
Data Sources: UNCITRAL, Head et al. (2010), Feenstra et al. (2005).
that membership is endogenous. Furthermore, the nature of trade changed in this period,
as the last two columns of Table 3.1 show. Differentiated goods, which tend to be more
contract-intensive, increased from less than half to 60% of world trade, using the product
categories defined by Rauch (1999). The share of trade between countries with colonial ties
also decreased significantly, so the business relationships behind trade transactions now more
frequently cross the barriers of language, legal origin and cultural affiliation.
Bilateral trade data came from Head et al. (2010). These include the US dollar value of
trade between country-pairs in all years between 1948 and 2006, as well as bilateral variables
like colonial linkages, distance and shared languages. I derive NYC members’ share of
global trade using the data on membership dates. The sources and descriptions for other
data items like regional trade agreement memberships are introduced with each relevant
variable. Regional trade agreements as a form of interaction between countries are briefly
discussed after the next baseline estimates on aggregate membership trends.
The 20 founding members of the treaty provide the initial conditions that I take as
given. This leaves the timing of membership decisions for about 120 economies available for
analysis, as well as the lags for the 45 non-members that I consider censored observations.
3.4.1 Baseline Estimates of Government Responsiveness γ
The γ term in equation (3.2) should be zero if interactions between governments play no
role in their treaty membership decisions. This motivates my first stage of analysis, which
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ignores all country-level attributes and trade. To do this, I estimate equation (3.2) fitting
data on the number of NYC members for each year between 1958 and 2014 to the equation
ln[P/(1− P )] = γt+ A.
The estimates yield a γ of 0.033 (using GMM). (The parameter’s z-statistic of 34.3
strongly suggests that it is not zero). With OLS, one gets similar estimate of 0.035, and an
R2 of 0.90 with an A term constructed to match the number of treaty members in 1958. The
fit between this naive model and countries’ accession to the NYC is itself remarkable. This
estimate yields the model predictions in Figure 3.1.
Having established that interactions between countries play a role in the NYC mem-
bership decision, the next steps are to disentangle the direct effects of trade from other
interactions, as those other interactions will represent contagion - the adoption of a policy
because others did the same, without .
3.4.2 Trade-Driven and Interaction-Driven Membership τ vs. κ
Here I allow interactions between countries to be weighted by trade, while keeping all
countries homogeneous as shown in equation (3.5). The data for this illustrative exercise
is limited to n, the number of eligible countries, N , the number of NYC members and
NY Ctradeshare, members’ share of trade in each year between 1958 and 2010.21






= (τNY Ctradeshare)t+ A (3.7)
Estimating equation (3.7) yields a τ of 0.037 (using GMM). (The parameter’s z-statistic
of 45.0 indicates that it is not zero). With OLS, one gets similar estimates of 0.038, and an
R2 of 0.98. This specification fits the aggregate trend better, which is not surprising – for a
trade treaty, the relevant form of interaction between countries should be trade. Estimating
(3.7) yields the model predictions in Figure 3.2. It is encouraging that more than 95% of
the variation in membership over time is explained by time and the share of trade by NYC
members, as shown by the fit of the model to the data in the graph.
These estimation exercises on aggregate membership trends are only suggestive, as they
21 To justify the form in (3.7), one must emphasize that the NY Ctradeshare term must be interacted
with the t term, in (3.1), the prevalence of NYC membership is one more factor that drives the ‘infection’ of
non-members. It cannot be separated from time. For this exercise, I extended the Head et al. (2010) data
using the UN COMTRADE database from 2007 to 2010.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics for Model Variables
VARIABLES Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum N
NYC Share of Trade .66 .33 0 1 8835
NYC Share of RTAs .37 .34 0 1 10441
Rauch Diff’d Goods .44 .15 0 1 7692
Colonial Share .14 .16 0 1 8534
The Rauch differentiated goods variable only becomes available from 1962. The table reports values for 1968
to 2006. NYC membership increases from 20 in 1958 to 139 in 2006. It is 140 in 2010.
do not consider the specific countries that adopted the treaty, nor the number and size of
their trade partners.
The rest of this section explores these findings in detail, using bilateral and country-
specific attributes.
3.4.3 Country-Level Differences in Trade-Driven Membership
Table 3.2 summarizes the variables used in the duration models that follow. At the
country-year level NYC partners generally represented more than half of imports and exports
for the average country between 1958 and 2006. As Table 3.1 suggests, this value increased
over time. The broadly consistent trend was stronger for some countries than others.
Interactions with NYC members in the context of regional trade agreements also changed
in this period. The average share of each country’s partnerships through RTAs that were
due to NYC members was less than four in ten, but the average depended on the country
and time. For some countries, all their RTA partners were NYC members, others had none.
In addition, I measure the nature of interactions between countries with the Colonial Share
and Rauch Diff ′d Goods variables: the first is the fraction of a country’s trade that in-
volved partners with colonial ties and the second represents contract-intensive goods as a
share of each country’s trade. In the data, Colonial Share was generally in decline while
differentiated goods were gaining global trade share.
I will emphasize RTA membership as a forum for interaction between countries for several
reasons: It is a reasonable measure of peer linkage between countries that is not a direct
measure of trade. Countries with strong trade ties tend to have regional trade agreements,
but this correlation is not perfect. By definition, RTAs are tied to regional geography.
Therefore RTA membership is a good proxy for interactions between countries on the basis
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of geographic proximity and the commonalities that usually come with such proximity. The
difference between the share of a country’s trade that is due to NYC members, and the share
of a country’s RTA partnerships that is due to NYC members provides a useful means to
identify whether countries join primarily because of trade, or because they want to be NYC
members like their peers.
Other variables that I use include legal origins and systems of government. There are
categorical by nature. The legal origins of the 197 countries in the analysis are: French
Common Law (76), German/Scandinavian (10), Socialist (33) and U.K. Common Law (63).
Government systems vary by year for several countries. Countries like Saudi Arabia and the
United Kingdom remained a monarchy or parliamentary democracy for all the years they
were in the data, while others changed systems of government. This category breaks down
into country-years as: Parliamentary Democracy (2013), Semi-Presidential Democracy(670),
Presidential Democracy (1056), Military Dictatorship (2327), Civilian Dictatorship (1573),
Monarchies (686). Cheibub et al. (2010) provided the data on systems of government between
1960 and 2008.
Table 3.3 presents the contributions of trade with NYC members to countries’ decision to
join. I assume an exponential form for the hazard model, following the distinctive structure
of equation (3.6). This form implies that countries join only because of interactions between
members and non-members over time. This also requires the explicit assumption that the
baseline participation hazard is constant. I argue that this is the case for NYC treaty
participation using an analogy. A person standing outdoors during a hailstorm faces a non-
negative hazard of getting hit by hail. If the said person had a perfectly sturdy umbrella,
one could say that hazard was constant (i.e. zero). However, carving a hole in the umbrella
returns the hazard to positive values. The hazard with a ‘holey’ umbrella is always the
constant value of zero plus the hazard due to exposure, just as the hazard of joining the
NYC is a baseline of zero added to the various forms of exposure to NYC participation
through direct benefits or peer effects.
Column 1 of Table 3.3 is consistent with the graph in Figure 3.1; the number of countries
that are current NYC members is a reasonable predictor of the participation hazard for non-
members. The estimates suggest that the hazard of non-members joining increases by 32%
[i.e. exp(0.15 ∗ 1.888)− 1] if the fraction of NYC members increased by 0.15 (one standard
deviation). That said, it is not plausible to assume that South Africa joining the treaty
would have the same effect on China as South Korea joining the treaty. The regional and
cultural links make South Korea a more proximate source of contagion for China. Column
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Table 3.3: NYC Membership Hazard Estimates: Contagion
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
NYC Countries 1.888*** 1.027
(0.00291) (0.206)
NYC Share of RTAs 1.081*** 0.968**
(0.00121) (0.0136)
NYC Share of Trade 1.098** 0.611*
(0.0152) (0.0872)
Constant -4.491*** -4.001*** -4.372*** -4.873***
(0) (0) (0) (0)
Observations 4,238 4,238 4,015 4,015
The table reports estimates from a duration model, where the duration of interest is the lag between when a
country is eligible to when it joins the NYC or the data is censored. The time-varying covariates represent
country-year observations, except for NY C Share, the fraction of all countries in a particular year that
belong to the NYC. NY C Trade Share is the fraction of imports and exports for a country-year traded
with NYC members. NY C RTAs is the fraction of a country’s RTA partners that belong to the NYC in
each year. The specification assumed an exponential form, i.e. constant baseline hazard.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at
the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
2 explores this idea.
By 2010 most countries belonged to a regional trade agreement. These regional fora for
negotiating trade policy are one of the defining features of the last half-century (Crawford
and Fiorentino, 2005). It is also reasonable to expect that information about the benefits
of NYC membership, or negotiations to influence non-members to join may happen in the
course of RTA meetings. Column 2 estimates the effects of belonging to RTAs with NYC
members on the hazard of participation: the hazard is estimated to be three times higher if
all of a country’s RTA partners were NYC members, compared with belonging to no RTAs
or RTAs with no NYC members.22
Column 3 of Table 3.3 mildly suggests that trade between members and non-members
promotes NYC participation. It is consistent with the Figure 3.2, with estimates that suggest
a 43% increased likelihood of participation for a non-member whose share of trade with
NYC members increases by 0.33 (one standard deviation). However, the level of statistical
significance for this estimate is less than the comparable estimates for contagion outside the
22If a country belongs to multiple RTAs, each is linkage to partners through an RTA is counted separately.
Data on RTA memberships by year from (Dűr et al., 2014).
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direct value of trade.
Combining all three measures of interactions between NYC members and non-members in
Column 4 confirms the intuition that interactions through trade and RTAs can explain away
the purported effects of contagion through observing the global trend in participation. The
estimates that follow will exclude the global NYC share measure in favor of the country-year
measures of interaction with NYC members.
Table 3.4 builds on the argument in Nunn (2007) that contract enforcement may be
more vital for some goods. Higher shares of contract-intensive goods in a country’s trade
portfolio should motivate participation in the NYC, which facilitates formal dispute resolu-
tions through arbitration. I measure the share of a country’s imports and exports that are
contract-intensive as those in the Rauch (1999) differentiated goods category. For an effective
contract, these differentiated goods not sold on a global exchange or reference-priced require
at the minimum that trading parties agree on the quality of the traded item. The category
covers a broad range of products that range from tee-shirts to airplanes. (The average share
of differentiated goods increased from 38% in 1958 to about 50% in 2010).
The estimates suggest that increasing differentiated goods as a share of a country’s trade
portfolio also increases the likelihood of NYC participation. The hazard of participation
according to column 1 increases by 47% if one increased this index by 0.152 (one standard
deviation).[Estimates computed as exp(2.545 ∗ 0.152) − 1]. The estimated effect decreases
slightly in column 2 when one accounts for the contributions of RTA memberships and trade
with NYC memberships.
Table 3.4 also tests a hypothesis from Masten and Prüfer (2014) – that traders will favor
formal adjudication as trade expands beyond the scope of past established relationships.
In this case, colonial history is the proxy for established relationships. Head et al. (2010)
shows that the erosion of colonial linkages is one of the most significant changes to trade
patterns over the last half-century. By this paper’s estimates, trade between countries with
historical colonial ties fell from above 20% in the 1950’s to about 7% in 2010. Historical
colonial linkages as a proxy also capture some of the effects of having similar languages, legal
institutions and trade treaties.
Column 3 of the table implies that the hazard of joining the NYC decreases by 12% for an
increase in the share of a country’s trade with past colonial partners of 0.145 (one standard
deviation). This agrees with the hypotheses in Masten and Prüfer (2014) that established
relationships with self-enforcement are a substitute for formal arbitration. However, the
estimates are not statistically significant.
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Table 3.4: NYC Membership Hazard Estimates: The Nature of Trade and Goods
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rauch Diff’d Share 2.545*** 1.992*** 1.951***
(0.00001) (0.000800) (0.00103)
Colonial Share -0.890 -0.705 -0.670
(0.153) (0.300) (0.360)
NYC Share of RTAs 1.032*** 1.176*** 0.983***
(0.00354) (0.000545) (0.00509)
NYC Share of Trade 0.765* 0.665* 0.767*
(0.0646) (0.0950) (0.0651)
Constant -4.581*** -5.289*** -3.423*** -4.394*** -5.151***
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Observations 3,426 3,373 3,994 3,994 3,363
The table reports estimates from a duration model, where the duration of interest is the lag between when a
country is eligible to when it joins the NYC or the data is censored. The time-varying covariates represent
country-year observations. Rauch Share, is the fraction of a country’s trade in a particular year that belong
to the Rauch differentiated goods category. I use the liberal definition. Colonial Share is the fraction of
imports and exports for a country-year traded with former colonies or colonizers. NY C Trade Share is the
fraction of imports and exports for a country-year traded with NYC members. NY C RTAs is the fraction
of a country’s RTA partners that belong to the NYC in each year. The specification assumed an exponential
form, i.e. constant baseline hazard.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at
the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
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Combining all the foregoing in Column 5 of Table 3.4 does not change any of the predic-
tions substantially. Having more differentiated goods is still associated with a statistically
significant hazard of NYC participation, as is having NYC trade and RTA partners. The
share of trade with colonial partners remains a negative contributor to the hazard, but is
still not statistically significant.
One must consider countries’ systems government or legal origins, given earlier discus-
sions of country-specific factors not related to trade. Table 3.5 examine how these two factors
contribute to the hazard of participating in the NYC. For example, one may consider democ-
racies more likely to agree to an international covenant. Among democracies, it may also
be more likely that parliamentary democracies approve treaties faster – the executive and
legislature are unlikely to be politically opposed, by definition. There is room for within-
and between- variation in the system of government variable. 90 of the 188 countries for
which data is available do not change systems of government. 40 of the remaining 98 change
more than once, with transitions to democracy becoming more common over time.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.5 do not support the view that the system of government
matters. The estimates suggest that compared to monarchies, democracies are more likely
to join, although this is not statistically significant when one considers the nature of traded
goods and the prevalence of NYC members in trade relationships. In Column 5, the estimates
that control for countries’ legal origins indicate that dictatorships are less likely to join the
treaty, but this is also not statistically significant.
Legal origins provide another measure of countries’ propensity to sign a treaty about using
legal resources to support trade. Some legal systems may be more disposed to cooperative
agreements of this nature, which should reduce the national government’s perceived political
costs of signing the treaty. Civil Law (76 countries) and Common Law (63 countries) are
the most common categories. These categories are time-invariant.
Columns 3 and 4 of the Table show that countries with socialist legal origins are more
likely to join the NYC convention. Even after controlling for interactions with NYC members
in column 4, the participation hazard for socialist legal origin countries is 1.9 times that of
Civil Law countries, [calculated as exp(0.65)]. The difference is statistically significant, while
the difference between Common Law and Civil Law countries is not. German/Scandinavian
legal origin countries have a higher estimated participation hazards, but this is not robust to
controlling for other interactions with NYC members and government systems in Column 5.
The socialist legal system was built on Civil Law and shares many features, for example,
in deciding cases judges must follow the Legal Code and not judicial precedent (as Common
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Table 3.5: NYC Membership Hazard Estimates: Country Features
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Government System
Parliamentary 0.532 0.387 0.270
(0.136) (0.331) (0.496)
Semi-Presidential 1.146*** 0.755 0.356
(0.00898) (0.142) (0.504)
Presidential 0.315 -0.0213 -0.0546
(0.387) (0.951) (0.886)
Military Dictator 0.369 0.199 -0.0864
(0.267) (0.564) (0.808)
Civilian Dictator 0.0755 -0.154 -0.354
(0.840) (0.687) (0.389)
Legal Origin
Germ./Scandinavian 1.086** 0.877*** 0.523
(0.0157) (0.127) (0.431)
Socialist 0.835*** 0.651** 0.684**
(0.00402) (0.0379) (0.0246)
Common Law -0.0917 0.0209 -0.111
(0.620) (0.923) (0.648)
NYC Share of RTAs 0.862** 0.996*** 0.852**
(0.0214) (0.00250) (0.0117)
NYC Share of Trade 0.742* 0.648 0.774*
(0.0863) (0.127) (0.0763)
Rauch Diff’d Share 1.740*** 1.948*** 1.696**
(0.00639) (0.00222) (0.0107)
Colonial Share -0.885*** -0.242 -0.305
(0.257) (0.734) (0.699)
Constant -3.963*** -5.113*** -3.701*** -5.257*** -5.093***
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Observations 4,152 3,342 4,077 3,293 3,289
The table reports estimates from a duration model, where the duration of interest is the lag between when a
country is eligible to when it joins the NYC or the data is censored. The time-varying covariates represent
country-year observations. Monarchy is the comparison category for government type that is not shown.
The reported categories are democracies – semi-Presidential and Presidential democracies, and dictator-
ships – military and civilian. Similarly, Civil Law as a legal origin category is the comparison category.
Rauch Share, is the fraction of a country’s trade in a particular year that belong to the Rauch differentiated
goods category. I use the liberal definition. Colonial Share is the fraction of imports and exports for a
country-year traded with former colonies or colonizers. NY C Trade Share is the fraction of imports and
exports for a country-year traded with NYC members. NY C RTAs is the fraction of a country’s RTA
partners that belong to the NYC in each year. The specification assumed an exponential form, i.e. constant
baseline hazard.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at
the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
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Law countries do). However, the socialist legal system puts more emphasis on power of the
state over property. Countries with this legal origin may have been inclined to join the NYC
in order to signal a willingness to trade with other countries, given the notable differences
in legal principles and procedures.
Combining all the factors in Column 5 gives a picture that is largely consistent with
previous columns and tables. Having either more differentiated goods or a socialist legal
origin increases the hazard of NYC participation, and so does having NYC members as RTA
partners. The share of trade with NYC partners is marginally significant.
Overall, the results reported in Table 3.5 suggest that both internal factors like legal
origins and external incentives like the membership of regional trade partners influence coun-
try’s decisions to join a treaty like the NYC. This lends support to other papers that find
evidence of peer effects in policy adoption, e.g. Shipan and Volden (2008) and Simmons
and Elkins (2004). The findings also support claims that some goods are more contract-
intensive (Nunn, 2007; Berkowitz et al., 2006), and the hypothesis in Masten and Prüfer
(2014) that the preference for formal adjudication will increase as the nature and scope of
trade expands.23
3.5 Conclusion
I evaluate factors that influence the hazard of participation in the New York Convention
(NYC) – a treaty that supports trade across legal jurisdictions through the commitment of
its signatories to the outcomes of international contract dispute arbitration. The significance
of countries’ commitment to support private dispute settlement with the power of the state
has led some to call the NYC a modern day Lex Mercatoria. The study is motivated by a
puzzling fact: despite benefits of joining the treaty, several large trading economies like the
United States, Canada and the United Kingdom waited more than a decade to join. (See a
discussion of the US case in Appendix Section III.B.4).
I find that participation in the treaty is driven by interactions with countries that are
members. Regional trade agreements are consistently statistically significant as a forum
for interaction that promotes faster adoption of the treaty. Consistent with this finding,
countries like Canada and the United States, who had no trade agreements in the 1960s, or
23 Masten and Prüfer (2014) argues that trade becomes more contract-intensive with geographic distance,
though the same principle applies to changes in the composition of trade. Distance provides little usable
variation for my tests: the global average for trade distance has remained unchanged near 5000km since 1985
(Berthelon and Freund, 2008).
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whose trade agreement partners did not belong to the NYC were less likely to join in the first
decade, compared with members of the European Free Trade Area, which was established
in 1960, and whose members include the first NYC signatories.
Peer effects matter in this context of international policy. Trade with NYC members in
itself does not consistently predict a higher hazard of joining the NYC. This implies that
in making the decision to join, peer effects or contagion through fora like RTAs may be as
influential as the direct benefits from trading with NYC members. This is consistent with
some of the work on policy diffusion and suggests further inquiry into the factors that make
such peer effects more or less effective. Early works in this area include (Golub and Jackson,
2010; Young, 2009; Shipan and Volden, 2008; Simmons and Elkins, 2004). Table III.A.4
in the appendix suggests that much of what is measured as peer effects could be from the
relationships of countries to their former colonial metropoles, or the countries from which
they broke away.24
Country-level factors like legal origins also affected the hazard of treaty participation,
with the estimated hazard of participation being almost twice as high for socialist legal
origin countries than Common Law or Civil Law countries. Other country-level factors like
the system of government do not yield statistically significant predictions. It is not clear
that democracies are more likely to join the treaty than dictatorships or monarchies.
The nature of traded goods also influences the hazard of participation. Countries that
specialize in contract-intensive goods have a higher hazard of joining the treaty compared
with those that trade commodities like cotton and coffee. The latter products are sold on
regular exchanges and presumably require little legal intervention for a successful transac-
tion. This finding supports the hypothesis in Masten and Prüfer (2014) that the preference
for formal adjudication will increase as trade expands beyond the scope of reputational
enforcement.
These findings come from estimating duration models that reflects the nature of the
problem, and is flexible enough to accommodate country-level categories, as well as time-
varying covariates like trade that are driven by interactions between countries.
The relevance of peer effects through RTA membership contributes to the literature on
policy adoption. First, the presence of peer effects suggests that rational choice by national
24In cases like Serbia and Slovenia, the speed with which Slovenia joined after seceding from Yugoslavia
may reflect the fact that Yugoslavia was a member of the NYC, just as Serbia succeeded to Yugoslavia’s
NYC status after the split. The main body of the paper interprets Slovenia’s entry as due to peer effects
from Serbia, for simplicity. Table III.A.4 nevertheless suggests further research into how the choices of
’parent-countries’ influence those of the countries they spawned.
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governments may not be completely divorced from social influence or contagion. Second, the
finding suggests that inter-governmental organizations may be important to the process of
policy adoption because of others’ influence. Whether this is due to learning, or homophily
as suggested by Jackson (2008), I leave for later work.
These findings also encourage future research on the estimated effect of NYC participation
on trade, after controlling for endogeneity in participation. Such work would contribute to
research on the subject by Leeson (2008) and Berkowitz et al. (2006).
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Appendix
III.A NYC Treaty Membership and Delays to Entry
III.A.1 Entry Date: Signature, Ratification, Accession and In-Force Dates
Countries join the New York Convention by ratification, accession or succession. All dates
for these actions by members are at the UNCITRAL website: http://www.uncitral.org/
uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html. Tables III.A.1
and III.A.2 report these dates and the delay to membership for countries that had joined by
October 2014.
The original treaty was signed by 20 countries on June 10, 1958 and came into force on
June 7, 1959. (Four countries signed later in 1958). All 24 countries that signed in 1958 are
considered founding signatories of the treaty. The treaty only took effect after ratification
by national legislatures; both dates are shown in the table at the link. From January 1959
countries acceded to the treaty by submitting a statement to that effect. Ratification was
necessary when national laws had to be amended to give the treaty effect. The joining
country’s legislature records the state’s obligations under the treaty, and a signed copy of
the treaty is submitted to the other contracting parties. Signatories that have acceded to, but
not ratified the treaty are obliged to support the treaty’s objectives in good faith. Countries
like Serbia that were carved out of an NYC member could succeed to the treaty on the terms
of the former member. The ratification or accession document defines when the treaty comes
into force, usually a few months after the ratification or accession date.
III.A.2 Entry Delay: Lag from Eligible Date to Signature Date
The delay to participation reported in the paper is the lag between when a country
first becomes eligible to when it signed the treaty, in years (with months as fractional years).
Participation is defined broadly to cover signature, accession, ratification or succession as de-
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scribed in the preceding paragraphs. The condition for eligibility, as stated by the governing
UN secretariat is:
The Convention is open to accession by any Member State of the United Nations, any
other State which is a member of any specialized agency of the United Nations, or is
a Party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice (articles VIII and IX).
84 countries met these criteria in 1958. A wave of countries achieved independence from
colonialism in the 1960s, increasing the pool of potential participants. By 2014, the number
of eligible countries had increased to roughly 200. Table III.A.1 shows members of the
treaty sorted by the lag between eligibility and participation. The eligibility date is June
10, 1958 for countries with treaty status when the NYC was created. For others, I used the
dates of membership in the UN, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and three selected
specialized UN agencies.25 The earliest membership date for these organizations formed the
basis for eligibility.
Figure III.A.1 represents a histogram of entry delays in years. (Each bin in the histogram
is six months wide). As described earlier in the paper, a batch of countries joined within
a year of becoming eligible; about 25% of all countries (33% of countries eligible in 1958).
Others joined in a relatively steady trickle that continued for more than a half-century, e.g.,
Myanmar joined in 2013, fifty-five years after it became eligible at the treaty’s formation in
1958. Transition economies like Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina joined in 1993, the next
year after attaining eligibility in 1992. Despite its size and trade, the US delayed entry by
more than 12 years while smaller economies like Jordan, the Philippines and Poland were
founding members. Country size offers no readily obvious patterns to membership. The
second panel of the figure show a similar pattern for all the countries that were eligible in
1958; the lag for these is not complicated by independence dates or the membership status
of other countries.
However, the patterns in Figure III.A.1 are themselves informative, following the reason-
ing in Section 3.1. The trickle of countries that follow the first five years of membership is
not increasing like a model with network effects would predict.
25For UN membership, http://www.un.org/en/members/; for ICJ membership, http://www.icj-cij.
org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=1&sp3=a; for International Labor Organization (ILO) membership,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11003:0; for the International Telephone Union mem-
bership (ITU) http://www.itu.int/online/mm/scripts/mm.list?_search=ITUstates&_languageid=
1; and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) membership http://www.fao.org/legal/home/
fao-members/en/.
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Table III.A.1: Countries, NYC Membership Status and Entry Delay
Country Code Eligible Joined Delay Country Code Eligible Joined Delay
Delay < 5 years Delay >5 years <30
Belgium BEL 1958 1958 0 Botswana BWA 1966 1971 5.2
Costa Rica CRI 1958 1958 0 Djibouti DJI 1977 1983 5.8
Germany DEU 1958 1958 0 Armenia ARM 1992 1997 5.8
India IND 1958 1958 0 Republic of Moldova MDA 1992 1998 6.5
Israel ISR 1958 1958 0 Antigua and Barbuda ATG 1981 1989 7.3
Jordan JOR 1958 1958 0 Azerbaijan AZE 1992 2000 7.9
Netherlands NLD 1958 1958 0 Tunisia TUN 1958 1967 9.1
Philippines PHL 1958 1958 0 Nigeria NGA 1960 1970 9.4
Poland POL 1958 1958 0 Ghana GHA 1958 1968 9.8
El Salvador SLV 1958 1958 0 Dominica DMA 1978 1988 9.8
Argentina ARG 1958 1958 0.2 Italy ITA 1958 1969 10.6
Slovenia SVN 1992 1992 0.2 Brunei Darussalam BRN 1984 1996 11.8
Slovakia SVK 1993 1993 0.3 United States of America USA 1958 1970 12.3
Serbia SCG 2000 2001 0.3 Mexico MEX 1958 1971 12.8
Montenegro MNE 2006 2006 0.3 Benin BEN 1960 1974 13.7
France FRA 1958 1958 0.4 Zimbabwe ZWE 1980 1994 14.3
Luxembourg LUX 1958 1958 0.4 Denmark DNK 1958 1972 14.5
Bulgaria BGR 1958 1958 0.5 Republic of Korea KOR 1958 1973 14.7
Belarus BLR 1958 1958 0.5 Marshall Islands MHL 1991 2006 15.3
Switzerland CHE 1958 1958 0.5 Cuba CUB 1958 1974 16.5
Ecuador ECU 1958 1958 0.5 Bahrain BHR 1971 1988 16.6
Finland FIN 1958 1958 0.5 Australia AUS 1958 1975 16.8
Sri Lanka LKA 1958 1958 0.5 Holy See VAT 1958 1975 16.9
Monaco MCO 1958 1958 0.5 Chile CHL 1958 1975 17.3
Pakistan PAK 1958 1958 0.5 United Kingdom GBR 1958 1975 17.3
Russia RUS 1958 1958 0.5 South Africa ZAF 1958 1976 17.9
Sweden SWE 1958 1958 0.5 Kuwait KWT 1959 1978 18.7
Ukraine UKR 1958 1958 0.5 Spain ESP 1958 1977 18.9
Latvia LVA 1991 1992 0.6 Bangladesh BGD 1972 1992 19.9
Morocco MAR 1958 1959 0.7 St. Vincent & Grenadines VCT 1980 2000 20
Czech Republic CZE 1993 1993 0.7 Cyprus CYP 1960 1980 20.3
Egypt EGY 1958 1959 0.8 Tajikistan TJK 1992 2012 20.5
Syrian Arab Republic SYR 1958 1959 0.8 Singapore SGP 1965 1986 20.9
FYR Macedonia MKD 1993 1994 0.9 Colombia COL 1958 1979 21.3
Croatia HRV 1992 1993 1.2 Lesotho LSO 1966 1989 22.7
Bosnia-Herzegovina BIH 1992 1993 1.3 Mozambique MOZ 1975 1998 22.8
Thailand THA 1958 1959 1.5 Ireland IRL 1958 1981 22.9
Cambodia KHM 1958 1960 1.6 Indonesia IDN 1958 1981 23.3
Madagascar MDG 1960 1962 1.8 New Zealand NZL 1958 1983 24.6
Estonia EST 1991 1993 1.9 Cook Islands COK 1984 2009 24.7
Georgia GEO 1992 1994 1.9 Uruguay URY 1958 1983 24.8
Central African Republic CAF 1960 1962 2.1 Kenya KEN 1963 1989 25.2
San Marino SMR 1977 1979 2.2 Haiti HTI 1958 1983 25.5
Norway NOR 1958 1961 2.8 Guatemala GTM 1958 1984 25.8
Tanzania TZA 1961 1964 2.8 Barbados BRB 1966 1993 26.3
Austria AUT 1958 1961 2.9 Panama PAN 1958 1984 26.3
Japan JPN 1958 1961 3 Algeria DZA 1962 1989 26.3
Romania ROU 1958 1961 3.3 Burkina Faso BFA 1960 1987 26.5
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 1962 1966 3.4 Oman OMN 1971 1999 27.3
Lithuania LTU 1991 1995 3.5 Malaysia MYS 1958 1985 27.4
Kazakhstan KAZ 1992 1995 3.7 Canada CAN 1958 1986 27.9
Hungary HUN 1958 1962 3.8 Cameroon CMR 1960 1988 27.9
Uzbekistan UZB 1992 1996 3.9 Mauritius MUS 1968 1996 28.3
Greece GRC 1958 1962 4.1 China CHN 1958 1987 28.6
Niger NER 1960 1964 4.1 Uganda UGA 1962 1992 29.3
Kyrgyzstan KGZ 1992 1996 4.8
*lag is the gap in months/12 rounded to 1.dp. between 10-Jun-1958 or the eligibility date, and when a country joined
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Table III.A.2: Countries, NYC Membership Status and Entry Delay (continued)
Country Code Eligible Joined Delay Country Code Eligible Joined Delay
Delay > 30 years Non-Members
Peru PER 1958 1988 30.1 Ethiopia ETH 1958
Côte d’Ivoire CIV 1960 1991 30.4 Iraq IRQ 1958
Qatar QAT 1971 2002 31.3 Libya LBY 1958
Guinea GIN 1958 1991 32.1 Sudan SDN 1958
Mongolia MNG 1961 1994 33 Yemen YEM 1958
Bahamas BHS 1973 2006 33.3 Togo TGO 1960
Mali MLI 1960 1994 34 D. R. Congo COD 1960
Turkey TUR 1958 1992 34.1 Congo COG 1960
Senegal SEN 1960 1994 34.1 Somalia SOM 1960
United Arab Emirates ARE 1971 2006 34.7 Chad TCD 1960
Mauritania MRT 1961 1997 35.6 Sierra Leone SLE 1961
Malta MLT 1964 2000 35.7 Malawi MWI 1964
Saudi Arabia SAU 1958 1994 35.8 Gambia GMB 1965
Portugal PRT 1958 1994 36.3 Maldives MDV 1965
Venezuela VEN 1958 1995 36.7 Swaziland SWZ 1968
Bolivia BOL 1958 1995 36.8 Equatorial Guinea GNQ 1968
Sao Tome & Principe STP 1975 2012 37.2 Nauru NRU 1969
Viet Nam VNM 1958 1995 37.3 Tonga TON 1972
Zambia ZMB 1964 2002 37.3 Guinea-Bissau GNB 1973
Paraguay PRY 1958 1997 39.3 Grenada GRD 1974
Nepal NPL 1958 1998 39.8 Cape Verde CPV 1975
Jamaica JAM 1962 2002 39.8 DPR of Korea PRK 1975
Fiji FJI 1970 2010 39.9 Papua New Guinea PNG 1975
Lao PDR LAO 1958 1998 40 Comoros COM 1975
Lebanon LBN 1958 1998 40.2 Suriname SUR 1975
Honduras HND 1958 2000 42.3 Angola AGO 1976
Albania ALB 1958 2001 43 Seychelles SYC 1976
Bhutan BTN 1971 2014 43 Samoa WSM 1976
Iran IRN 1958 2001 43.3 Namibia NAM 1977
Iceland ISL 1958 2002 43.6 Solomon Islands SLB 1978
Dominican Republic DOM 1958 2002 43.8 Saint Lucia LCA 1979
Brazil BRA 1958 2002 44 Vanuatu VUT 1981
Nicaragua NIC 1958 2003 45.3 Belize BLZ 1981
Rwanda RWA 1962 2008 46.1 St. Kitts & Nevis KNA 1983
Gabon GAB 1960 2006 46.3 Kiribati KIR 1986
Afghanistan AFG 1958 2004 46.4 Micronesia FSM 1991
Liberia LBR 1958 2005 47.3 Turkmenistan TKM 1992
Liechtenstein LIE 1963 2011 48 Eritrea ERI 1993
Guyana GUY 1966 2014 48.3 Andorra AND 1993
Burundi BDI 1962 2014 51.8 Palau PLW 1994




South Sudan SSD 2011
*lag is the gap in months/12 rounded to 1.dp. between 10-Jun-1958 or the eligibility date, and when a country joined
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Table III.A.3: States Without Treaty-Powers Annexed to the Treaty
Country Code Added By Joined
Bermuda BMU United Kingdom 1979
British Virgin Islands VGB United Kingdom 2014
Cayman Islands CYM United Kingdom 1980
Faeroe Islands FRO Denmark 1976
Gibraltar GIB United Kingdom 1975
Greenland GRL Denmark 1976
Guernsey GGY United Kingdom 1985
Hong Kong HKG China 1997
Isle of Man IMN United Kingdom 1979
Jersey JEY United Kingdom 2002
Macau MAC China 2005
Netherlands Antilles ANT Netherlands 1964
























0 20 40 60
Delay (years)
(a) Histogram of Entry Delay for all NYC members (b) Histogram for only countries eligible in 1958
Data Source: UNCITRAL (2014)
153
III.A.3 Results for Countries Eligible in 1958
Table III.A.4 replicates the main findings of the paper using only a subset of the data
- the 87 countries that were eligible to sign the NYC treaty in 1958. These results address
the concern that membership decisions of countries that became subsequently eligible may
have been biased, as the tables do not control for the NYC membership of parent-countries
or former colonial metropoles.
The first set of findings in Table III.A.4 are remarkably similar to those in Table 3.5.
The systems of government generally do not yield statistically significant prediction. (The
exception is the negative coefficient on the parliamentary democracy dummy in columns 1
and 2, but this goes away when other factors are considered in column 5). Legal origins also
follow a similar pattern, though more systems showing a statistically significant difference
in the propensity to join relative to the French Civil Law origin that represents the baseline.
The German/Scandinavian and Socialist legal origins are the most likely to join in this
assessment, as in the previous table.
The variables that measure interactions and peer influence reverse the findings in Table
3.5. This suggests that some of what the paper reports as peer influence may derive largely
from the choices of ’parent-countries’, or imitation of the patterns chosen by the former
colonial metropoles of countries that achieved independence after 1958. The conclusion to
the paper notes this caveat and suggests additional work in later work.
III.B Data
III.B.1 Data Sources
The bilateral aggregate trade data used by this paper is the CEPII gravity dataset. The
trade data was compiled from the IFS Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) Database by
Head et al (2010) and covers more than 200 countries and territories from 1948 to 2006.
This data set contains information on GDP and Population from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (WDI) (and national sources for Taiwan). It also has information
on legal origins, official languages, colonial relationships and regional trade agreements. The
data appendix of the Head et al paper provides further details and references for this gravity
dataset.
154
Table III.A.4: NYC Membership Hazard Estimates: Countries Eligible in 1958
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Government System
Parliamentary -1.420** -1.607** -1.360
(0.037) (0.048) (0.103)
Semi-Presidential -1.019 -0.887 -0.181
(0.155) (0.329) (0.858)
Presidential -0.847 -0.997 -0.907
(0.199) (0.213) (0.291)
Military Dictator -0.718 -1.020 -0.839
(0.278) (0.218) (0.329)
Civilian Dictator -0.458 -0.835 -0.707
(0.505) (0.324) (0.439)
Legal Origin
Germ./Scandinavian 1.234** 2.632*** 2.646***
(0.018) (0.000) (0.000)
Socialist 0.312 1.965*** 1.740***
(0.638) (0.001) (0.001)
Common Law 1.039* 2.622*** 2.605***
(0.580) (0.000) (0.000)
NYC Share of RTAs -1.015** -1.183*** -1.087***
(0.012) (0.005) (0.008)
NYC Share of Trade -0.728 -0.273 -0.784
(0.342) (0.731) (0.322)
Rauch Diff’d Share -1.749* -2.456*** -2.006**
(0.055) (0.007) (0.044)
Colonial Share 0.695 0.280 0.178
(0.540) (0.769) (0.879)
Constant 4.143*** 5.954*** 2.303*** 2.446*** 3.426***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1,664 1,507 1,681 1,507 1,507
Robust pval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The table reports estimates from a duration model, where the duration of interest is the lag between when a
country is eligible to when it joins the NYC or the data is censored. The time-varying covariates represent
country-year observations. Monarchy is the comparison category for government type that is not shown.
The reported categories are democracies – semi-Presidential and Presidential democracies, and dictator-
ships – military and civilian. Similarly, Civil Law as a legal origin category is the comparison category.
Rauch Share, is the fraction of a country’s trade in a particular year that belong to the Rauch differentiated
goods category. I use the liberal definition. Colonial Share is the fraction of imports and exports for a
country-year traded with former colonies or colonizers. NY C Trade Share is the fraction of imports and
exports for a country-year traded with NYC members. NY C RTAs is the fraction of a country’s RTA
partners that belong to the NYC in each year. The specification assumed an exponential form, i.e. constant
baseline hazard.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at
the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
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III.B.2 Explaining NYC Membership with RTA Membership
The increase in NYC membership coincided with the proliferation of trade agreements,
and the countries that joined those regional trade agreements (RTAs). Figure III.B.1 shows
the twin trend.
To support the assertion in the introduction that take up of the NYC was surprisingly
slow, given its benefits, Figure III.B.2 plots membership over time in the NYC side-by-side
with the WTO. Despite the obvious lack of a barrier to entry for the NYC, it only had 55
members in 1978, after two decades of its initiation. The comparable number for the WTO
is 75.
Given the stricter requirements for GATT/WTO membership, it should be clear from
the gap between GATT/WTO membership and NYC membership that initial take-up of
the latter was slow. At no time do the number of NYC members surpass the number of
GATT/WTO members. The WTO shows an initial surge in membership and the second
surge in membership in the sixties as more countries became treaty-eligible. The NYC does
not reflect such a pattern.
III.B.3 Trade with NYC members
Figure III.B.3 suggests that trade with other NYC members may not be the principal
incentive for countries to join the NYC. The left panel in the graph shows the year in which
each country joined the treaty on the horizontal axis, and the share of the joining country’s
trade that is with NYC members in the same year. Trade is the sum of exports and imports.
For comparison, a blank circle in each period shows NYC members’ share of trade for the
average non-member. If countries were joining the treaty because their trade partners were
in the treaty, then NYC members’ trade shares for joiners in each year should be higher than
the average for non-joiners.26
This is not the case, as shown in the right panel of the figure. For example, when China
(CHN) joined the NYC in 1987, members of the treaty provided about 65% of its imports
and exports. In the same year, 80% of the average non-member’s trade was with trade
partners like the US that were NYC members. If membership was motivated by trade, some
of the other non-members that traded more intensively with NYC partners should have
joined before China. In general, the gap between the trade shares of countries that joined,
26This is the intuition behind the semi-parametric linear rank estimator in the duration models of Robins
and Tsiatis (1992).
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The plot shows the number of NYC members in each year t as circles. The squares show the number of
corresponding number of countries belonging to at least one regional trade agreement (RTA).
Data Source: UNCITRAL (2014),Dűr et al. (2014)
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The plot shows the number of NYC members in each year t as circles. The triangles show the number of
corresponding number of countries belonging to the WTO in the same year.
Data Source: UNCITRAL (2014),WTO
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1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year of NYC membership
(a) The share of trade with NYC members (b) The gap between joiners in each year and other non-members
Data Source: UNCITRAL (2014)
and the average for countries that remained outside the NYC are almost evenly distributed
into negative and positive values.27
Figure III.B.4 relays the same idea differently, while considering two mechanisms – dis-
tance and trade. The left panel plots global average minimum distances to the set of countries
that are members of the NYC.28. The right panel plots averages of exports to NYC members
as a share of total exports.
The plot shows two averages in each year: one for countries that joined the NYC in a
particular year, and another for non-members that maintained the status quo. The graph
rests on the argument that if proximity-related incentives or mechanisms motivate joining the
NYC, then it should spread outwards stepwise on a map from its initial locations. Therefore
while the minimum distance to an NYC member should decrease globally over time, and
27The same applies to the US (USA) when it joined in 1970, less than 40% of its trade was with NYC
members, while trade with NYC members represented more than 60% for the average non-member. If trade
with other NYC members motivated participation, then most countries should be above the red line on
the right panel of the graph. Note that the figure is limited to countries that were eligible to join in 1958.
(Countries that became eligible after 1958 are not shown because the delay to NYC membership is not
comparable with those in the graph).









where Nt represents the number of joiners or non-joiners in year t, and NY Cj represents
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● Joined NYC in Year
Remained Outside NYC
(a)Minimum Distance to NYC Members (b) Share of Trade with NYC members
Note: The triangles represent average minimum distances to an NYC member (or exports to NYC members as a share of the total) for all countries
that remain non-members in a given year, the circles is the average for the set of countries that joined in that year.
Data Sources: Head et al. (2010),UNCITRAL (2014)
it should be on average lower for the countries that join in any given year. Similarly, the
trade linkages of NYC members to countries that join should be stronger than linkages to
the average non-member.
The plots do not suggest a dominant role for geographic or trade-driven participation.
Of the 47 years between 1959 and 2006, joiners were closer on average and traded more
with NYC members in 26 years and 17 years respectively. This is in comparison with other
countries in the same that remained non-members. As expected, average minimum distance
to an NYC member generally decreases over time, and average share of trade with NYC
members gradually approaches 100%. These suggest further inquiry into what motivates
participation in the treaty, or whether other variables moderate the effect of trade and
distance on treaty participation.
III.B.4 The US case
As the value of state relative to private enforcement increases, one expects domestic busi-
ness interests to increase pressure on the government for the extension of state enforcement to
international agreements. Less clear is why states might resist that pressure or delay action.
160
One explanation may be a general reluctance to subject domestic legal systems to outside
influences; as Trakman (1983: 42) observed, ‘National systems of law remain jealous of their
jurisdiction over world trade and hesitate to lose such business to foreign systems.’ Delays
may simple be due to the limited decision-making capacities of governments. Ratifying the
treaty requires reconciling the NYC with the domestic legal system on matters like time
limits for filing complaints, thresholds on the amount at stake, and grounds for refusal or
deferral of award enforcement.
The U.S. experience is illustrative. The U.S. participated in the 1958 conference that
established the New York Convention, but did not sign ‘because the American delegation
felt that certain provisions were in conflict with some of our domestic laws’ (Congressional
Report, 1970). Despite the urging of lawyers and businessmen for early and favorable action,
support from the American Bar Association, the American Arbitration Association, the
International Chamber of Commerce, the Departments of State and Justice, and the Bureau
of the Budget; and assurances that ‘so far as is known, there is no opposition to the bill,’ the
bill authorizing accession to the Convention did not arrive in the Senate until April 1968.
By a vote of 57 to 0, the Senate approved the NYC in October 1969, but the decision
was made to defer ‘depositing the instrument of accession’ until legislation modifying the
chapter of the United States Code containing the United States Arbitration Act could be
enacted. Asked why it took another four months (to February 1970) for the implementing
legislation to be submitted, the State Department explained that an advisory committee on
private international law in the State Department suggested changes to the approach for
incorporating the convention into the US legal code. The treaty eventually went into effect
in September 1970.
III.C NYC Membership’s Effect on Trade
As expected, Figure III.C.1 shows that trade growth on joining the New York Convention
is mostly concentrated on the extensive margin. Trade tends to grow for most countries at
average rates between 5 and 10%, with most of the growth coming from exports or imports
that repeated product-country linkages from the previous year (i.e. the intensive margin).
Growth due to any combination of new products or destinations is usually indistinguishable
from zero, according to the left panel of the figure.
However the extensive margin experienced a statistically significant leap in the year
that the NYC came into force, (for the countries that joined the NYC). Growth rates were
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years before and after NYC
(a) Growth Rate for Trade at the Extensive Margin (b) Growth Rate for Trade at the Intensive Margin
The extensive margin represents trade in a combination of SITC product category and country that was new a country in a
given year, e.g. in the first year the US exports computers to China, that trade contributes to the extensive margin. The
intensive margin includes changes from the previous year’s non-zero level of trade.
Data Source: UNCITRAL (2014);Feenstra et al. (2005)
averaged for all countries that joined, with each country’s year of entry taken as the reference
- or year zero. The graph was prepared using data from Feenstra et al. (2005), which shows
trade between countries at the SITC4 product level. The extensive margin here represents
a combination of a product and country that was new in a given year. In other words,
several new trade relationships tend to coincide with NYC participation. The growth at
the extensive margin does not dip significantly below zero in the following year, suggesting
that this one-time jump in new export relationships adds to cumulative trade growth. The
right panel of the figure confirms the stylized fact that most trade growth is on the intensive
margin, but this margin does not react systematically to NYC membership in this assessment.
That said, the data suggests that growth at the intensive margin is higher on average for
the years after NYC accession.
III.D The NYC Membership Curve is S-Shaped
The next few paragraphs settle questions about the shape of the curve in Figures 3.1 and
3.2. Generally, the true curve could be a straight line, a convex form with monotonically
increasing slope or a concave form with monotonically decreasing slope. Otherwise, the sign
of the slope changes at some point like an S-curve, for which the slope first increases before
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decreasing.
To formally show that the curve is S-shaped beyond the statistical margin of error,
Figure III.D.1 plots the relative hazard rate of joining over time.29 The relative hazard
rate represents the number of countries that join in each period relative to the interaction
between members and non-members, (nt+1−nt)N
nt(N−nt) . A plot of this ratio should be flat if the
membership curve was a straight line, always sloping downwards with a concave membership
curve and always sloping upwards with a convex membership curve. The figure shows a ratio
that first dips and increases in later years; supporting the paper’s claims of diffusion through
interactions.30
I add a cubic spline to the graph. The signs of the splines’ first coefficients are in
opposite. The statistical significance of these opposite-signed estimates, which fit the data
closely, suggest that the curve is indeed S-shaped beyond the statistical margins of error.
29Young (2009) takes the same approach to showing the pattern of hybrid corn adoption by farmers is
S-shaped.
30 The relative hazard rate would not change with time if membership was unrelated to the number of
non-members or their interactions with members. It would be consistently non-decreasing(non-increasing) if
membership was only motivated by the non-decreasing(non-increasing) fraction of countries that are members
(non-members).
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The relative hazard rate Ht = (nt+1 − nt)N/nt(N − nt) describes the ratio of new members to interactions
between members and non-members over time. The cubic spline equation is: Ht = α0+α1t+α2t
2+α3t
3+εt






Data Source: UNCITRAL (2014)
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